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Is open-mindedness necessary for intellectual well-being in education? To 
answer this question this thesis draws on Aristotle‟s virtue ethics and virtue 
epistemology. It is argued that in order to understand eudaimonia (well-being) it is 
necessary to understand phronesis. In this regard, it is implied that in order to 
understand well-being, it is necessary to understand virtue, thus, well-being needs 
virtue(s). Just as Aristotelian virtue ethics defends the necessity of virtue(s) for well-
being, virtue epistemology defends the priority of intellectual virtues for intellectual 
well-being. Unlike epistemology, virtue epistemology focuses on how an individual 
can be a good informant through the cultivation of intellectual virtues. To this end, 
this thesis proposes an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology for 
intellectual well-being in education. In this context, open-mindedness is examined as 
an intellectual virtue that secures and facilitates other virtues both for individual and 
collective well-being in education. Bringing together White‟s and Nussbaum‟s 
seemingly opposed approaches to well-being, this thesis argues that a better theory of 
well-being in education must be one that equally combines a collective subjective 
major-informed desire theory with an individual objective list account of well-being. 
This account of well-being implies a certain understanding of intellectual open-
mindedness. Drawing on Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s novel ideas of „secure‟ and „fertile 
functioning‟ as well as on Roberts‟ and Wood‟s „intellectual functionings‟, this thesis 
proposes a genuine intellectual open-mindedness that is both well-informed, 
reasonable, and necessary to „secure‟ and „fertile‟ „intellectual functionings‟ for 
intellectual well-being in education. Throughout the discussion, the thesis asserts that 
particular attention needs to be paid to the well-being of student teachers. Although it 
is widely accepted that pupils‟ well-being is important, less attention has been given 
to teachers‟ well-being. This thesis argues that teachers‟ and pupils‟ well-being is 
inextricably connected and initial teacher education should focus on student teachers‟ 
intellectual well-being as they constitute the future teaching workforce. The 
implications of how this account of well-being might inform Scottish initial teacher 






This thesis attempts to explore the significance of intellectual well-being in 
education with a particular focus on the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness. It 
begins from the general position that well-being needs virtue(s) and then focuses on 
the concept of intellectual well-being that gives intellectual virtues a primary role as 
presented in recent epistemological discussions. In this context, it argues that open-
mindedness can play a crucial role, because it is a virtue that secures and facilitates 
all other virtues and thus leads to well-being. Moreover, this thesis examines the 
concept of well-being in education and mainly focuses on the best known distinction 
of well-being in education as subjective or objective. It argues that a better theory of 
well-being in education equally values the subjective and the objective factor. It also 
argues that well-being in education is significant both from an individual point of 
view, and a collective point of view, since education is social by definition and thus, 
an individual approach would be insufficient. In this regard, the thesis specifically 
addresses a gap in Scottish initial teacher education programmes as it explicitly 
focuses on student teachers‟ well-being, an under addressed area of the research on 
well-being. In addition to this, the thesis argues for extending Scottish initial teacher 
education‟s focus on student teachers as (future) professionals. It is argued that in 
teaching, unlike other professions, it is not possible to separate the professional from 
the personal that is from what kind of person one is. Therefore, here, it is suggested 
that a specific focus of initial teacher education on student teachers as individuals 
that are intellectually flourishing and particularly open-minded is necessary both for 
themselves and for others. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion on how this 
account of student teachers‟ intellectual well-being with a particular focus on the 
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I owe to my parents to zein (life) and to my teacher to eu zein (well-being). 
(Alexander the Great, in Diogenes Laertius, 1925) 
 
1.1 Background 
This phrase, that Alexander the Great was quoted as saying, epitomizes the 
role of teachers and education in helping pupils live a life worth living. However, 
what does well-being (thereafter WB) consist in? Is it, for example, wealth, pleasure, 
fame, among the most popular, that make a life worthwhile when one‟s basic needs, 
such as food and shelter, are met? In this thesis, my understanding of WB is different 
and it is based upon an understanding of virtue(s). Although my teachers were not as 
famous as Aristotle, they gave me a good life, because their virtuous life cultivated 
the ground and broadened my horizons so that I could aim at a life worth living, a 
virtuous life, and, in this sense, every day is a work in progress, and being a parent 
and a teacher myself, I want to help both children and teachers to live a good life. 
Nowadays, at a time of urgent human problems and unjustifiable growing human 
inequalities all over the world, there is an increasing interest in the concept of WB, 
particularly as an educational and social ideal (White, 2011) (Nussbaum, 2011). 
However, I argue that most of the problems are related to a misleading or insufficient 
understanding of WB both individually and collectively.  
Here, I specifically focus on teachers and teaching, because I show that 
teachers‟ and pupils‟ WB are inextricably connected, therefore, an equal emphasis 
should be placed on both. However, I argue that there is a gap in teacher education, 
because it over-emphasizes pupils‟ WB and overlooks the significance of teachers‟ 
WB, both for teachers‟ own and then for pupils‟ WB. Additionally, I show that 
teacher education shows a one-sided interest in teachers as professional agents only. 
2 
 
However, I argue that in teaching, unlike other professions, it is not possible to 
separate the personal from the professional and both aspects are equally important 
for teachers‟ overall WB, which is inseparably connected to pupils‟ WB.  
To this end, I focus here on an account of WB that relies on a particular 
account of virtue(s), and then I argue that it is really one virtue that everyone has to 
have, that is, open-mindedness (thereafter OM). In particular, I draw a parallel to say 
that OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues and, therefore it facilitates the 
acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB. In this sense, 
this thesis brings the concept of OM into the concept of WB and contributes both to 
what we mean by WB and to what we mean by OM.  
In this context, I look at an account of WB that relies on an account of 
virtue(s) and argue that OM is a necessary concept if we want to know about what 
WB means. To this end, I draw on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics, because that 
connection itself is related to Aristotle as he connects the concepts of WB and virtue. 
In addition, I look at contemporary virtue epistemology which focuses more on 
intellectual WB and connects that to epistemic virtue(s). In this way, I bring Aristotle 
and virtue epistemology together as a background to what I believe an account of 
WB that requires an account of virtue(s) means. I then focus on WB discourse in 
education. In particular, I examine White‟s subjective-collective account of WB and 
Nussbaum‟s objective-individual account of WB. Additionally, I explore Wolff‟s and 
De-Shalit‟s concept of WB, which, although it is widely considered to be a 
development of the CA, there are differences that are relevant here. Last but not 
least, I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the link between all 
those different discourses examined so far that use different terminology. 
Specifically, I argue that the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both 
“reasonable” and “well-informed” is necessary for teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile” 
“intellectual functionings”, i.e. epistemic WB, both for themselves and for pupils‟ 
WB. Hence, before breaking down the argument of the thesis, let me explain, in the 




1.2 Why Teachers’ Well-being Matters 
The demand for education quality and particularly teacher quality is almost a 
platitude. In this regard, there is much discussion about teacher quality, but less 
discussion, if any at all, about teacher quality in terms of teachers‟ WB. This is rather 
paradoxical and I now attempt to explain why. First, very briefly, I look at the idea of 
quality and quality in education. Then, I focus on the demand for teacher quality and 
the fact that high-quality teachers are greatly and positively associated with pupils‟ 
WB. In this context, I argue that in order to have high-quality teachers we have to 
aim at teachers‟ WB and particularly at an account of WB that requires an account of 
virtue(s).  
Nowadays, as Day and Gu (2010) notice, there is growing and continuing 
concern on the part of governments worldwide about teachers and teacher education 
quality, raising standards and pupils‟ WB. However, although this goal is always 
stressed in educational institutions at every level, what exactly it means is far from 
clear. Quality is a multidimensional and slippery concept both theoretically and 
practically, and thus it is very difficult to define (Garvin, 1998). Aristotle, in his 
Categories, where he classifies basic types of entity, uses the term/category of 
quality to show what is distinctive of a thing (Studtmann, 2013). According to Peters 
(1977), a more general use is developed nowadays, with which we are more familiar. 
Specifically, quality in a normative sense is related to superiority in elements that are 
regarded as distinctive about the thing in question. For instance, “quality in a knife 
usually relates to its capacity for cutting” (Peters, 1977, p. 24). However, when we 
talk about quality in education generally and teacher education in particular, multiple 
criteria are necessarily involved. 
In Scotland, for example, Donaldson (2011), in the major five ideas which 
underpin his recommendations about teacher education, suggests that “firstly, the 
quality of teaching and secondly, the quality of leadership are the two most important 
ways in which school education can realize the high aspirations Scotland has for its 
young people” (ibid, 2011, p. 2). Although from a different point of view, the 
English Department for Education (2014) also emphasizes the need to raise the 
quality of teacher training, teaching and school leadership, and the European 
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Commission (2007) states that teacher training programmes “must be capable of 
providing high quality teaching in order to enable European citizens to acquire the 
knowledge and skills which they will need in their personal and professional lives.”   
It is a widely-held view that the basic criterion that determines teacher 
education quality is its contribution to pupils‟ achievement and overall WB. 
“Research shows that a great difference can be made to children and young people‟s 
accomplishment by high-quality teachers in comparison to those who are not” (Day 
and Gu, 2010, p. 5). To give an example, high-quality teachers are usually 
considered to be those who, among other things, are distinguished for resilience, 
lifelong learning, subject knowledge skills etc. The European Commission (2007) 
and OECD (2005) additionally note that, according to research reports, teacher 
quality is crucial for pupils‟ learning and is essentially and positively associated with 
pupils‟ achievements. Likewise, Donaldson highlights that “high quality people 
achieve high quality outcomes for children” (2011, p. 2). Moreover, the McKinsey 
report (cited by Malm, 2009, p. 78) underlines the fact that “the basic driver of the 
variation in pupils‟ learning in school is teachers and that even in good school 
systems students do not progress… because they are not exposed to teachers of 
sufficient quality.” Therefore, it is implied that the basic goal of teacher education is 
the formation of high-quality teachers and the main criterion for high-quality 
teachers is their contribution to pupils‟ WB. In this sense, teaching can be considered 
as a helping profession. 
However, the above criterion seems paradoxical and incomplete, because “if 
teaching is considered as a helping profession”, since it aims at helping children, and, 
“if helping means merely help others and not oneself”, as it seems to be in the case of 
teaching, “then teaching is not a helping profession” (Higgins, 2011, p. 3). In other 
words, if teaching is a helping profession, then it also has to help teachers to express 
their deepest motivations and personal ambitions.  
Particularly in teaching, unlike other helping professions, e.g. surgeons, it is 
impossible to separate teachers' self-fulfillment from their professional 
commitments, because teachers are to a large extent professionally concerned with 
the transformation of persons (pupils) and the transmission of a life worth living, 
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therefore it is a normal expectation that this is exhibited by those who hold it (Carr, 
1993) (Higgins, 2011). Similarly, Day and Gu (2010) emphasize that “who teachers 
are as persons cannot and should not be separated from who they are and what they 
do as professionals
1
” (ibid, 2010, p. 5). Malm (2009) also says that it is unnatural and 
meaningless to separate teachers‟ professional and personal lives. In addition, 
Griffiths and Tann (1992) argue that teachers‟ personal theories, that is who they are, 
should be valued and encouraged to be revealed so that they can be challenged by 
public theories, then confirmed or rebuilt into practice and thus, “increase the 
effectiveness of their own professional thinking” (ibid, 1992, p. 82). The educational 
life as it really is involves  
“actions and efforts of thousands of people, all of whom are devoting a considerable 
part of their lives to it… they find that their own lives are changed by the efforts they 
are making and each of their individual selves change and are changed by both 
small and large scale educational developments” (Griffiths, 1993, p. 151) 
Besides, Baehr (2013) argues that many teachers follow the profession 
because they consider teaching to be purposeful work that can give important 
meaning to their personal and professional lives and that “a worthy educational aim 
should make sense of the putative purpose and meaning of teaching and learning” 
(ibid, 2013, p. 253). In this regard, setting teachers‟ WB as a goal of teacher 
education programmes contributes to a better understanding of the purpose and 
meaning of teaching and learning themselves. Along the same lines, Hansen (2007) 
suggests that teacher education should operate between two boundaries, that is, “a 
professional, evidence-based track of what does work and an existential-normative 
track of how teachers understand themselves in what they are saying and doing” 
(ibid, 2007, p. 3). 
Donaldson (2011, p. 2) also recognizes that “teaching should be seen as both 
complex and challenging”. And Day and Gu (2014) observe that teaching is a multi-
layered relational context both of teachers‟ work and of their life and when it is 
perceived as such, it can produce collective intellectual and emotional excellence for 
job fulfilment. Additionally, Hamilton (2014) argues that being a teacher is “a 
                                                 
1
 It is teachers‟ professional duty to contribute to children‟s achievement and WB among other things. 
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complex and multi-faceted role” (ibid, 2014, p. 1) that involves both their personal 
and professional life and that subject knowledge is a vital characteristic in successful 
teaching, but it is not sufficient for teaching education needs which also involve 
knowledge and understanding about “what it is to be an educator” and a “teacher 
training that is sustained throughout teachers‟ working lives” (ibid, 2014, p. 4). In 
BERA (2014) the idea that being a teacher combines many practical, theoretical, 
technical skills etc. and that any narrow or simplified view should be avoided is 
emphasized, as well as the need for a systematic and coherent approach in teacher 
education (ibid, 2014, p. 8).  
Also, teacher education should not only be about how to teach, but about 
learning how to learn through teaching and about developing practical wisdom 
(Higgins, 2011). Hence, as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, I argue 
that teacher education should be something “educative that facilitates teachers' 
flourishing” (ibid, 2011, p. 256).  In this sense, I argue that teacher education 
programmes overlook a crucial factor in terms of quality achievement, which is 
teachers‟ WB. In other words, if we want high-quality teachers who make a 
difference to pupils‟ WB, it is necessary to value both the personal and the 
professional life of teachers, their WB overall, because pupils‟ and teachers‟ WB are 
inextricably connected.  
In this context, I argue for an account of teachers‟ WB that relies upon an 
account of virtue(s), and particularly on OM. In specific, I try to define the concept 
of WB and in order to define WB, I look at the concept of virtue(s) and at what OM 
means in particular, because I argue that WB and OM are connected. In particular, I 
argue that OM is a concept and a way of being that is necessary, in terms of 
conceptual clarification, if we want to know what WB is. I draw a parallel to say that 
OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, and therefore it facilitates the acquisition 
of teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings”, that is, OM facilitates 
both teachers‟ and their pupils‟ epistemic WB. Finally, I argue that a way to achieve 
teachers‟ WB is by focusing on their WB early, before they become teachers, 
particularly in initial teacher education programmes, which is the early foundation 
for high-quality teachers.  
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Although we might agree in theory that teachers‟ WB matters, in the next 
section I argue that there are at least two factors, i.e. wealth and power, that have 
significant negative impact on teachers‟ WB in practice and in turn on pupils‟ WB. 
In fact, it is almost a truism that teachers work in difficult and/or bad conditions and 
many people agree that this is negative and that much more attention and help should 
be given to them. However, what may not be so obvious is that profit-seeking 
(wealth) and political power are two factors that can involve the notion of corruption, 
which entails impairment of virtue(s), therefore, wealth and power become part of a 
“corrosive disadvantage” to teachers that over time increasingly hinder teachers‟ 
ability to be good teachers because they negatively affect their WB and then, 
unavoidably, hinder pupils‟ WB, since they are inseparably connected as I argued 
earlier. 
1.3 Threats to Teachers’ Well-being: Profit-seeking and Political Power  
To be more specific, it is necessary to clarify what profit-seeking and political 
power
2
 stand for in this chapter. The former relates to economic benefits as an 
essential aim, whilst the latter concerns governmental interventions and political 
expediencies, which are totally different from Aristotle‟s perception of politics as the 
development of virtue(s). Generally, if wealth and power by definition encompass 
the dynamic of corruption, as Girling (1997) argues, and if by corruption we 
basically and generally mean the impairment of virtue in terms of changing from 
good to bad and doing wrong (Merriam-Webster dictionary, 2014), unrighteousness 
and wrongdoing (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), or bad as opposed to good (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2014), then profit-seeking and political power constitute two dynamic 
factors that entail corruption and thus destroy virtue(s). In this sense, they 
unavoidably also destroy WB since the account of WB that this thesis argues for is 
based on an account of virtues. In particular, Girling (1997) observes that 
“Corruption is the illegitimate reminder of the values of the market place that 
everything can be bought and sold, which in the age of capitalism increasingly, even 
legitimately, permeate political and social spheres… Corruption is the symptom, not 
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the disease. The disease is the predicament of our time: the frustrated popular 
yearning for the good society” (Girling, 1997, p. ix). 
We can see ways of how profit-seeking and political power are involved with 
one another and with formal education and how these relationships negatively affect 
teachers‟ WB that is based on virtue(s). Peters (1977) argues that politicians and 
economists may tend to look on educational institutions and programmes in an 
instrumental way, because they are particularly interested in achieving the right 
amount of effectively trained workforce. From this point of view, quality in 
education differs greatly from quality in the context of WB and virtues as examined 
by this thesis that equally values individual and collective WB, because it is only 
related to its instrumental value, i.e. the ability to provide training relative to the 
places to be occupied and the ability to select the right workforce for these places 
(Peters, 1977). In this sense, the merely instrumental view of education, and 
accordingly of teacher education as a vital part of education in general, that 
politicians and economists tend to adopt, results in a mere concern about posts to be 
filled to which the workforce must be adjusted.  
Similarly, Macfarlane (2012) observes that “in this brave new world values 
are threatened, students have become customers and lecturers are treated as service 
providers and knowledge entrepreneurs” (ibid, 2012, p. 578). Therefore, there is a 
need for direct influence on the part of philosophers of education through 
“participation in policy and parliamentary committees, in think-tanks and lobbying 
groups” as well as partnerships across all sectors of educational research 
(Macfarlane, 2012, p. 578). What is worrying, according to Biesta (2012), is not so 
much the idea of teachers‟ professional development per se, but the fact that it is 
viewed unilaterally in terms of technical skills and scientific knowledge, which in 
turn monopolize the theory and practice of teaching and teacher education. To give 
an example, in the communication of the European Commission Improving the 
Quality of Teacher Education (2007), as well as in the OECD report Teachers 
Matter: Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers (2005), we find an 
exclusive focus on teachers‟ development concerning subject-knowledge and skills 
in order to be competitive in labour markets. No other alternatives, visions or 
suggestions are implied or proposed at all. 
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In this sense, these reports appear to articulate and promote one dominant 
way of thinking and doing in teaching and teacher education, i.e. to achieve high 
scores in international league tables and measurements, which appears to be 
interconnected with profit-seeking and political power. In particular, Papastephanou 
and Roth (2012) note that “the idea seems to be that standardization and testing… to 
underpin competition… will improve the quality of education” including teacher 
education (ibid, 2012, p. 188). However, “the suggested connection between 
competition and improved quality of education is not necessarily true or correct… it 
is likely a political vision that highlights the need and value of making the 
relationship between education and the job market stronger” (Papastephanou and 
Roth, 2012, p. 188). Any other alternative ways and/or views run the risk either of 
“being left behind” or of “ending up at the bottom end of the league table” (Biesta, 
2012 p. 9). However, the concept of change, which is a sine qua non in education, by 
definition encompasses, among other things, the element of the unexplored, and thus 
it entails risk(s). As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue, however, not all risks are bad.  
As I elaborate in Chapter 5, there are particular kinds of “risk(s)” that are 
embedded in the concept of “disadvantage” which works against WB. In this context, 
I argue that profit-seeking and political power form a part of such “corrosive 
disadvantage” to the particular account of teachers‟ WB that is based on virtue(s) and 
then to pupils‟ WB. Also, the notion of standardized-mindedness that I introduce in 
Chapter 6, unlike OM, is related to people who uncritically align themselves with 
such dominant yet “corrosive” standards in teaching and education in general. From 
another point of view, BERA (2014) stresses the significance of dialogue and of 
taking reciprocal risks in terms of giving teachers the opportunity to learn and 
explore why things work or do not work in several contexts. In this regard, I argue 
that the virtue of OM can play a crucial role, as it by definition entails, among other 
things, a serious engagement in dialogue, and helps one to be resilient and adaptable 
(Hare, 2006). 
Furthermore, Griffiths (personal communication, April 2014) emphasizes that 
national policies are significantly influenced and constrained by global trends, 
especially globalization and neo-liberalism, which seem to be the whole or part of 
the „disease‟ because of their explicit connections to profit-seeking and political 
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power, and teacher education does not constitute an exemption. Oancea and Orchard 
(2012) also note that typically philosophical concerns such as “what knowledge, 
values, dispositions and skills do teachers need to educate others well? Do teachers 
need to be good people, and if so, in what sense? How can teacher education and 
policy help foster and develop these abilities and the conditions in which they can be 
exercised?” remain rather unexplored in policy debates about teacher education (ibid, 
2012, p. 580). Likewise, Biesta (2012) argues that the key question in teacher 
education should be “how to become educationally wise”, not how to become 
scientifically competent and skilled at the top of worldwide league tables through 
testing and measurements (ibid, 2012, p. 8). He also notes that governments should 
not “turn their attention to teacher education in order to establish total control over 
the educational system”, but they should specifically focus on the formation of the 
entire individual towards educational wisdom (Biesta, 2012, p. 8).  
For example, in Scotland, as well as in most parts of Europe nowadays, 
unlike England and the USA, the provision of teacher education is mainly and 
increasingly undertaken by the university sector
3
 (Menter, 2011) (Hulme and Menter, 
2011) (O‟Brien, 2012) (Menter, Brisard and Smith, 2006) (BERA, 2014). 
Specifically, Donaldson (2011) stresses the significance of research-oriented 
professional skills and knowledge in teaching. He also argues that “the school 
experience should be designed along with the university experience to allow 
reflection on practice and its interpretation in ways which bring theoretical and 
research perspectives to bear in relation to actual experience” (Donaldson, 2011, p. 
7). Moreover, Oancea and Orchard (2012) highlight the need for teacher education 
                                                 
3
 Unlike others who are strongly dissatisfied with the university-based component of teacher training 
(e.g. Woodhead cited in Oancea, 2014) or situations where the “value of research in teacher education 
has diminished over years” (BERA, 2014, p. 6), I am in favour of the taking up of teacher education 
by universities, because higher institutions (should) provide overall higher quality. Besides, there is 
much debate relating to research v. practice, practical knowledge v. academic knowledge etc. 
(Oancea, 2014). In my view, all kinds of teachers, i.e. teachers, student teachers and teacher educators, 
should share most of the characteristics of their training. However, due to the particular nature of their 
working environments, teacher educators should be more research-oriented and less school-practising, 
whilst teachers should perhaps be more school-practising and less research-oriented (Edmond and 
Hayler, 2013) and student teachers should be somewhere in the middle as they are neither qualified 
teachers (yet) - though learning to be them - nor teacher educators. However, I believe that anyone 
should be in a position to experience and have an understanding of the different working 
environments and particular elements, so as to be realistic and adaptable to change, as change is 
intertwined with education environments (Kosnik, Cleovoulou, Fletcher, Harris, MacGlynn-Stewart 
and Beck, 2011). 
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partnership models. Similarly, Donaldson (2011) talks about “joint appointments 
between schools and universities… i.e. hub school partnerships… that should be 
pursued with research as an integral part… rather than as something which sits apart” 
(ibid, 2011, p. 8). The idea of partnerships is quite significant in social terms, 
because, although it maintains a distance from a mere individualistic perspective, it 
values, as this thesis does, the importance of collective factor(s) for WB in education, 
without in any way overlooking individuals. However, the “universitisation of 
teacher education” (Menter et al., 2006, p. 78) and its practical turn through the focus 
on research development and the establishment of standards (Furlong and Lawn, 
2010) may have led to Scottish teacher education “struggling to survive within the 
competitive environment of the modern university” (Menter, 2011, p. 297) (Christie, 
2008).  
In particular, Pring (1998 cited by Oancea, 2014) implies that universities 
seem to be under attack from government(s) which aim(s) at taking over control of 
teacher education. Likewise, Humes (2011) notes that “teacher education institutions 
in Scotland… when told to jump by government, they simply ask, how high?” (ibid, 
2011, p. 9). In contrast to this, Oancea (2014) suggests that all teachers should be 
“powerful participants in constructing the publicly visible accounts of their 
professional knowledge, its nature and significance and the best ways to cultivate it” 
(ibid, 2014, p. 7). From my perspective, neither the focus on research excellence nor 
the introduction of standards in teacher education is reprehensible. Perhaps they are 
symptoms of  
“either increased managerialism in higher education across the UK… and an effort 
to raise institutions‟ positions in international league tables or both research 
excellence and standards aim at the flourishing of teaching profession and of its 
leadership… in an increasingly fast-changing, complex and challenging national and 
global environment” (Menter, 2011, p. 295) (Donaldson, 2011, p. 82) 
Also, indicative of the current status of financial-oriented education is PISA‟s 
Results on Students and Money Report (2012), in which pupils‟ performance in 
financial literacy and their access to money are examined as well as their experience 
with financial issues. In this regard, the former tends to prevail over the latter and 
12 
 
this is unsurprising, if “competitiveness” and “managerialism”, among other market 
environment terms at whose heart lie profit-seeking and political power, are used to 
describe the aims and objectives of educational institutions and teacher education in 
particular.  
Additionally, according to the Universities Scotland report (2014), 51% of 
the income of Scottish higher education institutions in 2006 came from core public 
funding, i.e. the Scottish Government was the majority shareholder of university 
funding, which unavoidably involves political interests and motives. Particularly, 
Sinclair Goodlad (cited by Macfarlane, 2012) identified sponsorism as one of the 
heresies of academic life. Likewise, Grant and Zeichner (1984) argue that “there is 
not such a thing as a neutral educational activity” as it is necessarily linked to the 
external economic, political and social order (ibid, 1984, p. 112). In the 1970s 
funding for universities was 80% public and only 20% came from other sources. 
Nowadays, almost half of institutions funding comes from tuition fees, research 
contracts and consultancy. (Universities Scotland Report, 2014). However, as 
O‟Brien (2012) stresses “at a time of recession, finance may prove the ultimate 
stumbling block to the implementation of any proposed reform in education” (ibid, 
2012, p. 46). Similarly, I argue that profit and political power are not only 
“stumbling blocks” but part of a “corrosive disadvantage” which increasingly hinder 
teachers‟ ability to be good teachers because it has “corrosive” negative effects on 
their WB and then on pupils‟ WB.  
Although, as I argue, profit-seeking and political power appear to be part of a 
“corrosive disadvantage” to teachers‟ WB, suggesting a prohibition of their 
involvement in teacher education and in education generally would, I think, be 
unrealistic. Hence, if markets and state represent profit-seeking and political power, 
we can say that the more they are involved in teacher education, the more they hinder 
teachers‟ WB that is based on an account of virtue(s). Having said that, I do not 
suggest that the market and the state should not be involved in teacher education at 
all, because from another point of view, state funding is necessary for sustaining and 
developing teacher education programmes and political involvement is inevitable if a 
goal of education is the formation of good citizens. However, I think it is necessary 
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and realistic that their involvement be subject to conditions and control, so that they 
do not impede teachers‟ and then pupils‟ WB. 
From another point of view, teachers‟ WB is not only highly and positively 
associated with pupils‟ WB, but it can also contribute to the economy and prosperity 
of a nation generally (Griffiths, personal communication, April 2014). Similarly, 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) imply that the more one gets from one‟s education the 
more one gives and takes “advantage of a growing economy” (ibid, 2007, p. 144). In 
this regard, the more teachers get from teacher education programmes, the more they 
can contribute to the economy and national prosperity, and thus everyone, 
individually and collectively, can flourish. Especially nowadays, the economy and 
politics are equally accountable for the determination and achievement of 
educational goals, because they either facilitate the ground towards WB or, by being 
part of a “corrosive disadvantage” in the case of profit-seeking and political power, 
as argued above, they hinder teachers‟ WB both individually and socially. Hence, 
nowadays, when voices such as those who proclaim that “the persistence and 
expectation of peace is responsible for slow-growth… and a focus on war improves a 
nation‟s longer-run prospects” (Leonhardt, 2014) become increasingly popular, the 
significance of an account of WB that is based on an account of virtue(s) and equally 
values both individual and collective WB, as I argue in this thesis, seems timely and 
urgent.  
1.4 Chapter Aims 
So far, on the one hand, I have argued that teachers‟ WB matters because it is 
inseparably intertwined with pupils‟ WB and also, it necessarily consists in both their 
personal and their professional life. On the other hand, I have argued that profit-
seeking and political power are part of a “corrosive disadvantage”, since over time 
they are two factors that increasingly hinder teachers‟ ability to be good teachers 
because they negatively affect their WB and in turn pupils‟ WB. In this section, I will 
show how the argument unfolds within each chapter. As I previously said, my 
understanding of WB relies on a particular understanding of virtue(s). In order to 
make the connection between WB and virtue(s), first, I draw upon Aristotle‟s 
Nicomachean Ethics. Second, I rely on virtue epistemology (thereafter VEP) because 
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VEP specifically focuses on intellectual WB and connects that to intellectual 
virtue(s). In this regard, I am bringing the ancient Aristotelian virtue ethics and the 
contemporary VEP together as a background to what I think of as an account of WB 
that requires a particular account of virtue(s). In the VEP context, I imply that OM, 
in particular, is an intellectual virtue necessary, in terms of conceptual clarification, 
for intellectual WB, because it facilitates all other virtues, therefore, it facilitates 
“secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” that is epistemic WB. This, 
however, becomes obvious when I put it in the context of WB discourse in 
education, and then OM becomes the link between these different discourses which 
use different terminology. Thus, let me explain how the argument unfolds in the 
chapters of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, in order to make the connection between WB and virtue(s), I 
look at the Nicomachean Ethics, since this connection in itself is related to Aristotle. 
Aristotle‟s aim is the determination of arete (virtue) and agathon (good) as the 
means to accomplish the highest of all goods achievable by action, i.e. eudaimonia 
(WB) (Kraut, 2014). In this regard, he proceeds by considering what is ultimately 
essential to humans, i.e. WB, and explores ways that the answers can be found, 
specifically through the examination of the concept of virtue. 
According to Aristotle, eudaimonia (WB) consists in the activity of the 
rational part of human beings‟ psyche (soul) in accordance with arete (virtue). As 
Aristotle claims, the most characteristic good of human beings is their capacity to use 
reason and to use reason well, i.e. in accordance with virtue, in a lifetime; this is 
what WB consists in. Virtue is necessary in order to do anything well and it means 
human goodness and excellence of any kind (Liddell and Scott, 2011) and is what 
makes a human being good (Barnes, 2000). However, Aristotle does not exactly 
identify WB with virtue; he argues that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” 
(Aristotle, NE 1098b31). If WB means to live well during one‟s entire life, this in 
turn means not just being in a certain state, but also acting in a certain way. 
Therefore, WB appears to be a virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities 
appear as the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational
4
 part of human 
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 The part of the soul where the ability to reason belongs. 
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beings‟ soul. Aristotle maintains that engagement in virtue(s) entails participation in 
WB and vice versa. 
Aristotle claims that most people cannot be entirely mistaken, therefore he 
starts his investigation by looking at endoxa, i.e. any received opinions which are 
held by everyone or at least by most people, as well as those held by the wise, and 
then he critically assesses these views. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of human 
activity, namely (i) theoria, i.e. contemplative activity (Aristotle, NE 1177a17), (ii) 
praxis, i.e. activity related to matters of human conduct such as ethics and politics 
(Aristotle, NE 1178a10) and (iii) poiesis, i.e. productive activity and argues that 
praxis is the best human activity, a kind of WB that, unlike poiesis and theoria, is 
both virtuous and feasible.  
In particular, praxis is human activity in the realm of the contingent, which 
we seek to affect by our actions (Knight, 2007), and it focuses on virtuous action that 
contributes directly to one‟s own WB rather than serving ends determined by others. 
It is “a life of informed, virtuous activity that encompasses specific criteria such as 
both the individual‟s and others‟ WB” (Siegler, 1967, p. 31). Additionally, according 
to Aristotle, praxis is the “life in accordance with the other kind of virtue” (Aristotle, 
NE 1178a9-10). Particularly, according to a widely-held view, this virtue is 
phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom, which is the highest virtue of the mind when one 
deals with practical issues (Hughes, 2001). Therefore, in order to understand 
eudaimonia (WB) it is necessary to understand phronesis (virtue). Also, Aristotle 
argues that virtue reveals itself in action, however, virtue is not found in the action 
itself, but in the agent, thus, an action is not virtuous in its own right but due to the 
agent who performs it. 
Moreover, Aristotle describes arete (virtue) as hexis, i.e. as a state of 
character  which involves one‟s dispositions in relation to what one feels, how one 
thinks and reacts, what choices one makes and what actions one performs and all 
these in different situations (Aristotle, NE 1105b19) (Aristotle, NE 1106a12) 
(Lacewing, 2016). Similarly, the virtue of OM here is mainly considered to be a 
character trait of this kind. However, Aristotle says that it is also necessary to clarify 
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what sort of state of character virtue is (Aristotle, NE 1106a14-15). To this end, he 
looks into the concept of meson, i.e. the doctrine of the mean. 
Aristotle argues that “virtue is a kind of mesotes, since virtue aims at what 
meson is” (Aristotle, NE 1106b29) and elsewhere that “meson preserves the 
goodness” (Aristotle, NE 1106b12). Specifically, meson is “to feel at the right times, 
with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, 
and in the right way, what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of 
virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). This implies that the concept of meson is 
inextricably connected with the concept of virtue. Open-mindedness, as I argue in 
this thesis, is a virtue, therefore, OM, among others, is related to the concept meson. 
Specifically, if OM consists in the “willingness and within limits ability to transcend 
a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a 
distinct cognitive standpoint and… when it is necessary to adjust one‟s beliefs or 
confidence levels according to the outcome of their rational assessment” (Baehr, 
2011, p. 154), then it could be argued that OM aims at meson. It can also be 
maintained that OM is preserved by meson, so that one‟s “brains neither fall out” nor 
does one “take one‟s own ideas to be obvious, universal and thus, unquestionable” 
(Riggs, 2010, pp. 178, 184).  
Also, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of mesa and he particularly talks 
about the meson that is relative to the person and the meson that is relative to the 
object. The meson that is relative to us is “to feel at the right times, with reference to 
the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right 
way, what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” 
(Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Therefore, OM appears to share an additional characteristic 
with the concept of meson, i.e. they are both agent-oriented and relative to the 
individual. According to Aristotle meson is determined by reason (Aristotle, NE 
1138b20), thus, it involves rational thinking and is intellectually significant. The 
main difference between the two kinds of meson is that the meson relative to us 
varies and depends on persons, activities and aims, and involves the idea of 
prohairesis (choice). Along the same lines, I argue that the account of WB that this 
thesis defends involves the characteristics of one‟s desire and choice, which “is 
deliberate desire of things in our power…” (Aristotle, NE 1113a10).  
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However, are there any experts able to determine meson? Aristotle argues 
that the phronimos man, who is distinguished for their “phronesis, the reasoned and 
true state of capacity to act with regard to virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20), is able to 
determine meson in any case (Bostock, 2000). If WB is a virtuous activity in a 
lifetime and virtuous activities are the realization of virtues that belong to the 
rational
5
 part of human beings‟ soul, then phronesis is necessary for being virtuous. 
Thus, according to a certain understanding, being phronimos and virtuous is exactly 
the same, since a phronimos man has the same knowledge and desires as a virtuous 
man and in phronesis reason and desire are united (Moss, 2011) (Rorty, 1980). 
Hence, it is obvious that in Aristotelian ethics the concepts of WB and virtue are 
strongly connected with one another and also with the concept of meson which 
appears to be a criterion for both.  
In Chapter 3, I again look at the connection between WB and virtues, but this 
time from the perspective of VEP, which particularly focuses on the concept of 
intellectual WB and intellectual virtue(s). Virtue epistemology is a collection of 
contemporary approaches to epistemology, i.e. the theory of knowledge, which gives 
intellectual or epistemic virtues a primary and essential role for WB (Baehr, 2004) 
(Baehr, 2011). Virtue epistemologists argue that one‟s true belief should be obtained 
by virtue of one‟s epistemic activity, therefore, instead of focusing on what the agent 
knows, VEP turns its focus on the agent per se. In this regard, the central question 
that VEP raises, and its roots go back to Aristotle, is what it is to be a good knower 
rather than what knowledge is (Kotzee, 2013). Virtue epistemology places the 
individual in the centre and investigates how one can form beliefs in order to achieve 
credit for them and how an individual‟s characteristics can support justification for 
their beliefs. In this respect, VEP becomes an essential tool, because it focuses on the 
individual‟s traits per se as well as how one can be a good knower through the 
cultivation of one‟s intellectual virtues for WB.  
As in Aristotelian ethics, a virtue considered to be an excellence, in VEP an 
intellectual or epistemic virtue, is an intellectual excellence that aims at intellectual 
WB. Epistemic virtues in VEP have a general two-tier structure. Specifically, at a 
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primary motivational level, all epistemic virtues involve a kind of love for epistemic 
goods. An intellectually excellent (or intellectually virtuous) person is someone who 
desires and pursues epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. In this 
regard, the explicit orientation of VEP towards epistemic goods distinguishes the 
virtues examined in this field from moral virtues, which are explored in other areas 
such as in virtue ethics (Blackburn, 2001) (Baehr, 2013). Additionally, although 
epistemic virtues share a common motivational basis, i.e. the love of epistemic 
goods, each virtue alone seems to present its own distinctive activity or psychology 
which is grounded on that love of epistemic goods. For example, an open-minded 
person is willing to examine alternative views, because he/she recognizes that in 
doing so it is easier to accurately understand those views and approach the matter 
under investigation pluralistically (Baehr, 2013).  
Beyond this common ground that virtue epistemologists share, there is a 
dispute in relation to the relationship between intellectual and moral virtues. In this 
chapter, I clarify that I particularly focus on intellectual virtues as excellences and 
human characteristics which explicitly aim at epistemic goods such as knowledge 
and understanding. In addition, virtue epistemologists disagree about the nature of 
intellectual virtues. Here, I emphasize that disagreements over the nature of 
intellectual virtues may be pointless and harmful, because, as Battaly (2008) argues, 
a perfect account of VEP should include both virtues as faculties and virtues as 
character traits, e.g. a good knower in order to reach an epistemic good, let us say 
understanding, obviously needs both a good memory and persistence (Baehr, 2006). 
In other words, a person‟s persistence in achieving understanding seems pointless 
without their good memory, and vice versa. 
However, in this chapter, I mainly argue for a character-based, moderate-
autonomous, high-grade account of VEP, which is mainly responsibilist, but is also 
reliabilist in the sense that a perfect account of VEP obviously involves to some 
degree an understanding of virtues as reliable faculties such as sense, perception, 
induction, deduction and memory, as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I 
argue for a VEP account that expands outside the area of traditional epistemology 
and its debates, does not aim at giving robust definitions of knowledge or 
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justification and also, does not deal with standard epistemological concerns as 
Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) suggest. To this end, I introduce the 
concept of an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology (thereafter 
AREVEP). 
The account of VEP that I propose is “alternative”, because it perceives 
virtues primarily as character traits, but also necessarily as faculties in the sense that 
for instance, a good informant obviously needs both their good memory and 
persistence in order to reach an epistemic good (Baehr, 2006). In this regard, it is 
alternative because it does not explicitly follow either of the two basic approaches, 
i.e. virtue-responsibilism and virtue-reliabilism. Second, it is “regulative”, because it 
aims at providing guidance for epistemic practice, that is, how to conduct 
understanding and what to do when forming beliefs. Additionally, a regulative VEP 
is strongly practical and social and it is divided into two kinds: a rule-oriented and a 
habit-oriented, as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) argue.  
In this sense, I look at a “habit-oriented regulative” VEP because it attempts 
to provide training that helps teachers towards what it considers to be right 
intellectual dispositions (Roberts and Wood, 2007). This conflicts with analytic 
epistemology, which mainly targets the production of theories of knowledge and 
explores definitions of the terms under investigation (Wolterstorff cited by Roberts 
and Wood, 2007, p. 20). Also, it is “educative”, because in this thesis I talk about 
teachers‟ intellectual virtues and WB and a teacher education that aims at it. In this 
regard, as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, the account of VEP I 
argue for aspires to connect teaching and intellectual virtues and WB, therefore it 
should be something “educative” that facilitates teachers‟ intellectual WB (Higgins, 
2011, p. 256). In this context, AREVEP should be used as a tool towards epistemic 
goods for teachers‟ intellectual WB.  
My aim in exploring these connections in a VEP context is to contribute to 
the concept of intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and particularly, 
as far as teachers are concerned, to make them excellent intellectual agents, so as to 
help children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multi-faceted role 
(Hamilton, 2014, p. 1) and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in teaching the 
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“question is not only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is also a 
formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such a teaching for 
life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64).  
In Chapter 4, I look at something different. My aim here is to investigate WB 
discourse in education. I am doing this because I am specifically interested in 
teaching and teachers‟ WB, which, as I argue in this chapter, is inextricably 
connected to pupils‟ WB. I look at the best-known distinction in WB theories, 
between “subjective” and “objective” ones, with a particular focus on the “subjective 
major-informed desire” and “objective list” theories, where the issue at stake is 
whether something is good for us because we want it or we want something because 
it is good for us. In this chapter I argue for a combined theory of WB which is 
objective and also subjective enough to cope with any imbalances. However, this 
thesis also argues that a similar concern both for the individual and for collective WB 
in education is vital. That is, both self-interest and concern for others in the 
educational context should be viewed equally, because education is social by 
definition and this concept includes not only individual students and groups of 
children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc. who all interact with 
one another.  
To these ends, first, I explore White‟s (2011) account of WB which consists 
in “successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and 
relationships” (ibid, 2011, p. 109). According to White (2011), “success” is getting 
what one wants. However, success in a WB context is related to “desires that are 
both personally important and well-informed” and to be well-informed means, 
among other things, to know one‟s various options for WB, that is, to be autonomous 
(White, 2011, p. 50) (White, 1991). In this regard, White (2011) points at a kind of 
education that does not merely map out possible lives ahead, but also gives children 
lots of experience of what WB means, now and into the future, by inducting them 
into WB pursuits themselves (White, 2011). Similarly, from the point of view of this 
thesis, I argue that there is a whole open space for teachers to explore what 
intellectual WB means, if teacher education programmes help teachers to be open-
minded in order to accomplish epistemic goods such as knowledge, acquaintance and 
understanding, and in this way to induct them into WB pursuits themselves. 
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Moreover, WB pursuits should be “whole-hearted”, pursuits that children 
enjoy, and education should help them to experience WB now, while they are 
children, not in the future or just in their life as adults (White, 2009). However, it is 
not realistic to experience all kinds of worthwhile pursuits and, to this end, 
imagination can play a vital role. White (2011) argues that through literature and the 
arts children may experience all sorts of activities and relationships which it is not 
possible to experience directly, providing them not just with the relevant knowledge 
but with feeling(s) as well. In relation to teachers, however, unlike White, I argue 
that philosophy may be more appropriate in the context of an account of WB that 
requires an account of virtues.   
Additionally, in order to exclude meaningless activities, which may be what 
one wants and gets, but do not contribute to one‟s WB, White (2011) argues that the 
criterion of “worthwhileness is necessary to WB” (ibid, 2011, p. 58). In this way, 
White (2011) adds the parameter of objectivity in WB through the element of 
“worthwhileness”. However, he claims that WB depends on a desire satisfaction 
condition that is worthwhile for a loose group of people. Specifically, White (2007) 
argues that human nature alone is not in a position to provide reasons for worthwhile 
activities and relationships. Although there are not authorities to impose their views, 
an individual‟s WB pursuit has to be compatible with respect for others‟ worthwhile 
pursuits and autonomy. This implies that self-interest and concern for others should 
be inter-connected and treated with respect for one another, as I argue in this thesis. 
In this sense, “worthwhile activities and relationships are not relative to 
individual preferences”, which means that they are objectively determined (White, 
2011, pp. 59, 86) by experts on WB in the same way that art critics are called experts 
in their fields. Thus, the more “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are 
those with an “experience of all kinds of goods” who do not constitute a group of 
experts, but a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 
454). From this point of view, according to White (2011), almost all voices across 
the population in different contexts and in different degrees can and should 
participate in the discussion regarding the components of human WB, and the more 
expert one is the more “authoritative” one‟s voice is.  
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In this context, White (2011) argues that education can play a vital role in 
distinguishing who exactly can participate in that loose body of people and to what 
extent. If one of the aims of education is WB, as White suggests, then, because of 
education, individuals become better-informed in discerning what WB consists in. 
Similarly, in this thesis, I argue that the virtue of OM is necessary, in terms of 
conceptual clarification, to any discussions regarding WB, especially in the 
educational environment, because one of the characteristics of this account of OM, 
among other things, is its serious engagement in dialogue and its ability to keep 
dialogue alive and fertile towards WB (Hare, 2006). 
In Chapter 5, I still look at WB discourse in education. However, I argue that 
White‟s account of WB is insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he places 
too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB rather than on the 
objective and individual ones, which in this thesis are considered equally important 
for WB. For this reason, here, I also examine Nussbaum‟s (2011) objective-
individual account of WB, which is more objective and individual-oriented than 
White‟s account, but it is subjective and collective enough to confront criticism.  
However, it is stressed that there are implications with Nussbaum‟s account 
that are not addressed satisfactorily, which makes her concept of WB rather 
problematic in relation to the aims of this thesis. Therefore, I argue that it is 
necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to go beyond Nussbaum‟s CA and 
expand her ideas, especially those related to the concepts of “capabilities” and 
“functionings” for WB. The best way to do this is through Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s 
(2007) concepts, which are a development of the CA. I particularly focus on Wolff‟s 
and De-Shalit‟s (2007) novel ideas that WB consists in “genuine opportunities for 
secure functionings”, in promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing 
“corrosive disadvantages”. In this context, I draw a parallel, which I elaborate in the 
following chapter, and say that OM is an intellectual virtue that facilitates other 
virtues, therefore it facilitates the acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile” 
“intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB.  
In particular, Nussbaum (2011) develops a theory of WB which consists in 
ten central capabilities/objective goods that articulate different priorities at both the 
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personal and the social levels. The concept of capabilities is central to Nussbaum‟s 
account and it is the answer to the basic question of the CA, i.e. what a person is able 
to do and to be. Specifically, she argues that “capabilities are a set of interrelated 
opportunities or freedoms created by a combination of a person‟s abilities, political, 
social and economic environment”, which are valuable in themselves, because they 
entail the notions of “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 20, 25). She talks 
about three kinds of capabilities and emphasizes that it is among the duties of society 
to contribute to the development of people‟s “capabilities” for their WB, especially 
through education. In the light of Nussbaum‟s (2011) ideas, it could be argued that if 
teachers‟ WB is crucial, as stressed in Chapter 1, then a special emphasis should be 
given to the development of teachers‟ “combined” and “internal capabilities” in order 
to promote their WB and then pupils‟ WB. In other words, teacher education 
programmes should give teachers the opportunities or freedom, as Nussbaum (2011) 
suggests, or teach them to be open-minded as I argue in this thesis, to function 
according to their “internal capabilities” and in this way to help them also to develop 
their “combined capabilities”.  
On the opposite side to “capabilities”, according to Nussbaum (2011), there 
are “functionings, which are the realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 24). 
However, Nussbaum (2011) argues that in promoting capabilities one is promoting 
freedom and choice and this is not the same as promoting someone to function, and 
in this sense, policy should promote “capabilities”, not “functionings”. In particular, 
she argues that “WB demands a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities which 
should be protected and promoted by governments so that all people are able to have 
a dignified and minimally fulfilling life” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32).  
However, I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to 
expand Nussbaum‟s CA and look at Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas in relation to WB. 
Like this thesis, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) mainly focus on “functionings” rather 
than on “capabilities”. They argue that “the concept of capabilities is too abstract and 
thus, it should be replaced with the concept of genuine opportunities to secure 
functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 74). In this regard, they suggest 
that a “genuine opportunity” is an opportunity that does not involve undue costs and 
risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 80). It is also an opportunity 
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to do something only if this is reasonable, that is, any costs of doing so are 
reasonable, depending on the context. Thus, being disadvantaged consists in “lack of 
genuine opportunities for secure functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 4). In 
this context, it is crucial that policymakers consider how to provide and secure 
people‟s functionings and not just their capabilities. In Chapter 6 I draw a parallel to 
say that as in the case of policy and people generally, teacher education should focus 
on facilitating teachers‟ “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB by teaching 
teachers to be open-minded. 
Moreover, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), unlike the CA, emphasize how 
crucial it is for WB not only to achieve a functioning but also to “secure” that 
“functioning” over time. From this point of view, they argue that it is necessary to 
look at the concept of “risk” and underline the fact that the “lack of genuine 
opportunities for secure functionings” usually involves risk to other functionings and 
therefore to WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 65, 84). Along the same lines, 
Chapter 6 includes discussion of two cases of anti-OM that entail the idea of risk in 
some respects, namely standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness.  
However, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, we need more than to 
understand the concepts of “risk” and “secure functionings” alone. In addition, it is 
necessary to look at the phenomenon of “clustering” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 
120). Specifically, they observe that functionings “cluster together”, and in this 
sense, either they produce “corrosive disadvantages” or “fertile functionings”. 
Whereas the former “affects other functionings in a negative way”, the latter 
“spreads its good effects over several categories, either directly or by reducing risk to 
the other functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 121-122). Regarding 
“corrosive disadvantages”, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) notice that there is a 
significant degree of difficulty in identifying cause(s) behind them, because 
“causation is not straightforwardly observable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 136). 
Also, as far as “fertile functionings” are concerned, they say that it is “difficult to 
verify beyond doubt fertile functionings, because very little is known” about this 
concept (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 154).  
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However, in relation to these difficulties, among other things, and from the 
perspective of this thesis, I argue that the virtue of OM can play an important role. 
Specifically, I argue that if in teaching we aim at pupils‟ WB and help them be 
mutatis mutandis as advantaged as possible, then, on the one hand, we should focus 
on teachers‟ “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” that constitute 
advantages for their WB and facilitate teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile functi onings”. 
In parallel, on the other hand, we should try to limit and/or diminish teachers‟ 
exposure to “risks” that constitute “disadvantages” for their WB, such as profit-
seeking and political power, as I argue in Chapter 1, and then for pupils‟ WB. To this 
end, in the following chapters, I argue that a way to facilitate teachers‟ “secure” and 
“fertile functionings” is by teaching teachers to be open-minded, whilst standardized-
mindedness and closed-mindedness are discussed as two anti-OM cases that hinder 
teachers‟ acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” and therefore hinder 
teachers‟ WB as well as pupils‟ WB. 
In Chapter 6, I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the 
link between those different discourses that use different terminology as examined in 
the previous chapters. Specifically, I argue that as a virtue that facilitates other 
virtues, OM facilitates the acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile” 
“intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB, both one‟s own and that of others‟. In 
particular, building upon what we established in Chapter 3 and VEP, I focus on two 
accounts of OM that appear to be “the most developed in character-based VEP”, that 
is, Baehr‟s (2011) and Riggs‟ (2010) accounts of OM (Kwong, 2015, p. 3), which I 
further enrich by looking at the relationship(s) of OM with strongly-held beliefs and 
dialogue in the educational context (Adler, 2004) (Hare, 2006).  
According to Baehr (2011), OM is a willingness and within limits ability to 
transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up (seriously) the merits of a 
distinct cognitive standpoint… and when OM involves rational assessment, it also 
necessarily involves adjusting one‟s beliefs according to the outcome (Baehr, 2011, 
p. 154). Equally importantly, Baehr (2011) argues that “OM is largely or often a 
facilitating virtue”, that is, OM is an intellectual virtue that creates the space for other 
virtues and faculties to achieve their functions, especially by “helping one‟s mind to 
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detach or stay detached from a specific position” (ibid, 2011, p. 157). According to 
Riggs (2010), OM as an intellectual virtue is descriptive and normative, detailed and 
applicable to the real world, a personal quality necessary for epistemic WB. In 
relation to the latter, Riggs (2010) notes, as I argue in Chapter 3, that although virtue-
reliabilism and its idea about virtues as faculties seems necessary for an excellent 
informant, virtue-responsibilism and its agent-oriented concept of virtues as 
character traits appears more relevant and satisfactory in terms of providing an 
account of OM.  
Moreover, it is common practice among virtue epistemologists to present lists 
of intellectual virtues and OM is often at the top of these lists (Riggs, 2010). 
Generally, it appears as a top-of-the list virtue because, although OM has strong 
ethical aspects, it does not introduce itself as a moral virtue, therefore it seems less 
controversial. In this thesis, however, OM is significant neither as the most important 
virtue for intellectual WB, since I do not attempt to rank virtues here, nor as less 
disputed, because I do not look at the controversial relationship between intellectual 
and moral virtues. In this chapter I imply that a special characteristic of this account 
of OM is that all other virtues that aim at intellectual goods and epistemic WB 
necessarily involve some kind of OM. On the other hand, I argue that “closed-
mindedness” (Riggs, 2010) and standardized-mindedness are two anti-OM examples 
that hinder the way towards epistemic goods and intellectual WB. In this context, I 
introduce the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-
informed, and becomes the link between those different discourses discussed in the 
previous chapters. In this regard, I argue that as OM facilitates other virtues (Baehr, 
2011), it also facilitates teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” 
for both their own and pupils‟ epistemic WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts 
and Wood, 2007). 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude with some ideas about how the concepts of 
this thesis can be applied in a real context in Scotland. In particular, since I am 
talking about teaching, WB and OM, the natural conclusion should be how we are 
going to get there, therefore, I look at Scottish initial teacher education programmes 





Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: Virtues for Well-being 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter from an Aristotelian perspective, I look at an account of WB 
that requires an account of virtue(s). Although there are various approaches to the 
concepts of WB and virtue(s), Aristotle‟s approach as presented in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (thereafter NE) seems to be one of the best sources of examination of how 
best to live human life. The Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia (WB) is inextricably 
connected to the concept of arete (virtue). In this regard, Aristotle implies that 
engagement in arete (virtue) entails participation in eudaimonia (WB) and vice 
versa. In Aristotelian ethics WB involves a lifetime, the concepts of success and 
achievement beyond mere contentment and satisfaction as well as external goods to 
some extent. Aristotle‟s account of WB is also intertwined with a person‟s choices 
and it requires rational thinking. Thus, he argues that WB consists in the activity of 
reason in accordance with virtue. Specifically, according to Aristotle, eudaimonia 
(WB) is a virtuous activity in lifetime and virtuous activities are the realization of the 
virtues that belong to the rational part of human beings‟ psyche (soul).  
In this context, Aristotle argues that praxis is the best human activity, a kind 
of eudaimonia (WB) that, unlike poiesis and theoria, is both virtuous and feasible. 
Praxis appears to be a life of informed, virtuous activity concerned both with one‟s 
own eudaimonia (WB) and with others‟ WB. In praxis, phronesis is the key 
intellectual virtue and the practical approach to knowledge, therefore, in order to 
understand eudaimonia it is necessary to understand phronesis.  In other words, as 
this thesis argues, in order to understand WB it is necessary to understand virtue, and 
in this sense, the concept of virtue(s) is necessary to the concept of WB. 
Additionally, in a phronimos person, that is, a person who acquires phronesis, reason 
and desire are united, and although there are not experts in WB, a phronimos person 
can operate as a guide towards WB and virtues.  
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 Moreover, one of the key concepts of phronesis, according to Aristotle, is 
meson which appears to provide the criterion for being phronimos and thus virtuous 
and eudaimon. Meson, according to Aristotle, is to feel at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in 
the right way, which is the best and is characteristic of virtue. The concept of meson 
is inextricably connected with the concepts of arete (virtue) and eudaimonia (WB). It 
involves a person‟s prohairesis (choice) and rational thinking and it is also agent-
oriented and intellectually significant.  
In this thesis I also argue that teacher education should focus on teachers‟ 
WB and particularly on an account of WB that is based on an account of virtue(s). In 
this regard, the concepts of intellectual WB and intellectual virtues are specifically 
explored in the next chapter from a virtue epistemological perspective. In this 
context, it is argued in Chapter 6 that teacher education programmes should 
particularly focus on the intellectual virtue of OM, both for teachers‟ intellectual WB 
and then for pupils‟ WB as I argue in the previous chapter.         
2.2 The Significance of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for the Concepts of Well-
being and Virtue(s) 
To begin, Aristotle should be read carefully and thoughtfully, with an 
understanding of the historical, social and political context not as an ally in a modern 
debate, nonetheless, as one of the best sources of examination of the human ethical 
condition (Pakaluk, 2005). Almost all of his topics in the NE are central to modern 
moral philosophy, however, one should read this as a record of work in progress, as 
lectures to be delivered instead of a finished philosophical work (Hughes, 2001). In 
this context, the significance of Aristotle‟s work seems to be beyond question for two 
main reasons. On the one hand, his innovative investigation regarding how best to 
live one‟s life concerns any society with rational reflection on human aims over time 
and, on the other hand, his answers to this investigation about the right and wrong 
ways to act and feel, as well as the conception of the human good partly based on an 
understanding of the human nature, are always an inexhaustible source of insight and 
inspiration (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000). In addition, as Papastephanou (2010) notes, 
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“it is possible… to defend the relevance of Aristotle to present-day educational 
concerns… in fresh and fertile ways” (ibid, 2010, p. 589).  
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties regarding Aristotle‟s specific 
background and work that should be taken into consideration when one examines his 
work. First, it is essential to remember the context in which Aristotle composed the 
NE. He was writing two and a half millennia ago and was himself a nobleman 
writing for noblemen in a city – state, with a world view quite different from that of 
any modern writer (Hughes, 2001). Many of Aristotle‟s audience were aiming at 
making careers in law and politics, and for them it was essential to comprehend what 
was to be rewarded and punished. Second, Aristotle, like many people of his time, 
regarded slaves, women and manual workers as inferior and incomplete beings only 
capable of “listening to the reasoning and acting on the instructions of their male 
superiors” (Knight, 2007, p. 35).  
The NE is a seminal work for the concepts of WB and virtue (Saylor 
Foundation, 2013). Specifically, the main issue in the NE is the determination of 
arête (virtue, excellence) and agathon (good) as the means to accomplish the highest 
of all goods achievable by action, i.e. eudaimonia (well-being, flourishing, 
happiness, fulfilment) (Kraut, 2014). Aristotle addresses this issue almost in all his 
works but mostly in his ethical works
6
, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics and 
Magna Moralia. The first has been recognized according to During (1991) as the 
most mature of Aristotle‟s ethical treatises due to its critical clarity, insightful 
argument, exquisite mental structure and perhaps some kind of literary style. 
However, Hughes (2001) argues that the NE may also strike the modern reader as, if 
not exactly chaotic, rather loosely written. Similarly, Bartlett (2008) implies that 
Aristotle‟s writing is uncommonly complicated and indirect, characterized by 
oddities such as unnecessary repetitions, long parentheses and self-contradiction. 
In any case, the NE is important for the concepts of WB and virtue(s) both 
from an individual and from a collective point of view, and this interests us here. In 
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particular, it addresses important issues related to the eudaimon life and makes brief
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points about the kind of the community in which people leading such a life hope to 
function best, i.e. the polis. In other words, Aristotle‟s aim in the NE is to provide an 
account of how a good person should live and how society should be structured in 
order to make such lives possible (Hughes, 2001). It is also a work of practical 
philosophy in the sense that the purpose of the philosophy is not merely to purvey 
truth but also to affect action, both personal and social, and in particular, as applied 
in this thesis, to affect teacher‟s WB, and then pupils‟ WB, as I argue in Chapter 1, 
and a teacher education that would be oriented to teachers‟ WB (Barnes, 1995). 
Specifically, Aristotle notes that  
“The present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we 
are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since 
otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of 
actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the 
states of character that are produced” (Aristotle, NE 1103b26-31) 
In addition, the NE attempts to reply to questions about what an individual 
should do. In this regard, it proceeds by considering what it is that is ultimately 
essential to humans, i.e. eudaimonia (WB), and explores ways that the answers can 
be found, e.g. through the examination of arete (virtue). However, as Aristotle 
clarifies, “our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-
matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions” 
(Aristotle, NE 1094b13-15).  
2.2.1 Other Approaches to Well-being and Virtue(s): Plato, Consequentialism, 
Deontology and Various Strands of Virtue Ethics 
The Aristotelian account of WB requires an account of virtue(s), however, 
this is neither the only approach to WB nor a perfect one. Aristotle‟s contemporary 
and teacher, Plato, also maintains a virtue-based account of WB, that is, that 
eudaimonia (WB) is the highest human goal of moral thought and conduct and arete 
(virtues) are the necessary skills and dispositions to accomplish it (Frede, 2013). 
Nonetheless, as Frede (2013) notices, Plato‟s concept of WB is an ideal state 
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grounded on metaphysical assumptions alienated from ordinary everyday life and 
bodily pleasures, whilst Plato thinks that virtue is both a necessary and a sufficient 
element for WB regardless of any external factors. Aristotle, on the other hand, 
regards WB as something truly realistic. For Aristotle, according to my 
understanding, theory without practice is not possible for humans to achieve and 
practice without theory is not WB. Thus, Aristotle aims at an account of human WB 
that entails both theory and practice, i.e. an account of WB that entails phronesis. 
From one point of view, Aristotle seems to regard virtue as an element that is only 
necessary to and not sufficient for WB, as he stresses the significance of external 
conditions for one‟s WB. From another point of view, though, Aristotle implies that 
the virtue of phronesis, in particular, is an element both necessary and sufficient for 
eudaimonia (Moss, 2011). In this chapter, I argue that virtue/phronesis is necessary 
for WB and I leave the problem of sufficiency for future investigation.  
Additionally, according to Crisp (2000), virtue ethics are usually challenged 
by two other major theories, namely consequentialism and deontology. In 
deontology, as the word itself reveals coming from the Greek deon + logy/logos, i.e. 
necessary and science (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), the ultimate aim is what one ought 
to do instead of what kind of person one is or should be, as in virtue ethics. For 
example, according to Kant, human beings must act out of duty, and what makes an 
action right or wrong is the motive of the agent who performs that action (Alexander, 
2012). On the other hand, Alexander (2012) observes that consequentialism holds 
that an action is assessed as wrong or right by the consequences it brings about for 
many.  
Also, both consequentialism and deontology might converge in some 
practical conclusions with virtue ethics, e.g. one should be just, but the reasons 
behind their conclusions differ. For instance, Crisp (2000, p. xvii) notices that 
whereas consequentialism argues that what makes actions just is their producing the 
largest amount of the overall WB and deontology maintains that what makes actions 
just is their being in accordance with the law of reason, Aristotelian virtue ethics 
argue that what makes actions just is their being virtuous. There is also a third 
combining view. Specifically, Nussbaum (1999) points out that it is confusing to 
categorize virtue ethics as a third major theory of ethics next to consequentialism and 
32 
 
deontology. In particular, she says that “both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain 
treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot be a separate approach in contrast to 
them” (ibid, 1999, p. 164).  
Apart from theories outside virtue ethics, there are also different strands of 
virtue ethics. In particular, when Anscombe published her seminal work Modern 
Moral Philosophy (1958) as an objection to the central place that modern moral 
philosophy was giving to the notions of obligation and duty and as a call to return to 
Aristotle and ancient ethics, back to the notions of virtue, character and WB, many 
theories and concepts resulted; these were widely known as virtue ethics and all were 
influenced by Aristotle (Garver, 2006). However, different scholars developed 
different theories of virtue. For example
8
, Garver (2006) notes, the ethics of care, 
mainly developed by feminists such as Noddings and Gilligan, is a theory influenced 
by Aristotle‟s virtue ethics, but different from Slote‟s agent-based account of virtue 
ethics, which in turn differs from the eudaimonist account maintained by Hursthouse 
and the pluralist one developed by Swanton with reference to Nietzsche etc.  
In this context, as Athanassoulis (2016) points out, many scholars who 
whole-heartedly embrace a return to the concept of virtue undertake the task of 
defining virtue ethics with regard to what it may not be, i.e. how it differs from other 
normative theories, and avoiding their faults. Among them is Bernard Williams 
(1985) who makes a significant distinction between the concepts of morality and 
ethics. He proposes abandoning the idea of morality altogether as too narrow, too 
limited and over-focused on the notions of obligation and duty. Williams (1985) 
prefers the terms “ethics instead of morality as a wider concept which encompasses 
elements that may be rejected as irrelevant by morality such as things that are out of 
an individual‟s control but important for one‟s WB whatsoever” (ibid, 1985, p. 6).  
Clearly, these topics are huge and worth further investigation within the 
context of WB and virtue(s), however, the limitations and the particular focus of the 
present work do not allow further elaboration. In the following sections, I attempt to 
approach conceptually some key Aristotelian terms and then provide various views 
on their use and content, because a proper understanding of these is fundamental in 
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the investigation of Aristotle‟s argument, and also the argument of this thesis, that an 
understanding of human WB requires an understanding of virtue(s).  
2.3 Eudaimonia (Well-being): the Aristotelian Account of Well-being 
According to Aristotle eudaimonia is the highest of all goods achievable by 
action and identifies living well and doing well with being eudaimon (Aristotle, NE 
1095a16-19) (Aristotle, NE 1098b21-22). The word “ethics” comes from the Greek 




 means a treatise on morals (Liddell and Scott, 
2016). Barnes (2000) also notes that ethika are issues to do with character. 
Eudaimonia consists of two words, that is, eu (– good, well) and daimon (– spirit, 
divinity) but Aristotle does not take this etymology into account; he seems to regard 
eudaimonia as a substitute for eu zein, i.e. to live well (Kraut, 2014), and eu prattein, 
i.e. to do well (Knight, 2007). Aristotle defines eudaimonia as (i) the chief final good 
without qualification that is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of 
something else (Aristotle, NE 1097a28-37) (Aristotle, NE1097b1-7), (ii) the final 
good which is thought to be self-sufficient and all other goods are desirable for the 
sake of it (Aristotle, NE 1097b8-14), i.e. when isolated it makes life desirable and 
lacking in nothing (Aristotle, NE 1097b15-17) and (iii) the ultimate good which is 
obviously the end of action (Aristotle, NE 1097b21).  
The traditional subjectivist translation of the word adopted by Ross and Irwin 
(cited by Knight, 2007) is “happiness”, but, as Bostock (2000) argues, this cannot be 
right because eudaimonia is essentially long-term
11
, it connotes success and 
achievement and requires more than mere contentment and satisfaction; one is 
eudaimon or not and this is absolute. Different scholars adopt different views, 
however. The most well-known dispute about the meaning of eudaimonia is that 
between an inclusive-comprehensive and an exclusive-intellectual view of the 
concept (Knight, 2007). For instance, Hardie (1968) and Nagel (1972) are in favour 
of a supreme dominant end of contemplation, whilst Ackrill (1973) and Kraut 
(1989), who have an inclusive understanding, argue that eudaimonia is constituted by 
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many different desirable and tuned-up ends. This thesis takes a position between the 
inclusive - exclusive view in the sense that there is both an ultimate end and various 
sub-ends towards that supreme end. However, as Nyabul and Situma (2014) note, 
Aristotle himself
12
 seems to be responsible for this misunderstanding(s) because 
sometimes he implies that eudaimonia is a single end and at other times he suggests 
that eudaimonia is made up of multiple ends. From my perspective, Aristotle 
understands eudaimonia both as a single end and as something made up of many 
ends.  
Additionally, others use a range of words for eudaimonia depending on the 





2001). As Robinson (1989, p. 90) points out, eudaimonia is the “human flourishing” 
in a life that is given over to what is most honourable and enduring. Ackrill (1980) 
also argues that the word eudaimonia has a force not at all like happiness, comfort or 
pleasure, but more like the best possible life where the “best” does not have a 
narrowly moral sense. Last but not least, Knight (2007) observes that an increasingly 
prevailing translation of the term is “success”. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is 
not an external good, nor a good of the body, but a good of the human psyche (soul), 
which is the highest kind of good. Simultaneously, some external goods
15
 such as 
wealth and power as well as  some bodily goods such as health and good looks (NE 
1098b13) are necessary conditions for eudaimonia, as one cannot be eudaimon 
without some kind of wealth, beauty, good birth, friends, political influence and good 
children (Aristotle, NE 1099a31) (Aristotle, NE 1099b1-5).  
Although an eudaimon person does require some good fortune, it is, however, 
more important that one cultivates the appropriate state of psyche
16
 (Bostock, 2000). 
According to Ackrill (1980), as in this thesis, eudaimonia is neither the outcome of a 
lifetime‟s effort nor is it something to look forward to, such as a contented 
retirement. Eudaimonia is a life that is enjoyable and worthwhile all the way through 
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and not the reward for a life. It is eupraxia, i.e. doing well, and not the result of doing 
well, which is unavoidably intertwined with one‟s choices, since in choice the 
desirable (good or bad) comes after what the judgement states is doing well 
(Anscombe, 1967). Garver (2006, p. 328) also notes that “eudaimonia is an 
energeia
17
”, i.e. an actuality, made up of energeiai‟ (actualities) and in this sense the 
good person has to make their life one energeia out of many (Aristotle, NE 
11177a12).  
Clearly, there is plenty of disagreement as to what eudaimonia consists in, 
but no disagreement whatsoever that eudaimonia is what we all want. Particularly in 
this thesis, as I elaborate further in the following chapter, I argue for a cognitive 
account of WB that partly consists in intellectual virtue(s) and obviously one that 
goes beyond the basics in life such as food, shelter etc. To this end, Aristotle‟s 
unique - in the sense that no one before had presented this particular account of what 
it is to live well (Kraut, 2014) - concept of eudaimonia seems the most appropriate 
source to look at. It is also appropriate in terms of understanding because eudaimonia 
has multiple definitions both as a single end and as something made up of multiple 
ends towards an ultimate single end. Alternatively, the term I use throughout the 
thesis is “well-being” (WB). 
2.3.1 The Function Argument and Arete (Virtue) 
As Kraut (2014) observes, it would be rather useless to acknowledge that 
eudaimonia is the highest of all goods, if we did not determine what good(s) 
eudaimonia consists in. In order to deal with this, Aristotle looks at ergon, i.e. what 
is the characteristic function of human beings, and argues that eudaimonia (WB) 
consists in the activity of the rational part of human beings‟ psyche (soul) in 
accordance with arete (virtue). As Aristotle claims, the most characteristic good of 
human beings is their capacity to use reason. Additionally, a human being who uses 
reason well in a lifetime is eudaimon and this is what eudaimonia consists in.  Virtue 
or excellence is necessary in order to do anything well. Human arete means virtue, 
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human goodness and excellence of any kind (Liddell and Scott, 2011). Arete is what 
makes a human being good (Barnes, 2000). Specifically, Aristotle notes that 
“To say that eudaimonia is the chief good seems a platitude and a clearer account of 
what it is that is still desired. This might perhaps be given if we could first ascertain 
the function of a man (Aristotle, NE 1097b22-24)… Now if the function of man is an 
activity of psyche which follows or implies reason (Aristotle, NE 1098a7-8)… human 
good turns out to be activity of psyche exhibiting virtue and if there are more than 
one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete… in a complete life.” 
(Aristotle, NE 1098a16-19) 
So, does Aristotle identify eudaimonia with arete? Not exactly. He argues 
that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). If eudaimonia 
means living well for one‟s entire life, this in turn means not just being in a certain 
state, but also acting in a certain way. Therefore, eudaimonia appears to be a virtuous 
activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues 
that belong to the rational
18
 part of human beings‟ psyche (soul).  
2.3.2 Endoxa: Aristotle’s Starting Point of Investigation of Various Kinds of Life 
and Well-being 
Hence, Aristotle maintains that engagement in virtue(s) entails participation 
in eudaimonia and vice versa. However, what is the starting point of his investigation 
about the good life and the concept of virtue and why is this relevant here? Aristotle 
used to begin his examination with endoxa, i.e. any received opinions which were 
held by everyone or at least by most people as well as those held by the wise, and 
then he used to subject these views to critical assessment. Looking at Aristotle‟s 
ways of finding answers to his problems is significant, especially from a practical 
point of view. In this case, for example, endoxa could be what policy, institutions, 
government, anyone involved in education thinks about the concepts of WB and 
virtue(s), and then teacher education could use this „data‟ as a starting point for 
further investigation concerning teachers‟ WB. However, Aristotle also seems 
sympathetic to the view that most people cannot be entirely mistaken, i.e. it is often 
the case that what the majority of people thinks is indeed right. In particular, he says  
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“Some of these views have been held by men and men of old, others by oligous and 
endoxous, i.e. a few eminent people, and it is not probable that either of these should 
be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect 
or even in most respects (Aristotle, NE 1098b26-29)… Those things are endoxa 
which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise and either to all of them, 
or to the majority, or to the most endoxois (notable) among them” (Aristotle, Topics 
100b21-23) 
As Klein (1992) notes, Aristotle relies heavily on this method and his 
argument about eudaimonia uses two kinds of endoxa, i.e. the substantive and the 
regulative. The former provides plausible alternatives for the determination of 
eudaimonia and the latter specifies the evaluative criteria. For instance, in Book X of 
the NE, Aristotle claims that basically four kinds of life seem to be chosen by men. 
Most men aim at hedone (pleasure), which is an aim for slaves or beasts. Other men 
aim at political arete (honour), which is the object of the political life. But honour 
depends more on the one who gives rather than on the receiver, whereas the end of 
life must be something that assures one of their own virtue, and virtue seems the end 
of political life. Some men also pursue wealth, but this is a means rather than an end. 
Finally, Aristotle says that the life of contemplation is the highest end and this way 
proceeds to an inclusive outlook on human life. He also classifies these kinds of life 
according to hedone (pleasure), political arete (excellence) and phronesis (practical 
wisdom), while he considers the third type superior on the grounds that it can provide 
the ultimate end, that is, eudaimonia. 
Put differently, ways of life based on external goods, bodily goods and 
honour seem to be eliminated by the criteria of regulative endoxa such as the 
criterion of ultimate end, self-sufficiency, uniqueness to human beings, endurance, 
internality etc., leaving moral virtues and contemplative activities as the alternatives 
that fit with all the regulative endoxa. Thus, it may be the case that since only these 
two kinds of virtuous activities survived the examination, they alone constitute 
eudaimonia. Then Aristotle argues that contemplation is eudaimonia in a higher 
sense than morally virtuous activity is, because it fits more rigorously with the 
regulative endoxa (Klein, 1992). However, Klein (1992) also stresses that Aristotle‟s 
method might be superior if any “plausible opinions were examined in a cooperative 
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or shared discourse which would proceed systematically so as to overcome 
objections to preceding opinions” (ibid, 1992, p. 153). In the same line of thought, 
Hughes (2001) points out the possibility that Aristotle‟s method only amounts to 
repeating the prejudices and unexamined assumptions of his own culture.  
Although Klein (1992) and Hughes (2001) indicate two important problems 
in relation to Aristotle‟s method, their comments in my view make sense only up to a 
point. Specifically, on the one hand, Klein (1992) seems to look at Aristotle‟s 
method in the light of modern research methods and emphasizes ways of 
improvement. In this sense, an “improved” Aristotelian method might be “superior” 
as Klein (1992, p. 153) suggests, but it would no longer be Aristotle‟s. Besides, since 
one is interested in original Aristotelian ideas, I think one should look at them 
exactly the way they are, i.e. as a work in progress and as lectures to be delivered, 
not like a modern work, since it was written two and a half millennia ago, 
nevertheless, it remains central to modern philosophy as an inexhaustible source of 
insight and inspiration (Hughes, 2001) (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000).   
On the other hand, it may be the case, as Hughes (2001) observes, that 
Aristotle repeats prejudices and assumptions from his culture as he was himself a 
nobleman in a city state where women, slaves and workers were regarded as inferior 
and incomplete beings and had a world view quite different from ours today (Knight, 
2007). But still, I think that, all things being equal, Aristotle‟s work is of great 
significance, because it is innovative, timeless and unique in terms of coping with 
how and why questions concerning human WB in everyday life and in practical 
reasoning about a good to be brought (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000) (Pakaluk, 2005). 
Next, let us look at Aristotle‟s investigation into human activity and how he relates it 
to eudaimonia.  
2.4 Understanding Well-being as a Human Activity 
According to Aristotle, eudaimonia (WB) consists in the activity of reason in 
accordance with virtue. Thus, it is implied that WB is a virtuous activity during a 
lifetime whilst virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues that belong 
to the rational part of human beings‟ soul. In addition, Aristotle recognizes three 
kinds of human activity, namely (i) theoria, i.e. contemplative activity (Aristotle, NE 
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1177a17), (ii) praxis, i.e. activity related to matters of human conduct such as ethics 
and politics (Aristotle, NE 1178a10) and (iii) poiesis, i.e. productive activity. In this 
context, Aristotle seems to argue that praxis is the best human activity, a kind of WB 
that, unlike poiesis and theoria, is both virtuous and possible to achieve.  
2.4.1 Praxis: the Best Human Activity and an Account of Well-being both 
Virtuous and Feasible 
While honing in on the concept of praxis it is necessary at the same time to 
look at theoria and poiesis in terms of a deeper understanding of the concept of 
praxis. To begin, according to Aristotle theoria, i.e. the activity of reason, consists in 
dealing with the best, eternal and unchangeable matters and exercising philosophical 
thinking is a human being‟s noblest end (Aristotle, NE 1177a11-13) (Aristotle, NE 
1177a19-24) (Aristotle, NE 1177b35). The purpose of theoria is the pursuit of truth 
through the contemplative life and its telos (end) is the achievement of knowledge 
for its own sake (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Some scholars argue that theoria 
constitutes a perfect and superior kind of eudaimonia. Notwithstanding, Ackrill 
(1980) notes that what is the best life a man should lead remains rather vague. 
Aristotle is, however, quite clear in his opinion that a life of theoria is superior to any 
other life and such indeed is the life of divinity, of God. Nonetheless, he admits that 
theoria by itself does not constitute a possible life for human beings (Aristotle, NE 
1177b27-30). A man is a sort of syntheton (compound) within space and time, who 
is, however, able to engage in an activity that may escape time and touch the eternal.   
Most importantly, Aristotle tries to prove that his concepts are not just 
theories. Although he believes that a life dedicated to the activity of reason is the 
noblest one, he acknowledges that such a life is superhuman, because on the one 
hand, man by nature is an incomplete and finite being and on the other hand, it is 
impossible to fulfil every external condition that theoria demands in advance 
(Aristotle, NE 1179a19-23). So, if this is the case, why bother looking at theoria 
anyway? If both theoria and virtuous action are valuable forms of activity, perhaps 
they could be combined for the accomplishment of the best possible human life 
(Ackrill, 1973). And the result of such a combination is praxis. 
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Hughes (2001) highlights that the best needs the rest and Aristotle seems to 
exaggerate the concept of theoria in order to stress the importance of practical 
activity. Similarly, Knight (2007) notes that Aristotle “refers to theoretical activity in 
order to provide practical activity its further final end” (ibid, 2007, p. 36). He points 
out that unlike theoria, which produces nothing beyond itself and deals with the 
universal, unchangeable truths, praxis is human activity in the realm of the 
contingent, which we seek to affect by our actions (Knight, 2007). Thus, Aristotle in 
the concept of praxis appears to suggest a secondary
19
 kind of eudaimonia (Aristotle, 
NE 1178a9) which is more realistic and approachable to all human beings. A 
practical activity is concerned with political and ethical life and its end is practical 
wisdom and knowledge (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Praxis also focuses on virtuous 
action that contributes directly to one‟s own eudaimonia rather than serving ends 
determined by others. It is “a life of informed, virtuous activity that encompasses 
specific criteria such as both the individual‟s and others‟ eudaimonia” (Siegler, 
1967, p. 31).  
Moreover, Nicholson (2016) notes that “poiesis is the productive activity that 
requires technical skills and it has an end goal” which is the end product (ibid, 2016, 
p. 52). The aim of poiesis is to create something and its end is the production of some 
artefact (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Aristotle, distinguishes poiesis from both theoria 
and praxis as an activity that basically lacks virtue, on the grounds that the end and 
value of an artefact is in the product itself, whereas the value of a virtuous action 
depends on the individual who must be virtuous and know and choose the action for 
itself (Parry, 2014). For example, Aristotle says that “the end of medical art is health, 
that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth” 
(Aristotle, NE 1094a9). In this sense, what might be the end of teacher education? A 
possible answer to this could be, as I argue in this thesis, teachers‟ WB which 
requires an account of virtue(s). In this regard, poiesis cannot be the ultimate end of 
teacher education because it lacks virtue(s).  
For example, teacher education programmes nowadays seem to aim at a kind 
of modern poiesis, if I may put it that way.  In particular, it seems that they mainly 
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focus on the development of teachers‟ technical skills and knowledge in terms of 
competence and achievement through testing and measurements, so as to be, for 
instance, at the top of worldwide league tables (Biesta, 2012)
20
 (White, 2011). 
Hence, in this light, the end and value of a top-league-tables-focused teacher 
education seems to be in itself, whilst the end and value of a teacher education that 
aims at virtuous teachers‟ and teachers‟ WB is in teachers who aim at virtue(s) and 
know and choose any action for itself, and then for pupils‟ WB, as I argue in Chapter 
1. In this context, as Higgins (2011) suggests, teacher education programmes should 
not only aim at teaching teachers how to teach, but also teach teachers how to learn 
(be virtuous) through teaching. In other words, a teacher education for an account of 
teachers‟ WB that requires an account of virtue(s) with a particular focus on the 
virtue of OM will, as I argue in Chapter 6, help teachers, among other things, to 
further develop their self-cultivation, both for the sake of their own WB and then for 
pupils‟ WB.  
Furthermore, there is much discussion in philosophy and education, 
concerning the relationship(s) between the theoretical, practical and productive 
human activity and on this, Aristotle, who, as Pakaluk (2005) observes, is unique in 
pursuing all three concepts can shed some light. However, on the one hand, Knight 
(2007) notices that Aristotle “is not consistent in his semantic distinction between 
praxis and poiesis, action and production” and threfore, difficulties arise (ibid, 2007, 
p. 19). For instance, it seems unreasonable for someone actually engaged in theoria 
to interrupt their contemplation so as to engage in praxis (Adkins, 1978). On the 
other hand, Ackrill (1978) says that Aristotle “fails to deal with obvious direct 
questions such as what is an action” and this alone can cause contradictions (ibid, 
1978, p. 601).  
Although Aristotle‟s discussion is often not as clear as it should be, when he 
talks about praxis, the practical activity as the “life in accordance with the other kind 
of arete”, he attempts to engage in a more detailed way (Aristotle, NE 1178a9-10). 
Particularly, according to a widely – held view, this arete is phronesis, i.e. practical 
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wisdom, which is the highest arete of the mind when one deals with practical issues 
(Hughes, 2001). Aristotle‟s statement here is of great importance for the argument of 
the thesis, because he seems to consider arete (virtue) and particularly phronesis, a 
key intellectual virtue, which is necessary to praxis, that is, it is necessary to 
eudaimonia (WB). Therefore, in order to understand eudaimonia (WB) it is 
necessary to understand phronesis (virtue). To this end, next, I look at the concept of 
phronesis, i.e. the practical approach to knowledge and a key intellectual virtue, as 
well as at its relationship(s) with episteme and techne which constitute the theoretical 
and practical approaches to knowledge respectively. Besides, it is important to look 
at phronesis as the practical approach to knowledge, because knowledge and teacher 
education are unbreakably intertwined.  
2.5 Understanding Well-being as an Approach to Knowledge 
The most appropriate place in the NE to start an exploration of knowledge, 
and thus, an exploration of WB as an approach to knowledge, is Book VI, where 
Aristotle elaborates the concept of intellectual virtues. Let us recall that Aristotle 
maintains that the psyche (soul) is divided in two parts, i.e. the ellogon (rational) and 
the alogon (irrational) (Aristotle, NE 1102a29). The irrational part of the psyche 
(soul), from an Aristotelian point of view, is vegetative in nature and relates to 
nutrition and growth, therefore it does not relate to anything of interest to us here 
(Aristotle, NE 1102a35). In addition, Aristotle in Book VI (Aristotle, NE 1139a4-16) 
goes further and distinguishes in the rational part of the psyche between the 
logistikon, i.e. the calculative part, with which a human considers variable and 
changeable things (practical/productive thinking), and the epistemonikon, i.e. the 
scientific part, with which one considers invariable and unchangeable things 
(theoretical reasoning) (Kraut, 2014). As I said earlier, for the aims of this thesis, I 
focus on the logistikon and particularly on practical reasoning. 
Then, Aristotle stresses the importance of looking at “the best state of each of 







 virtues, namely, those concerning theoretical 
reasoning, i.e. nous (intuitive reason or intelligence), episteme (scientific 
knowledge), sophia (philosophical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom) regarding 
practical thinking, and techne (art or craft knowledge) in relation to productive 
thinking (Aristotle, NE 1139b14) (Aristotle, NE 1141b25). On the one hand, nous as 
the starting point for scientific knowledge cannot be the object of such knowledge, 
craft knowledge or practical wisdom. On the other hand, sophia is the highest and 
perfect kind of knowledge and combines both intelligence and scientific knowledge 
(Hoffmann, 2016). In this context, Aristotle examines three ways to knowledge, i.e. 
episteme, techne and phronesis, and how they relate to one another as well as which 
qualifies as the most appropriate in terms of being both virtuous and possible to 
achieve. In this project, I mainly focus on phronesis, however, in terms of a full 
understanding of phronesis as the practical approach to knowledge, I also have to 
look at the concepts of episteme and techne which are the theoretical and productive 
approach to knowledge respectively. 
2.5.1 Episteme: the Theoretical Approach to Knowledge 
According to Aristotle “the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity, 
therefore it is eternal, ungenerated and imperishable… it is a state of capacity to 
demonstrate” (Aristotle, NE 1139b23) (Aristotle, NE 1139b32). The most common 
interpretation of episteme is that of scientific knowledge or knowledge (as presented 
in the next chapter epistemology also comes from episteme), but as Kraut (2014) 
stresses, one should not confuse this with the modern understanding of science, 
which involves experimentation. Its translation as scientific knowledge rather aims at 
highlighting its concern with necessary, unchangeable truths and involves 
demonstration (Hoffmann, 2016). Apart from the interpretation of episteme as 
knowledge or scientific knowledge, it is worth noting that among scholars there is 
also wide acceptance of the concept as “understanding” which involves 
demonstration, i.e. the capacity to explain (Burnyeat, 2012) (Barnes, 1994) (Taylor, 
1990) (Irwin, 1988) (Burnyeat, 2012).   
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2.5.2 Techne: the Productive Approach to Knowledge 
Aristotle attempts to define techne mainly by contrasting it with phronesis. 
Specifically, he argues that “techne is concerned with coming into being, i.e. 
considering how something may come into being, and whose origin is in the maker 
and not in the thing made… Making and acting being different, techne must be a 
matter of making not of acting… and both are concerned with the variable” 
(Aristotle, NE 1140a37) (Aristotle, NE 1140a23). Techne like poiesis does not imply 
that a technites (craftsman) is making something in a virtuous way or that they are 
virtuous, which is in contrast with phronesis where one is virtuous and acts in a 
virtuous way. The only criterion here is that the object is good, e.g. a well-built table 
that does not fall apart (Hoffmann, 2016). The relationships between Aristotelian 
episteme, phronesis and techne lay the foundations for the modern concepts of pure 
theory, experienced-based practice and something that involves both. However, there 
is some uncertainty among researchers about how Aristotle uses the terms which 
may cause various problems in interpretation (Kraut, 2014).  
2.5.3 Phronesis: the Practical Approach to Knowledge and a Key Virtue to 
Praxis 
Furthermore, Aristotle describes phronesis as being “reasoned and capable of 
action with regard to human goods … to things that are good or bad for man… it 
cannot be episteme or techne; not episteme because that which can be done is capable 
of doing otherwise, not techne because action and making are different kinds of 
thing … phronesis is a virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20) (Aristotle, NE 1140b37) 
(Aristotle, NE 1140b24). At this point, before elaborating on the concept of 
phronesis, that is, the practical approach to knowledge and a key intellectual virtue 
necessary for WB, it is important to look at the concept of arete (virtue) and how 
Aristotle defines phronesis in terms of arete (virtue).    
2.5.3.1 Phronesis Is Arete (virtue): an Account of Virtue  
The concept of arete (virtue) in Aristotelian ethics forms the basis for 
eudaimonia (WB) (Broadie, 1991). Earlier we saw that eudaimonia is the highest of 
all goods achievable by action and consists in the exercise of reason in accordance 
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with arete in a complete life. As Lacewing (2016) points out, Aristotle‟s list of aretes 
(virtues) is not just a diverse collection, but is based on a broad, justified account of 
what arete is. Hence, after having distinguished human psyche (soul) into two parts, 
i.e. the elogon (rational) and the alogon (irrational) (Aristotle, NE 1102a29), 
Aristotle in a similar way argues that  
“Arete (virtue) too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference, for 
we say that some of the aretai (virtues) are dianoetikai (intellectual) and others 
ethikai (moral), sophia (philosophic wisdom) and synesis (understanding) and 
phronesis (practical wisdom) being dianoetikai (intellectual), eleutheriotes 
(liberality) and sophrosene (temperance) ethikai (moral)… Virtue then being two 
kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue(s) (virtues of mind or intellect) in the 
main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for this reason it requires 
experience and time), while moral virtue(s) (virtues of character) comes about as a 
result of ethos (habit)” (Aristotle, NE 1103a4) (Aristotle, NE 1103a14)  
Additionally, Aristotelian arete is sometimes interpreted as a habit or 
disposition or fixed disposition and eudaimonia as a mindless routine, but this 
according to Sachs (2016) seems imprecise and rather passive, because Aristotle 
himself argues that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). 
Thus, virtue reveals itself in action. However, Aristotle argues that virtue is not 
found in the action itself, but in the agent. In other words an action is not virtuous in 
its own right but due to the agent who performs it. So, from an Aristotelian 
perspective, virtue reveals itself in the actions of a virtuous person.  
Furthermore, Aristotle (Aristotle, NE 1105b19) (Aristotle, NE 1106a12) 
describes arete as hexis, i.e. as a state of character,  which involves one‟s 
dispositions in relation to what one feels, how one thinks and reacts, what choices 
one makes and what actions one performs and all these in different situations 
(Lacewing, 2016). For Aristotle arete is neither passions such as bodily appetites, 
emotions and feelings that go along with pleasure or pain nor faculties such as such 
hearing or the ability to feel angry, which are given by nature (Lacewing, 2016). 
Likewise, in Chapters 3 and 6, I argue that the virtue of OM mainly as such a 
character trait fits, among other things, the Aristotelian concept of virtue that is 
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required for a full account of WB. However, Aristotle suggests that “we must not 
only describe arete as a state of character but also say what sort of state it is” 
(Aristotle, NE 1106a14-15). To this end, Aristotle turns to the concept of meson, i.e. 
the doctrine of the mean, as a criterion of phronesis and of man who is phronimos. 
2.5.3.2 Meson, Eudaimonia (well-being) and Arete (virtue) 
Aristotle develops his doctrine of meson mainly in the context of the 
discussion about arete (virtue) and it appears to be a sine qua non of his ethical 
theory. First, he introduces the concept in terms of health, e.g. “drink or food which 
is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is 
proportionate both produces and increases and preserves health” (Aristotle, NE 
1104a16). Perhaps he does this because he wants to establish a general principle that 
is widely acceptable. But how is this relevant to the concept of arete? Aristotle 
argues that “arete is a kind of mesotes, since arete aims at what meson is” (Aristotle, 
NE 1106b29) and elsewhere that “meson preserves the goodness” (Aristotle, NE 
1106b12).  
The idea of meson is also important for the overall argument of this thesis, i.e. 
if an account of WB requires an account of virtue(s) and if OM is a virtue, then OM 
is necessary for WB. Let me explain. According to Aristotle meson is “to feel at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the 
right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is 
characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Therefore, the concept of meson is 
inextricably connected with the concept of virtue. Open-mindedness is a virtue, as I 
show in Chapter 6. Therefore, OM as a virtue is related to meson. Specifically, if OM 
consists in the “willingness and within limits ability to transcend a default cognitive 
standpoint in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive 
standpoint and… when it is necessary to adjust one‟s beliefs or confidence levels 
according to the outcome of their rational assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154), then it 
could be argued that OM aims at meson. It can also be maintained that OM is 
preserved by meson, so that one‟s “brains neither fall out” nor does one “take one‟s 




However, in terms of understanding, let us approach the idea of meson 
conceptually. There are two main Greek words that Aristotle uses interchangeably in 
order to develop his concept and they have the same meaning, i.e. mesotes and 
meson
23
, where the former seems more general and refers to a state of character as 
intermediate and the latter is more specific and relates to an action as intermediate 
(Pakaluk, 2011). Modern scholars talk about meson as intermediate (Ross, 1925), 
middle (Bostock, 2000), betweenness (Pakaluk, 2011), and most of them translate it 
as mean (Urmson, 1980) (Broadie, 1991). However, Chatzopoulos disagrees with the 
translation of meson as mean. To justify his disagreement he gives an example of the 
translated Aristotelian quote that courage is the mean between cowardice and 
recklessness and argues that this is wrong because the original word includes the 
concepts both of mean and of dispersity.  
In addition, Chatzopoulos observes that in antiquity, Aristotle, like other 
people, did not have any statistical tools available. Therefore, people used the 
methods of example and analogy to form their explanations, e.g. the right quantity of 
food that a human should consume could be used as an example of what it means for 
a person to achieve a virtue. Nowadays, we use statistics and thus, we are able to 
quantify the amount of food that a man needs by means of a sample taken by a group 
of people and by calculating both the mean and the dispersity. However, when one 
translates meson as mean, Chatzopoulos argues, one seems to destroy arete (virtue) 
because one removes the degrees of freedom, the range that dispersity gives to arete, 
while Aristotle shows exactly the opposite. Therefore, meson should be translated as 
mid-space and not as mean (Chatzopoulos). In this chapter I maintain the original 
word of meson throughout. 
Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of meson and the virtue of OM is 
related in particular to the second kind of meson as explained next. First, he talks 
about a kind of quantitative meson, i.e. “the intermediate to the object” (Aristotle, NE 
1106a29) and “the intermediate according to arithmetical proportion… which is 
equidistant from each of the extremes and it is one and the same for all” (Aristotle, 
NE 1106a34) (Aristotle, NE 1106a32). Second, he identifies a meson that is relative 
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 Here, I use the term meson. 
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to the person which differs from the meson that is relative to the object. The meson 
that is relative to us is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, 
towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both 
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). 
Therefore, OM shares an additional characteristic with the concept of meson, i.e. 
they are both agent-oriented and relative to the individual.   
To illustrate his notion, Aristotle talks about Milo, an athlete, whose diet is 
regulated relative to the aim of the amount of food that promotes Milo‟s good health; 
“if ten pounds is too much for someone to eat and two too little, it does not follow 
that the trainer will order six pounds… for this would be too little for Milo and too 
much for the beginner in athletic exercises” (Aristotle, NE 1106b36). The main 
difference between the two mesa is that the meson relative to us varies and depends 
on persons, activities and aims and involves the idea of prohairesis (choice). In a 
similar line of thought, I argue that the account of WB that this thesis defends 
involves the characteristics of a person‟s desire and choice, which I further 
investigate in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of the WB discourse in education. 
Also, the idea of prohairesis
24
 (choice) may enlighten how the concepts of meson 
and arete (virtue) are related to the intellect. According to Sorabji (1980) Aristotle 
expresses this aspect clearly in his statement that  
“The agent (who acts in accordance with the virtues) must have knowledge and he 
must choose the acts… in order to be good (virtuous) when one does several acts, 
one must do them as a result of choice… and that… choice is deliberate
25
 desire of 
things in our power…” (Aristotle, NE 1105a32) (Aristotle, NE 1144a17) (Aristotle, 
NE 1113a10) 
Likewise, Evrigenis (1999) talks about a strong connection between arete, 
phronesis and meson and between all these concepts and eudaimonia. Hence, 
eudaimonia consists in using reason in accordance with virtue, virtue is a kind of 
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 I acknowledge that there is much discussion and disagreement concerning the meaning(s) and, for 
some, the inconsistent use of Aristotelian prohairesis in the NE, but it is not my aim here to elaborate 
on this. 
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 I use deliberation as zetesis, i.e. involving search (NE 1112b20, 1142b15 etc.). As for prohairesis, 
deliberation and its association with it seems quite problematic to some scholars in terms of means, 




mesotes and meson is a characteristic of virtue, therefore, meson is intellectually 
significant and involves rational thinking. This is particularly important from the 
point of view of this thesis, because I argue for a cognitive account of WB (which 
becomes more obvious in the next chapter) that requires an account of virtue(s) and 
in this regard, it requires OM. In this context, OM and meson are further connected 
because they are both intellectually important and involve rational thinking. 
However, this becomes more obvious in Chapter 6 where I elaborate on the concept 
of OM as an intellectual virtue that facilitates WB. 
In addition, Aristotle‟s concept of meson, as Pakaluk (2005) notes, is 
interesting and bold, but it is not true in an obvious way and certain issues in it need 
further clarification. He also highlights that in Aristotelian work the concepts of 
eudaimonia (WB) and arete (virtue) are essentially related, i.e. no one can be 
eudaimon unless they are virtuous, and he observes that eudaimonia and arete are the 
two key concepts upon which the idea of meson is based. According to Aristotelian 
theory, eudaimonia and arete consist in the equal mean between two extremes, i.e. an 
excess and a defect. Besides, the concept of meson constitutes a core theme in his 
ethical treatise in the sense that if somebody wants to accomplish arete and be 
eudaimon, they should avoid extreme choices (Pakaluk, 2005).  
Furthermore, the key point for virtuous actions is logos (reason), that is, the 
capacity to think. Therefore, one is eudaimon when one acts according to logos as 
“life seems to be essentially the act of thinking” (Aristotle, NE 1170a19). 
Additionally, logos (reason) aims by definition at balance and symmetry, at 
something that is not extreme, neither an excess nor a defect, and therein lies 
eudaimonia. Specifically, “to be in a state of excess or deficiency in relation to a 
virtue is to have a vice; it is not to have too much or too little of a virtue” (Hardie, 
1968, p 136). Also, Pakaluk (2005) says that success (as a sine qua non for 
eudaimonia) consists in the correct way, but the concept of way suggests degree, and 
degree in turn needs balance and correct adjustment of things. Having said that, 
though, it is not at all implied that meson is a kind of mediocrity. 
On the other hand, Urmson (1980) interprets meson quantitatively in terms of 
too much or too little concerning deon (right) and as an intermediate between two 
50 
 
things. However, Hursthouse (1980) (2006) disagrees with this view and points out 
that it is not possible for almost anyone or anything to be simply measurable in a 
straightforward manner, and in relation to this, Aristotle himself gives the image of 
the centre of a circle “e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for 
him who knows” (Aristotle, NE 1109a25). Moreover, Williams (1985, p. 36) states 
that the doctrine of meson should be “better forgotten” as the least useful and 
depressing part of Aristotle‟s theory. However, Williams (1985) recognizes that 
meson may have a point in the sense that “virtuous people are supposed to recognize 
others‟ vices as such and those who have them or their actions as unpleasant or 
unhelpful” (ibid, 1985, p. 36). On the other hand, Losin (1987) argues that Williams 
(1985) is unfair to Aristotle‟s insights in relation to meson. Like Pakaluk (2011), he 
thinks that the concept of meson is vital for the complete not partial interpretation of 
Aristotelian ethics and suggests an alternative interpretation in terms of hexis (habit) 
that is observable and public and not in terms of disposition or quality of psyche 
(soul). Here, as I noted above, the concept of meson is significant in relation to 
Aristotle‟s key topics of eudaimonia (WB) and arete (virtue), and therefore it is 
particularly important for the argument of this thesis and the virtue of OM. 
Hence, Aristotle describes arete (virtue) as hexis (a state of character) which 
is related to prohairesis (choice). The concept of prohairesis lies in the kind of 
meson that is relative to the person and it is determined by a rational principle which 
in turn is determined by the person. However, is there any expert(s) able to determine 
meson? Aristotle argues that the phronimos man, who is distinguished for his 
“phronesis, the reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to virtue” 
(Aristotle, NE 1140b20) is able to determine meson in any case (Bostock, 2000). In 
this regard, the concept of meson also becomes significant in practical terms, because 
it is implied that the phronimos man, that is, a person who has phronesis, can provide 
some kind of guidance towards meson and eudaimonia (WB). This in turn may have 
implications for teacher education, if teacher education programmes aim at teachers‟ 
WB and if they particularly aim at an account of WB that requires an account of 
virtue such as OM, as I argue later in the thesis. In the following section, let us look 
at the idea of phronesis, that is, the practical approach to knowledge and a key 
intellectual virtue necessary for eudaimonia (WB). 
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2.5.3.3 Phronesis: a Key Intellectual Arete (virtue) Necessary for Eudaimonia 
(well-being) 
Since arete (virtue) is the ground upon eudaimonia (WB) lies, a thorough 
examination of virtue(s) could help us know what eudaimonia is and how to achieve 
it (Broadie, 1991). In Book VI of the NE, Aristotle elaborates on the virtues of the 
intellect which specifically interest us here, because I look at an account of teachers‟ 
WB as an approach to knowledge and a teacher education that supports this. 
Aristotle‟s aim here is mainly to elucidate his previous statements “that meson is 
determined by reason, let us discuss this… it should also be determined what correct 
reason is and what is the standard that fixes it” (Aristotle, NE 1138b20) (Aristotle, 
NE 1138b35).  
To this end, Aristotle turns to the examination of the virtues of the intellect 
which are concerned with truth and enable one to reason well under any 
circumstance. In other words, Aristotle seems to hold that logos (reason) makes 
someone able to arrange their activities in accordance with rational pursuits (Ackrill, 
1973). As Kenny (1978) observes, the output of the intellectual virtues is truth either 
about how things are or about bringing them into existence. Specifically, Aristotle 
says that “we must learn what the best state of each of these two rational parts of the 
soul is for this is the virtue of each… that is truth
26
” (Aristotle, NE 1139a15-6) 
(Aristotle, NE 1139b13).  
In 2.5 we saw that Aristotle distinguishes ellogon, i.e. the rational part of the 
psyche (soul), into two parts: first, the logistikon, i.e. the calculative part with which 
a human considers variable and changeable things and which is practical reasoning 
or productive thinking and second, the epistemonikon, i.e. the scientific part with 
which one considers invariable and unchangeable things and which is theoretical 
reasoning (Kraut, 2014). Then, he identifies five chief intellectual virtues. 
Specifically, Aristotle on the one hand talks about the key intellectual virtues of 
sophia, nous and episteme that belong to the epistemonikon, and on the other hand 
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about phronesis and techne that belong to the logistikon as I illustrate in the 






(Figure 1: Aristotle‟s main intellectual virtues) 
 
Let us focus on the key intellectual virtue of phronesis. It comes from the 
ancient Greek verb phronein, i.e. to think, to have understanding
27
 and the noun 
phren, i.e. mind, thought. As Noel (1999) notices, phronesis has various English 
translations and interpretations in order to cover the full meaning of the term. 
Usually it is translated as practical wisdom, practical reasoning, moral insight or 
prudence (Noel, 1999) (Liddell and Scott, 2011) (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). 
Different translations stress different aspects of the concept of phronesis and many 
disagreements arise among scholars concerning its nature, functions and relationship 
                                                 
26a 
The non-rational part of the soul is also divided into the epithemetikon, i.e. the appetitive part that 
responds to reason and the phytikon, i.e. the vegetative part, that does not respond to reason. Moral 
virtues, i.e. the virtues of character, respond to the appetitive part. The second kind are the virtues of 
the intellect which respond to the rational part of the soul. 
27
 Not to be confused with the minor intellectual virtue of understanding which “only judges whilst 
phronesis issues commands” (Aristotle, NE 1143a8-10), i.e. understanding as a virtue of the intellect 
is not related to action. 
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with other concepts in Aristotle‟s theory (Noel, 1999). Clearly, it is beyond our scope 
here to discuss them all. In this thesis I mainly use the original term of phronesis 
with a combination of interpretations
28
 and an emphasis on its inextricable 
connection with the concepts of arete (virtue) and eudaimonia (WB) as well as with 
a focus on who one is as a whole person.  
Additionally, I do not look at the intellectual virtues of nous, episteme and 
sophia where the latter is a combination of the former two, because they are all 
concerned with unchangeable things. Specifically, Aristotle says that “sophia will 
contemplate none of the things that will make a man eudaimon but phronesis has this 
merit
29
” (Aristotle, NE 1143b20). However, this does not necessarily mean that 
phronesis is the highest and best intellectual virtue to achieve eudaimonia. As Kenny 
(1978) argues despite the fact that sophia appears from time to time alongside 
phronesis as a quasi-synonym or to mark a contrast, Aristotle states that “phronesis 
is not supreme over sophia any more than the art of medicine is over health” 
(Aristotle, NE 1145a6).   
Furthermore, Kraut (2014) and Hoffmann (2016) observe that Aristotle 
discusses techne (craft knowledge) only in order to offer a contrast with the other 
intellectual virtues; he does not suggest it as a necessary element towards 
eudaimonia, because technites (craftsmen) do not necessarily make something in a 
virtuous way, nor are they themselves virtuous, in contrast with phronesis and the 
phronimos man. Having said that, in the previous chapter, it was argued that “who 
teachers are as persons cannot and should not be separated from who they are and 
what they do as professionals” (Day and Gu, 2010, p. 5), because teachers are to a 
large extent professionally concerned with the transformation of persons and the 
transmission of a life worth living. Therefore it is a normal expectation that a life 
worth living is exhibited by those who hold it (Higgins, 2011) (Carr, 1993). In the 
light of this, as I argued in Chapter 1, teacher education should not be seen in an 
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 Due to the fact that all kinds of interpretations seem to be intertwined in Aristotle‟s ethics, it may 
not be possible to talk just from one point of view, e.g. the moral character interpretation, the basic 
interpretation, the rationality interpretation, the situational perception and insight interpretation etc. 
(Noel, 1999).  
29
 Nevertheless, a few paragraphs later Aristotle says the opposite, i.e. “so does sophia produce 
eudaimonia” (NE 1144a5).  
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instrumental way that aims at producing technites, but for the sake of pupils‟ WB it 
should equally value teachers‟ WB and aim at producing phronimous.  
To be more specific, according to Biondi Khan (2005) there are at least three 
major views of phronesis. The first is about choosing the right end and the means to 
that end. This is not the same as choosing any end and then just accomplishing it, 
because there are both good and bad ends. It is choosing correctly, having euvoulia, 
i.e. “excellence in deliberation” (Aristotle, NE 1142b6) regarding both ends and 
means to these ends. In that sense, phronesis differs from deinotes, i.e. cleverness, 
however, “phronesis does not exist without this faculty” (Aristotle, NE 1144a30).  
From another point of view, Aristotle seems to define phronesis in terms of 
proper means to the right end. Specifically, he says that “virtue makes the goal right 
and practical wisdom makes what leads to it correct” (Aristotle, NE 1144a9). 
However, if phronesis is only about proper means, then it does not essentially differ 
from deinotes (cleverness) (Biondi Khan, 2005). Third, it may be the case that 
phronesis does not exist in its own right, but in relation to the phronimos man, i.e. a 
person who is both virtuous and clever.  
Although Aristotle generally does not give clear-cut answers, he explores 
various ways that answers can be found. However, his “discussion is adequate if it 
has as much clearness as the subject--matter admits of, for precision is not to be 
sought for alike in all discussions” (Aristotle, NE 1094b13). For the aims of this 
thesis I adopt a position between the first and the third interpretation, but certainly 
not the second view as it distinguishes phronesis from virtue. Rorty (1980) notices 
that the problem whether phronesis relies on virtue to provide the ends or offers the 
ends itself is solved by acknowledging that the desires of the phronimos man are the 
requirements of virtue.  
Moreover, Aristotle emphasizes that “phronesis must be a reasoned and true 
state capable of action with regard to human goods… phronesis is a virtue… and to 
virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20) (Aristotle, NE 1140b24) 
(Aristotle, NE 1098b31). In phronesis reason and desire are united. Earlier on we 
saw that the most characteristic good of a human being is one‟s capacity to use 
reason. Subsequently, a human being who uses reason well in a lifetime is eudaimon 
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and this is what eudaimonia consists in. However, in order to do anything well one 
requires arete (virtue). Similarly, “if the function of a man is an activity of psyche 
(soul) which follows or implies reason… human good turns out to be activity of 
psyche exhibiting arete (virtue) and if there are more than one arete,  then in 
accordance with the best and most complete… in a complete life” (Aristotle, NE 
1098a7) (Aristotle, NE 1098a16).  
It seems that eudaimonia is virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous 
activities are actually the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational
30
 part of 
human beings‟ psyche (soul). According to this understanding, phronesis is 
necessary
31
 for being virtuous. As Moss (2011) argues, being phronimos and virtuous 
or good is exactly the same. In other words, Aristotle says that “it is not possible to 
be good in the strict sense without phronesis” (Aristotle, NE 1144b30) and being 
virtuous, i.e. to act in accordance with virtue and not being in a passive state, is 
necessary (and perhaps sufficient
32
) for being eudaimon. Therefore, it appears that 
being phronimos is necessary for being eudaimon and in this sense, virtue(s) is 
necessary for WB. Rorty (1980) also notes that the life of a phronimos man is 
eudaimon, however, not necessarily always. 
Additionally, Aristotle says that “with the presence of phronesis will be given 
all the virtues” (Aristotle, NE 1145a2) and that “virtues do not exist in separation 
from one another” (Aristotle, NE 1144b34). In relation to this, Russell (2009) argues 
that phronesis is the key element that unites all virtues and rejects the view that 
virtues conflict. It is widely accepted that all virtues seem to involve phronesis, from 
which it can be implied that virtues form a kind of unity, even though it is rather 
unclear what kind of unity this is (Russell, 2009). Likewise, Rorty (1980) claims that 
the phronimos man has the same knowledge and desires as the virtuous man. 
Furthermore, “phronesis is what is fitting in relation to the agent and to the 
circumstances and the object” (Aristotle, NE 1122a25). How is it realized though? 
Phronesis is accomplished through the phronimos man. Aristotle argues that “a man 
has phronesis not by knowing only but by being able to act… and he acts voluntarily, 
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 The part where the ability of reason belongs. 
31
 And for some scholars phronesis is also sufficient for eudaimonia (Moss, 2011). 
32
 As I said earlier, I am not concerned here with the condition of sufficiency. 
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for he acts in a sense with knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which 
he does it, but is not wicked, since his choice is good” (Aristotle, NE 1152a13) 
(Aristotle, NE 1152a15).   
However, various problems occur with the Aristotelian idea of phronesis and 
the phronimos man such the problem of circularity (Biondi Khan, 2005) which is 
also a general problem of the NE as discussed in the following sections. Specifically, 
Aristotle defines phronesis in terms of virtue and vice versa, e.g. “it is not possible to 
be virtuous without phronesis or have phronesis without virtue” (Aristotle, NE 
1144b32). In this regared, one should be virtuous in order to acquire phronesis but 
simultaneously, one cannot be virtuous unless one is phronimos. A second problem 
is how to identify the phronimos man. As Biondi Khan (2005) observes, Aristotle 
does not offer any straightforward reply to this. On the one hand, there are those who 
are not phronimoi, perhaps the majority of people. However, since they do not have 
the excellent qualities of a phronimos man, how are they in a position to distinguish 
one who is phronimos? Maybe only a phronimos man, one or many, can recognize 
another phronimos person(s). But again, how can this be justified? To this end, 
Aristotle‟s endoxa, as explained in the previous sections, may provide some sort of 
advice as Reeve (1999 cited by Biondi Khan, 2005, p. 50) suggests.  
Next, I look at some
33
 well-known objections to Aristotelian virtue ethics that 
are also relevant to the topics that this thesis explores such as the problem of 
guidance in action, objections concerning circularity, a criticism about self-
centredness and the problem of luck. 
2.6 Some Objections to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 
After Anscombe‟s (1958) paper Modern Moral Philosophy and the revival of 
virtue ethics, not surprisingly, various criticisms were raised among scholars 
concerning virtue ethics. However, as Athanassoulis (2016) observes, much of the 
work on virtue ethics so far constitutes responses to such criticisms. Obviously, it is 
not possible and is beyond our scope here to look at every objection in relation to 
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 There are also the problems of teleology, conflict between virtues, utopianism etc. 
57 
 
Aristotle‟s virtue ethics. Therefore, I particularly focus on four well-known problems 
as more relevant
34
 to the aims of this thesis.  
2.6.1 Guidance in Action 
A first problem according to Hursthouse (2012) is the application problem 
that is whether Aristotelian virtue ethics can provide guidance in action. For 
example, utilitarianism presents the principle of the greatest good for the greatest 
number and Kantianism provides the categorical imperative. Does the concept of 
meson in virtue ethics function in a similar way? We saw earlier on, for instance, that 
Williams (1985) discards meson as not useful at all and suggests that it is “better 
forgotten” (ibid, 1985, p. 35). Many scholars also notice that the criteria of “too 
much” and “too little” or “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way” 
(Aristotle, NE 1106b20) are in practice complex, vague and difficult to understand 
(Lacewing, 2016). However, as Losin (1987) argues, meson is not intended to 
function as a guide in action, but is presented as a sine qua non of Aristotle‟s concept 
of arete and is also determined by the phronimos man. 
Could then a person with phronesis (practical wisdom), who holds arete and 
acts in accordance with it, be such a rule or principle for guidance? Advocates of 
virtue ethics argue that the phronimos man can operate as an exemplar in action 
which is much more flexible and context – sensitive in contrast with other theories 
which appear too rigid and fixed (Athanassoulis, 2016). Thus, phronesis is necessary 
in order to apply any rule or principle correctly (Hursthouse, 2012). But what about 
those who do not exercise virtue and are not oriented towards phronesis (practical 
wisdom)? Guidance from this point of view seems to be provided just to a few. On 
the other hand, Aristotle implies that only a few people are entirely corrupted, that is, 
have no sense of what is good or bad, which especially nowadays I find quite 
optimistic, and that most people have an understanding of the good and in order to 
deepen this understanding they just have to become more virtuous (Lacewing, 2016).  
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From my perspective, this is one of many fascinating elements in Aristotle‟s 
theory. Admittedly, human life is so complicated that simply applying a rule or a set 
of principles would not do.  Aristotle avoids providing a fixed „recipe‟ or „one size 
fits all‟ solution and partly in this way, from the inside out, he may also avoid 
paternalism and oppression. In any case, just because Aristotle does not offer a 
straightforward set of rules, this does not mean that he does not give us any guidance 
in action at all. He does, but it is a different kind. Hence, Aristotle does not provide 
precise answers on what to do and he warns us in advance about this. Rather, he 
points out ways that answers can be found (Hughes, 2001) by considering “the 
highest of all goods achievable by action” (Aristotle, NE 1095a16) (Aristotle, NE 
1098b21) both an individual point of view and a collective one. 
Furthermore, Solomon (1988) argues that just because virtue ethics provide a 
different kind of guidance, this does not mean that no guidance in action is provided 
at all. The main focus of virtue ethics is on human character and since human 
character is a dynamic phenomenon, unavoidably the focus turns to a person‟s whole 
life. To this end, Aristotelian virtue ethics do not use algorithms to cope with 
practical problems, which perhaps policy makers, governments etc. would love, but 
rather Aristotle seems to favour a kind of “fitness programme to get one prepared for 
a race” (Solomon, 1988, p. 437). Additionally, whereas both consequentialism and 
deontology provide principles and rules for guidance in action, there is always 
difficulty in applying them. Therefore, as Solomon (1988, p. 438) stresses, “easy 
cases are easy for everyone and hard cases are hard for all too”. 
2.6.2 Circularity 
Another objection raised against Aristotelian virtue ethics is that of 
circularity. According to Monan (1968) one finds plenty of explanative circularities 
in the NE, that is, Aristotle seems to define concepts in terms of each other. This 
seems to belong to the wider problem of justification (Hursthouse, 2012). To 
mention briefly only two, there is the possibility of circularity in defining 
eudaimonia as virtuous activity and virtuous activity in terms of virtuous agent. For 
instance, Ackrill (1973) notes that, if eudaimonia partly consists in virtuous activity, 
one cannot explain at all why this certain activity is virtuous by arguing that it 
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promotes eudaimonia. However, Peterson (1992) says that this is not necessarily 
circular and argues that “any notions which occur in Aristotelian entirely unfolded 
practical advice can be arranged in an explanative sequence which has no apparent 
circularity” (ibid, 1992, p. 105). 
Moreover, Lacewing (2016) notices that a simple reading of Aristotle‟s 
sentences usually causes problems of circularity. For instance, in reading all together 
that (a) an activity is virtuous if it is done by a virtuous agent in a certain situation 
and (b) a virtuous agent is someone who is inclined to act in a virtuous way, the 
difficulty is that we do not have a clear picture of what a virtuous activity or a 
virtuous agent is and we finally get a definition in terms of each other. But the 
problem may be solved by looking closer and in more detail at Aristotle‟s statements. 
Specifically, he notes that a virtuous activity is indeed what a virtuous agent does, 
but they know exactly what they are doing and they chose the activity for its own 
sake (Lacewing, 2016).  
Likewise, Peterson (1992) argues that a virtuous agent is not just someone 
who acts in a virtuous way, but one who acts virtuously “plus the full array of 
qualifications… that is, a number of qualifying phrases  such as what one ought, 
when one ought, to whom one ought etc.” (ibid, 1992, p. 94). Last but not least, 
Nussbaum (1980) notices that it still seems impossible to define the phronimos man 
in a way that is separate from the changeable human way of thinking about practical 
thought, but she also says that circularity issues should not discourage us as they are 
usually found to some extent in any complex ethical theory (Nussbaum, 1986). She 
concludes that 
“In the end our feeling about the circle, as to whether it is small and pernicious or 
large and interesting, will depend upon our sense of whether Aristotle has indeed 
done well what his method dictates: to work through the complexities of our beliefs 
concerning choice, correctly describing the conflicts and contradictions they present 
and to produce the ordering that will save what we most deeply consider worth 





Another problem with Aristotle‟s virtue ethics is its primary concern with the 
individual‟s own WB and the acquisition of virtues as part of one‟s own WB and in 
this sense he seems to overlook others‟ WB. Due to this, Aristotle‟s theory is 
criticized as self-centred or egoistic (Athanassoulis, 2016). In relation to that, 
Williams (1973) says that the “problem with an egoist is neither that one expresses 
desires nor that they are their desires, but that their desires are only for oneself” (ibid, 
1973, p. 260). Similarly, Annas (1993) observes that “an ethics of virtue is at most 
formally self-centred or egoistic; nevertheless its content can be fully other-
regarding” (ibid, 1993, p. 128). Hence, “is Aristotle a kind of egoist” or not? 
(Hughes, 2001, p. 172). Hughes (2001) argues that this is not true and only a narrow 
understanding of WB in the NE could result in such a conclusion.  
As Solomon (1988) suggests, a quick reply to the egoism objection 
(Hursthouse, 2012) is that the objectors overlook two important elements of virtue 
ethics. First, they fail to see the significance of one‟s own character in practical 
thinking and second, they overlook the virtues that one tries to integrate into one‟s 
character. Whilst the former seems too self-centred, the latter, however, counteracts 
that risk. In other words, one may put one‟s effort into the development of one‟s 
character, but at the same time that effort can also make one fully concerned with 
others‟ WB, e.g. trying to be just. Additionally, this criticism seems to be focused on 
a kind of imbalance between one‟s concern about one‟s own character and one‟s 
concern about others‟ character (Hursthouse, 2012). So one might ask, “should I 
have the same concern for other‟s character as I have for my own?” (Solomon, 1988, 
p. 435). 
This problem appears to be a part of the general problem of cultural relativity 
(Hursthouse, 2012) and it is as ineliminable in virtue ethics as it is in 
consequentialism and deontology (Solomon, 1988) (Hursthouse, 2012). For instance, 
Solomon (1988) argues, that in Kantianism the difference between duties to oneself 
and duties to others is found in that, whilst one can only aim at others‟ WB, one must 
first aim at one‟s own WB. Besides, in deontology one deals with one‟s own actions 
in a different way to that in which one deals with others‟ actions. The same difficulty 
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may be found in consequentialism. To give an example, in classical utilitarianism 
others‟ WB is merely instrumental because any concern relating to others is 
essentially directed by the single criterion of maximizing human WB overall. In this 
sense, in both deontology and consequentialism individuals are required to deal with 
their own actions or motivations in a different way to that in which they deal with 
others‟ actions (Solomon, 1988).   
Finally, as Garver (2006) observes, Aristotle‟s ethical virtues are in fact 
political virtues and as such they are necessarily others-regarding as well. Similarly, 
according to Eikeland (cited by Papastephanou, 2010, p. 591) “for Aristotle, even the 
wisest individual will be better able to think with the aid of others rather than alone.” 
Besides, it is not by chance that Aristotle elaborates on human relationships
35
 and 
virtues in relation to others, e.g. kindness, justice etc., throughout the NE. This is 
obvious when Aristotle states that 
“Surely it is strange too to make supremely eudaimon man a solitary; for no one 
would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political 
creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the eudaimon 
man lives with others… the eudaimon man needs friends.” (Aristotle, NE 1169b17) 
2.6.4 Luck 
There are various responses and approaches in relation to the problem of luck 
in Aristotelian virtue ethics as there are with almost any objection (Nelkin, 2013). 
According to some “luck is the only decisive factor in having a good life, whilst in 
another view, a good life is totally invulnerable to luck” (Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 320, 
322). Specifically, it is argued that virtue ethics leave too much space open in terms 
of luck, if by luck we mean good or bad things that occur in one‟s life independently 
of one‟s control and affect one‟s WB (Statman, 1991). Let us recall what Aristotle 
says 
“Eudaimonia, evidently, needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not 
easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends 
and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of 
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 He especially devoted two whole books of the NE (viii and ix) to friendship.  
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which takes the lustre from eudaimonia - good birth, goodly children, beauty… for 
this reason some identify eudaimonia with good fortune though others identify it with 
virtue.” (Aristotle, NE 1099a30) (Aristotle, NE 1099b10) 
According to particular understandings of virtue ethics, some accounts of 
virtue depend on external goods. Thus, it could be said that if an individual is subject 
to luck it may be unfair to praise or blame them for matters of luck that are in any 
case outside their control. However, how is it possible to accomplish WB if some 
aspects of it are beyond one‟s control? Nelkin (2013) and Athanassoulis (2016) 
notice that some theories attempt to solve the problem of luck by setting it aside as 
irrelevant, e.g. deontology. On the other hand, virtue ethics embrace luck and 
recognize it as a widely accepted indispensable element of the human condition 
which in my view is both realistic and humane.  Additionally, Nussbaum (1986) 
observes that “we can see that luck appears to have a significant ethical role, in 
making us able or not so able to act virtuously, and thus, to lead ethically complete 
lives” (ibid, 1986, p. xiv). She also recognizes the fragility of individual elements of 
the best human life and although Nussbaum (1986) thinks that eudaimonia is 
vulnerable to external factors, she also argues that “a life so vulnerable is, 
nevertheless, the best” (ibid, 1986, p. 10). In the next section, I briefly point out some 
educational implications in relation to the ideas examined so far, and I further discuss 
them in chapters 6 and 7. 
2.7 Educational Implications 
To sum up, in this chapter I argued for an account of WB that requires an 
account of virtue(s) from an Aristotelian perspective. Aristotle claims that WB 
consists in the activity of reason in accordance with virtue. In other words, WB is a 
virtuous activity during lifetime, whereas virtuous activities appear as the realization 
of the virtues that belong to the rational part of human beings‟ soul. In this context, 
Aristotle argues that praxis is the best human activity, a kind of WB that is both 
virtuous and feasible. Additionally, in praxis, as Kenny (1992) observes, phronesis is 
a key virtue and also the practical approach to knowledge. Phronesis also appears to 
be unique in terms of coping with how and why questions concerning one‟s WB in 
everyday life and is important in practical reasoning about a good to be brought 
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about in terms of what should be done.  In this regard, Aristotle implies that in order 
to understand eudaimonia it is necessary to understand phronesis, therefore, in order 
to understand WB it is necessary to understand virtue, and thus, virtue(s) is necessary 
for WB. 
From an educational perspective, if, for instance, “we should offer a teacher 
education that is not only about learning how to teach, but about learning how to 
learn through teaching, a teacher education for practical wisdom that helps teachers 
further their own self-cultivation” as Higgins (2011, p. 12) suggests, then, as this 
thesis argues, we should seek a concept of WB that requires virtue(s). In addition, 
Aristotle notes that “intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth 
to teaching for which reason it requires experience and time” (Aristotle, NE 
1103a15). Likewise, this thesis argues for a teacher education that is not just or 
mainly instrumental in terms of merely learning how to teach. In Aristotelian terms, 
an instrumental teacher education might be a kind of techne (craft knowledge) that 
neither need necessarily be done in a virtuous way nor require that those who are 
learning how to teach, that is student teachers, be virtuous (Kraut, 2014) (Hoffmann, 
2016). On the contrary, here it is argued that teacher education programmes should 
aim at cultivating teachers‟ virtues which from an Aristotelian point of view means 
that teacher education should aim at producing phronimous. 
In the light of this, if teachers have a main responsibility for pupils‟ 
intellectual WB, since thinking-related virtues are basically acquired through 
instruction and learning, as Pakaluk (2005) notes, then teachers themselves should 
first acquire intellectual virtues and experience intellectual WB. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, who teachers are as persons and what they do as professionals 
should not be separated, because, basically, teachers are professionally concerned 
with the transformation of their pupils and the transmission of a life worth living; 
therefore it is a normal expectation that this life is exhibited by those who hold it 
(Higgins, 2011) (Carr, 1993) (Day and Gu, 2010). From this point of view, I argue 
that teacher education should primarily focus on teachers‟ WB and help them 
cultivate their intellectual virtues with a particular focus on the virtue of OM, so that 
they also contribute to pupils‟ WB. In this sense, would such an account of WB that 
is based on an account of virtue(s) be reasonable and possible to achieve in teacher 
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education programmes in contemporary times? This thesis is sympathetic to that 
view, however, certain conditions such as profit-seeking and political power as 
discussed in the previous chapter, should be taken into account in terms of 
achievement of this account of WB.  
Next, I elaborate the argument of this thesis that an account of WB requires 
an account of virtue(s) and to this end, I particularly look at virtue epistemology 























Virtue Epistemology: Intellectual Virtues for Intellectual Well-being 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter, like the previous chapter, addresses the concepts of WB and 
virtue(s) that are connected and mutually defined from both an individual and a 
collective point of view. In the previous chapter I argued that according to a certain 
understanding of Aristotle‟s ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle implies 
that in order to understand eudaimonia (WB) it is necessary to understand phronesis 
(virtue), and therefore, an account of WB requires an account of virtue(s). From an 
Aristotelian point of view it was argued that eudaimonia (WB) is a virtuous activity 
in a person‟s lifetime, and virtuous activities are the realization of the virtues of the 
rational part of human beings‟ souls. In this context, praxis appears to be the best 
human activity and an account of WB that is both virtuous and feasible. Additionally, 
the key intellectual virtue of praxis is phronesis, that is, the practical approach to 
knowledge. In this regard, eudaimonia (WB) and phronesis (virtue) are connected 
and mutually defined. It was concluded that the concept of virtue(s) generally and 
that of phronesis in particular appear unique in terms of coping with how and why 
questions regarding WB in everyday life, and in practical reasoning about a good to 
be brought about, and this has implications for teachers and teacher education.  
In this chapter, I particularly focus on teachers‟ intellectual WB and 
intellectual virtues, and I therefore, look at the concept of virtue epistemology 
(thereafter VEP) because it gives intellectual virtues an essential and primary role in 
intellectual WB (Roberts and Wood, 2007). The basic claim of virtue epistemology 
is that individuals should form their beliefs in the right way, virtuously and not 
because of (good) luck or accidentally. In this regard, VEP focuses on how 
individuals form their beliefs in order to achieve credit for them and how individuals‟ 
characteristics can support justification for their beliefs (Kawall, 2002). Moreover, 
VEP is explicitly oriented towards the accomplishment of epistemic goods such as 
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knowledge and understanding, and in this way it becomes an essential tool towards 
intellectual WB. It focuses on the individuals‟ traits per se and how they can be good 
informants through the cultivation of their intellectual virtues. VEP focuses on the 
individual per se and what it is to be a good knower instead of what the individual 
knows and what knowledge is.   
In this chapter, I argue for a particular kind of alternative regulative educative 
virtue epistemology (thereafter AREVEP). To this end, I draw mainly, among others, 
on Roberts‟ and Wood‟s work Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative 
Epistemology (2007). This chapter argues for a character-based, moderate-
autonomous, high-grade account of VEP that is both responsibilist and reliabilist. It 
is reliabilist in the sense that a perfect account of VEP should include both virtues as 
faculties and virtues as character traits as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I 
argue for a VEP account that expands outside the area of traditional epistemology 
and its debates, does not aim at giving robust definitions of knowledge or 
justification and also, does not deal with standard epistemological concerns, as 
Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) suggest. I also draw on Kvanvig‟s 
(2010) non-traditional epistemological ideas, especially those concerning any 
relationship(s) of VEP with education and other-regarding/social concerns. However, 
under this wide, non-traditional framework, I also attempt to bring in the ideas of 
other scholars, all of whom suggest that the study of knowledge and relative human 
goods should be expanded and connected with ethical issues as well as with the 
enterprise of education.  
Moreover, particular emphasis is given to discussing the idea of AREVEP 
and its connections with the concepts of intellectual virtues and the epistemic goods, 
such as knowledge and understanding. In this context, intellectual virtues explicitly 
aim at epistemic goods and constitute the foundation of excellent epistemic activity 
such as reasoning and they also demonstrate strong social dimensions (Roberts and 
Wood, 2007). From this perspective, epistemic virtues are regarded as individual 
qualities that are mainly acquired through action and practice and they are “an 
acquired base of excellent intellectual functioning of some human activity” (Roberts 
and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215) (Baehr, 2011) (Riggs, 2010). In addition, it is argued 
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here that knowledge as intellectual good involves more than a narrow understanding 
of it as justified true belief. I also argue that epistemic goods such as knowledge, 
acquaintance and understanding are interconnected and therefore, should not be 
treated separately from one another but as a complex. 
My aim in exploring all these connections is to contribute to the concept of 
intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and particularly as far as 
teachers are concerned, to make them excellent intellectual agents, so as to help 
children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multi-faceted role (Hamilton, 
2014, p. 1), and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in teaching the “question is not 
only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is also a formation in human 
excellence and the characteristic products of such a teaching for life are called 
virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64).  
3.2 Epistemology: the Roots of Virtue Epistemology  
To begin, epistemology is considered to be the theory of knowledge, that is, 
the systematic examination of knowledge, its nature, its origins and limitations as 
well as the study of truth and justification (Williams, 2001) (Blaauw and Pritchard, 
2005) (Steup, 2005). The word derives from the Greek verb epistamai, i.e. to know, 
to know how to and logos, i.e. word (Liddell and Scott, 2016). Also, in Greek the 
noun episteme means “(scientific) knowledge, a system of understanding” and an 
epistemon is a person who acquires episteme (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). One of the 
most basic questions of epistemology is what the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of knowledge are (Craig, 1990).  
In this sense, the main tasks of epistemology are (a) the constituent elements 
or the nature of knowledge, (b) the substantial states or sources of knowledge and (c) 
the limits or extents of knowledge (Blaauw and Pritchard, 2005) (Truncellito, 2007). 
These three areas of investigation cause debates over the analysis, sources and limits 
of knowledge and justification (Moser, 2002). As Steup (2005) observes, these are 
essential characteristics of the traditional epistemology which is belief-oriented and 
evidential. On the other hand, there is also the non-traditional kind of epistemology 
which is agent-oriented and based on one‟s intellectual virtues or cognitive faculties 
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(Steup, 2005). Virtue epistemology, which is particularly examined in this chapter, is 
considered a non-traditional epistemological theory.  
Specifically, epistemology is the study of “propositional knowledge”, i.e. 
know-that-something-is-so knowledge, in contrast with other kinds of knowledge 
such as procedural knowledge, i.e. know-how-to-do knowledge, and knowledge by 
acquaintance or direct awareness i.e. know-someone/something knowledge (Moser, 
2002) (Zagzebski, 2004) (Steup, 2005) (Truncellito, 2007) (Pritchard, 2010). 
According to Moser (2002), epistemologists have divided “propositional knowledge” 
into (a) empirical or a posteriori knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is grounded on 
perceptual or sensory content and uses reason (b) non-empirical or a priori 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge that uses reason and is independent of any experience, (c) 





 (Truncellito, 2007).  
In a similar context, there is also discussion in relation to knowledge as 
having “intrinsic” and “extrinsic value” (Zimmerman, 2014). Various terms are used 
to refer to value as “intrinsic” such as “in itself”, “in its own right”, “for its own 
sake”. As Zimmerman (2014) observes, the intrinsic value of something is found in 
the value that this thing has for its own sake, whereas extrinsic value consists in not 
being intrinsic. From this point of view, what does it mean, for example, that 
knowledge is valuable for its own sake and, from the opposite viewpoint, that 
knowledge has value for the sake of something else to which it is related in some 
way? Perhaps Aristotle‟s ideas could shed some light on this question. In Book 1 of 
the NE, Aristotle argues that  
“If there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake 
(everything else being desired for the sake of this) and if we do not choose everything 
for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so 
that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief 
good.” (Aristotle, NE 1094a 19-23).  
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 Social epistemology is a strand of epistemology that particularly addresses this kind of propositional 
knowledge. 
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 VEP specifically explores this type of knowledge.  
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Therefore, it may be the case that what is intrinsically good is not derivatively good 
since it is good for its own sake and in contrast, what is not intrinsically but 
extrinsically good is derivatively good since it is good for the sake of something else 
that is good and to which it is related in some way (Zimmerman, 2014). In this 
chapter I am interested in a kind of knowledge and other epistemic goods that have 
both intrinsic and extrinsic value, that is, they are good both in themselves and for 
others. To this end, I look at VEP, which is a collection of contemporary approaches 
to epistemology that attributes a primary role to intellectual virtue(s) for epistemic 
WB.  
Specifically, epistemology regarding the problem of what knowledge consists 
in replies that “knowledge is justified true belief” (JTB), and from this traditional 
point of view, “propositional knowledge” consists in these three individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient elements (Ichikawa and Steup, 2012) (Sosa, 1991). In 
relation to this, Moser (2002) observes that “in contemporary epistemology questions 
about the concepts of belief and justification attract much attention” whilst truth is 
less controversial (Moser, 2002, p. 4) (Ichikawa and Steup, 2012). However, this 
traditional definition of knowledge was challenged by Edmund Gettier (cited by 
Steup, 2005), who showed that JTB cannot fully elucidate knowledge and proved 
that JTB is incomplete (Steup, 2005). To this day, the debate on the Gettier problem 
remains extremely complicated and unresolved (Moser, 2002) (Shope, 2002) 
(Kvanvig, 2003) (Zagzebski, 2008), however, this debate was the triggering point for 
the birth of VEP, as is explained next. 
3.2.1 Gettier’s Case: The Transition from Epistemology to Virtue Epistemology 
When Gettier published his paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), 
he “challenged what was held to be the traditional analysis of knowledge so far, that 
is if one has a JTB that p then one knows p”, the origins of which are found in Plato
38
 
and which is adopted by eminent philosophers of the 20
th
 century (Shope, 2002, p. 
29). Gettier showed that knowledge is not only JTB and that the three elements of 
justification, truth and belief are not sufficient for knowledge, because “some true 
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 Plato in his work Theaetetus, by the mouth of Socrates, is the first who says that “knowledge is true 
opinion accompanied by reason” (Plato, Theaetetus 202c). 
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beliefs may be supported merely by luck and therefore, they cannot be knowledge” 
(Gettier, 1963, p. 121).  
Specifically, against the traditional definition of knowledge that Smith knows 
that p if and only if p is true and Smith believes that p is true and Smith is justified in 
believing that p is true, Gettier (1963) juxtaposed the following argument: Smith has 
a justified belief that Jones will get the job that they have both applied for, because 
the manager told him so. Smith also has a justified belief that Jones has ten coins in 
his pocket, because he saw them. Therefore, he infers that he who gets the job will 
have ten coins in his pocket. His belief is reasonable and well-justified, because it is 
based on a testimony and on his observation. Also, it comes out that Smith‟s belief is 
indeed true, but not in the way that Smith believes, i.e. it is he himself who gets the 
job, not Jones, and it is also he himself who has ten coins in his pocket, and both 
these things were unknown to him. So, is his true belief that he who gets the job will 
have ten coins in his pocket, knowledge or not? Gettier (1963) argued that it is not, 
and changed epistemology discourse forever. 
Pritchard (2010) also argues that the problem with the traditional definition of 
knowledge as JTB is that two of the three components, i.e. justification and belief, 
are related to the agent and only one, i.e. truth, is related to the world, and this is 
problematic. However, a response to the Gettier problem that knowledge is true 
belief that is achieved as a result of the operation of reliable (a) intellectual virtues 
and/or (b) cognitive faculties “clarifies knowledge in terms of the individual‟s 
intellectual virtues and cognitive faculties and this is known as virtue epistemology” 
(Pritchard, 2010, p. 59).  
From a VEP perspective, Smith, in order to know, would have to obtain his 
true belief by virtue of his reliable (a) epistemic activity and/or (b) cognitive 
faculties, and neither was the case. In addition, Roberts and Wood (2007) claim that 
the recent focus on virtues and the ways they relate to epistemic or intellectual goods 
puts epistemology in the right place, and that VEP in particular is a solution to 
Gettier‟s problem concerning epistemic luck. Battaly (2008) also notes that 
epistemology so far was concerned with debates over rival analyses of knowledge, 
truth and justification, whereas DePaul and Zagzebski (2003) observe that when 
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Sosa‟s work The Raft and the Pyramid (1980) (cited by Zagzebski, 2003) was 
published the concept of intellectual virtues appeared in a clear and distinct way and 
a distinctive kind of epistemology was raised with its own classification, that is, VEP 
(MacAllister, 2012).  
Sosa (1980), in particular, tried to resolve the conflict about the problem of 
justification by introducing the notion of intellectual virtue. Since then, depending on 
“how philosophers conceive the concept of an intellectual virtue, different kinds of 
approaches in VEP have been developed”, as I show in the following sections (Sosa, 
1980, p. 9). In this context, some virtue epistemologists argue that traditional 
subjects of epistemological investigation such as knowledge, rationality, truth and 
justification could be defined in terms of intellectual virtues, whilst others suggest 
that the traditional goals of epistemology could be replaced by an examination of 
virtues in the cognitive realm (DePaul and Zagzebski, 2003).  
3.3 Virtue Epistemology 
Virtue epistemology is a collection of contemporary approaches to 
epistemology that gives intellectual-virtue concepts an essential and primary role and 
much recent epistemological discussion concerns the concept of intellectual virtues 
(Baehr, 2004) (Baehr, 2011). In VEP individuals rather than beliefs are the primary 
objects of epistemic evaluation, and intellectual virtues and vices (evaluations of 
persons) constitute the basic concepts. Virtue epistemologists argue that one‟s true 
belief should be obtained by virtue of one‟s epistemic activity. In particular, VEP 
views intellectual virtues and vices, i.e. forms of agent-evaluation, as more important 
than justification, knowledge or any other kind of belief-evaluation. By contrast, 
belief-based epistemology argues for justification and knowledge that is kinds of 
belief-evaluation, instead of intellectual virtues and vices or any other forms of 
agent-evaluation (Battaly, 2008). In other words, instead of focusing on what the 
agent knows, VEP turns its focus on the agent per se. Roberts and Wood (2007) note 
that this is related to the way that VEP copes particularly with the problem of 
epistemic luck, as in Gettier‟s case.   
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In addition, Hetherington (2014) notices that VEP is particularly related to 
two problems in Gettier cases, that is, luck and fallibility. On the one hand, there is 
significant luck in the way belief combines truth and justification, i.e. some unusual 
circumstance is present in the case that makes justified and true belief rather 
accidental. On the other hand, justification in these cases is fallible, i.e. it leaves open 
at least one possibility for a false belief. In order to deal with the problem of 
epistemic luck, VEP proposes turning the focus on the individual rather than on 
beliefs, especially by introducing the notion of credit on behalf of the individual 
(Roberts and Wood, 2007). In the case of Smith, for instance, Smith does not deserve 
credit for his true belief, because it was not obtained by his intellectual or epistemic 
activity, but rather by luck. All in all, the central question that VEP raises, and its 
roots go back to Aristotle, is what it is to be a good knower rather than what 
knowledge is (Kotzee, 2013). Virtue epistemology places the individual in the centre 
and investigates how one can form beliefs in order to achieve credit for them and 
how an individual‟s characteristics can support justification for their beliefs. This is 
possible when individuals form their beliefs in the right way that is virtuously and 
not because of (good) luck or accidentally. In this way, VEP becomes an essential 
tool, because it focuses on the individual‟s traits per se as well as how one can be a 
good knower through the cultivation of one‟s intellectual virtues for WB.  
Furthermore, VEP is criticized for over-emphasis on self-regarding virtues 
and over-looking other-regarding virtues which implies that it is more interested in 
the individual WB rather than in the collective one (Kawall, 2002). Such an 
individualistic kind of VEP would be problematic here, because this thesis argues for 
an equal concern both for individual and collective WB, in terms of teachers‟ 
intellectual WB and then pupils‟ WB. In this context it is argued later in the chapter 
that, although individualistic implications are found in VEP, these can be partly 
addressed by introducing the concept of social epistemology which focuses on social 
conditions for WB and on virtues in which individuals engage to share information 
with others (Schmitt, 1999) (Kotzee, 2013).  
Also, I argue that through the particular focus on the intellectual virtue of 
OM, which I elaborate in Chapter 6, this thesis avoids the problem of over-emphasis 
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on the individual virtues and WB in VEP at the expense of collective virtues and 
WB, as this account of open-mindedness is related both and equally to the individual 
and to the collective factors.  In addition, as Higgins (2011) suggests, in order to 
investigate how to reconcile self-interest and other-regard, I look at teaching and 
teachers. Based on Carr‟s (1993) ideas, in Chapter 1 I argue that in teaching, unlike 
other helping professions such as medicine, it is impossible to separate teachers' self-
fulfillment from their professional commitments. Therefore, an understanding of 
teachers‟ intellectual WB from a VEP perspective as examined in this chapter 
consists in an understanding of the individual‟s self-cultivation. Self-cultivation, in 
turn, is perceived as the cultivation of one‟s intellectual virtues, and this has 
implications for teachers and teacher education, as I argue in Chapter 1 and further 
explore in the last chapter of the thesis. Just as in Aristotelian virtue ethics the 
concept of virtue is necessary for WB, in VEP discourse the concept of intellectual 
virtues is indispensable for intellectual WB. In this regard, we now need to clarify 
the central concept of virtues within VEP. 
3.3.1 The Concept of Virtues in Virtue Epistemology 
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, Aristotelian virtue ethics define virtue as a meson 
between two extremes. In this sense, virtue is an excellence and aims at eudaimonia 
or human WB. In addition, Aristotle was the first philosopher who identified a class 
of intellectual virtues separately from the class of moral virtues and gave them a 
primary role in human knowledge (Baehr, 2011) (Zagzebski, 1996). Analogously, in 
VEP, whose roots are found in Aristotle‟s ethical theory, an intellectual virtue is 
regarded as an intellectual excellence and aims at intellectual WB.  
Before exploring the differences between strands of VEP it is necessary to specify 
the common ground upon which they all build including this thesis‟s AREVEP. As 
Hookway (2003) notes “all types of VEP share a common characteristic, that is they 
are approaches to basic problems of epistemology which give to intellectual or 
epistemic virtues a primary role” (ibid, 2003, p. 183). Baehr (2013) also emphasizes 
that there is a widely-held view among virtue epistemologists that intellectual virtues 
seem to have a general two-tier structure. Specifically, at a primary motivational 
level, all epistemic virtues involve a kind of love for epistemic goods. An 
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intellectually excellent (or intellectually virtuous) person is someone who desires and 
pursues epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. In this regard, the 
explicit orientation of VEP towards epistemic goods distinguishes the virtues 
examined in this field from moral virtues, which are explored in other areas such as 
in virtue ethics (Blackburn, 2001) (Baehr, 2013).  
Additionally, as Baehr (2013) observes, although epistemic virtues share a 
common motivational basis, i.e. the love of epistemic goods, each virtue alone seems 
to present its own distinctive activity or psychology which is grounded on that love 
of epistemic goods. For example, a person who is curious is quick to wonder and ask 
why-questions out of a desire to comprehend the surrounding world. An open-
minded person is willing to examine alternative views because he or she recognizes 
that in doing so it is easier to accurately understand those views and approach the 
matter under investigation pluralistically. Also, an intellectually courageous person 
tends to persist in beliefs that reasonably will lead one to the truth against all odds 
and despite the fact that this may cause them harm (Baehr, 2011). Next, I look at the 
various views and debates within VEP discourse because the kind of VEP that this 
thesis introduces, namely an alternative regulative educative VEP (AREVEP), 
combines characteristics from many different types. 
3.3.2 Types of Virtue Epistemology 
Beyond this shared ground, however, points of view differ. First, a significant 
point of dispute in VEP concerns the relationship(s) between intellectual and moral 
virtues. This conflict again goes back to Aristotle and the problem of the reciprocity 
of virtues (Bailey, 2010). In relation to the latter, Baehr (2011) identifies three 
strands: 
“(a) the reductive thesis where no principled distinction can be drawn between 
intellectual and moral virtues; intellectual virtues just are or are reducible to moral 
virtues; while, in ordinary thought and language, we distinguish between intellectual 
virtues and moral virtues, this distinction is superficial and lacks any ultimate basis, 
(b) the subset thesis according to which intellectual virtues are a species or proper 
subset of moral virtues; whilst intellectual virtues are moral virtues, they are unified 
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in a way that sets them apart from other, more familiar moral virtues and (c) the 
independence thesis where intellectual virtues are not a proper subset of moral 
virtues; rather, they are fundamentally distinct from moral virtues” (Baehr, 2011, p. 
207) 
Baehr (2011) takes a position between the subset-independence thesis, whilst 
Zagzebski (1996), Roberts and Wood (2007) are in favour of the reductive thesis and 
argue that any attempt to draw a dividing line between intellectual and moral virtues 
is “artificial and unhelpful” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 60). Others like Sosa 
(1991) and Greco (2002), seem to support the independence thesis. In this chapter, 
however, it is not my intention to draw a sharp distinction between intellectual and 
moral virtues and adapt a definite position. In this chapter, I only use the terms 
intellectual or epistemic virtues, which does not in any way exclude the moral 
element, and in this sense, I refer to virtues as intellectual or epistemic excellences, 
as explicit human characteristics, which in VEP explicitly aim at epistemic goods.  
Second, depending on how virtue epistemologists define the concept of 
intellectual virtues, they usually support a different strand without being able to form 
a common and clear consensus. In particular, Greco and Turri (2011) say that 
although virtue epistemologists generally regard the epistemic virtues as more 
important than knowledge and justified true belief, they do that in two different 
ways. On the one hand, the theorists or conventional virtue epistemologists, such as 
Sosa (1991) and Zagzebski (1996), define or ground knowledge and justified true 
belief in terms of intellectual virtues and try to use virtue epistemological resources 
to approach standard problems in Western epistemology in standard ways (Battaly, 
2008). On the other hand, the anti-theorists or alternative virtue epistemologists such 
as Roberts and Wood (2007), avoid stereotypes and standards concerning virtues and 
knowledge and argue that epistemic virtues are the primary and basic concepts in 
epistemology and can be explored in their own right drawing simultaneously on 
literature and history (Battaly, 2008). Likewise, from an educational point of view, 
Kvanvig (1992) argues that VEP should put aside standard questions of traditional 
epistemology regarding the nature and limits of knowledge and focus on the role that 
intellectual virtues can play in training and education. 
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Moreover, whilst virtue epistemologists agree that intellectual virtues are 
epistemic excellences, they disagree about what kind of epistemic excellences they 
are, i.e. they argue about the nature of intellectual virtues.  In this context, there are 
two different groups (Axtell, 1997). First, there is the “virtue-reliabilist” group which 
argues that intellectual virtues should be understood as reliable faculties such as 
sense, perception, induction, deduction, and memory (Sosa, 1991) (Greco, 2002). In 
particular, they argue that virtue is the quality of something that enables it to perform 
well (Battaly, 2008) (Baehr, 2011) (Ortwein, 2012) (MacAllister, 2012). In this 
context, if one‟s fundamental intellectual function is to reach an epistemic good, e.g. 
understanding, intellectual virtues are any faculties, either natural or acquired, that 
enable one to accomplish the target of attaining understanding (Greco and Turri, 
2011) (Ortwein, 2012).  
For instance, according to Sosa (1991), an intellectual virtue is “a quality that 
helps to maximize one‟s amount of truth over error” (Sosa, 1991, p. 225). He also 
notes that “a person has an intellectual virtue or faculty relative to an environment E 
if and only if the person has an inner nature I in virtue of which one would mostly 
attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of propositions F, when in certain 
conditions C” (ibid, 1991, p. 284). Likewise, Greco (2002) defines intellectual 
virtues as general cognitive abilities or powers which help one to reach the truth. 
Specifically, he says that intellectual virtues are “innate faculties or acquired habits 
that enable an individual to reach at truth and avoid error in some relevant field” 
(Greco, 2002, p. 287). 
In contrast, the “virtue-responsibilist” group argue that epistemic virtues are 
traits of character, qualities of an individual that are closely identified with a person‟s 
selfhood and not just as natural faculties which are the raw materials of the self 
(Code, 1987) (Montmarquet, 1993) (Zagzebski, 1996) (Hookway, 2003) (Battaly, 
2008) (Baehr, 2011) (Ortwein, 2012) (MacAllister, 2012). Specifically, Code (1987) 
argues that intellectual virtues are “a matter of orientation toward the world, toward 
one‟s knowledge-seeking self and toward other such selves as part of the world” 
(ibid, 1987, p. 20). Likewise, Montmarquet (1993) perceives intellectual virtues as 
qualities of an individual that desires truth. Zagzebski (1996) also states that an 
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intellectual virtue is “a person‟s deep and enduring acquired excellence which entails 
the basic elements of motivation and success” (ibid, 1996, p. 137). 
Also, Axtell (cited by Hookway, 2003, p. 188) contrasts two types of VEP. 
On the one hand, the reliabilist VEP appears to define justified belief in terms of 
virtuous character and explain virtuous character in terms of successful and stable 
dispositions to form true beliefs. On the other hand, the responsibilist VEP 
emphasizes the role of intellectual virtues in guiding individuals in accomplishing 
activities such as inquiries. Virtue-responsibilists explicitly reject virtue-reliabilists‟ 
claim that reliable vision, memory and the like count as intellectual virtues. In this 
regard, virtue-responsibilists seem to construct their analyses of intellectual virtues 
on Aristotle‟s analysis of moral virtues, i.e. they think of the intellectual virtues as 
acquired character traits for which the individual is to some extent responsible and 
their paradigms of intellectual virtue include OM, intellectual courage etc. 
(Hookway, 2003). 
The division between virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism, however, 
has been criticized in a way that I also adapt in this chapter. In particular, Battaly 
(2008) emphasizes that disagreements about the nature of intellectual virtues are 
pointless and harmful, because on the one hand, there seem to be many ways towards 
intellectual WB and on the other, a perfect account of VEP should include both 
virtues as faculties and virtues as character traits, e.g. a good knower in order to 
reach an epistemic good let us say understanding, obviously needs both a good 
memory and persistence (Baehr, 2006). In other words, a person‟s persistence to 
achieve understanding seems pointless without their good memory, and vice versa. 
Another field of disagreement in VEP concerns what virtue epistemologists 
introduce into the notion of cognitive abilities (Pritchard, 2003). Specifically, 
Pritchard (2003) notices that internalist virtue epistemologists, like Zagzebski and 
other virtue-responsibilists, argue that a cognitive ability primarily involves some 
kind of appropriate reflection, e.g. whether the conditions and the environment are 
appropriate for the exercise of the relevant intellectual ability. In contrast, externalist 
virtue epistemologists, such as Greco and other virtue-reliabilists, think that 
intellectual abilities are often totally unreflective (Pritchard, 2003).  
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Particularly concerning the character‐based virtue responsibilist kind of VEP 
which this thesis mainly draws on, Baehr (2011) (2008) observes that there are two 
general approaches namely the “conservative”, which addresses the notion of 
epistemic virtue as a way of approaching traditional epistemological problems and 
the “autonomous”, which focuses on epistemic virtues in ways that overlook 
traditional epistemological questions, but are still epistemological in nature (Baehr, 
2011, p. 11). Both conservative and autonomous character-based VEP have sub-
categories. On the one hand, there is the strong conservative, which gives the 
intellectual virtues a primary and central role in traditional Western epistemology, 
whilst the weak conservative gives intellectual virtues a secondary role. On the other 
hand, the strong or radical autonomous argues that an autonomous virtue‐based 
approach should replace traditional approaches and that there is not an important role 
for intellectual virtue to play in traditional epistemology, whereas the weak or 
moderate autonomous do not aim at replacing traditional epistemology, but rather at 
enlightening issues that conventional epistemology seems to have overlooked 
(Baehr, 2011) (Baehr, 2008). 
Last but not least, as Battaly (2008) notes, there are different voices regarding 
grades of knowledge. Specifically, low-grade knowledge, e.g. perceptual knowledge, 
is acquired passively. In contrast, high-grade knowledge is acquired rather actively 
than passively, as a result of intentional inquiry, i.e. it requires the individual to 
perform voluntary intellectual activity such reasoning, understanding etc. In this 
regard, virtue-reliabilism, despite the fact that it may offer a valuable yet arguable 
account of low-grade knowledge, seems to fail to explain high-grade knowledge. 
Likewise, virtue-responsibilism, although it may offer an informative yet contestable 
account of high-grade knowledge, seems to fail to explain low-grade knowledge 
(Battaly, 2008). 
In this chapter, I mainly perceive intellectual virtues as character traits 
because, among other things, “thinking of intellectual virtues as traits of character 
encourages us to expand our conception of intellectual goods” (Roberts and Wood, 
2007, p. 42). I also argue for a character-based, moderate-autonomous, high-grade 
account of VEP, which is mainly responsibilist, but it is also reliabilist in the sense 
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that a perfect account of VEP obviously involves to some degree an understanding of 
virtues as reliable faculties such as sense, perception, induction, deduction and 
memory, as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I argue for a VEP account that 
expands outside the area of traditional epistemology and its debates, does not aim at 
giving robust definitions of knowledge or justification and also, does not deal with 
standard epistemological concerns as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) 
suggest. To this end, I introduce the concept of an alternative regulative educative 
virtue epistemology (AREVEP), which I elaborate in the following sections.  
3.3.3 Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology 
Let me clarify the concepts behind the terms as each of these captures 
something important. First, the account of VEP that I propose in this chapter is 
“alternative”, because it perceives virtues primarily as character traits, but also 
necessarily as faculties in the sense that for instance, a good informant obviously 
needs both their good memory and persistence in order to reach an epistemic good 
(Baehr, 2006). In this regard, it is alternative because it does not explicitly follow 
either of the two basic approaches, i.e. virtue-responsibilism and virtue-reliabilism.  
Second, it is “regulative”, because it aims at providing guidance for epistemic 
practice that is how to conduct understanding and what to do when forming beliefs. 
Additionally, a regulative VEP is strongly practical and social and it is separated into 
two kinds: a rule-oriented and a habit-oriented, as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and 
Wood (2007) argue. In this sense, I am looking at a “habit-oriented regulative” VEP 
because it attempts to provide training that helps teachers towards what it considers 
to be right intellectual dispositions (Roberts and Wood, 2007). This conflicts with 
analytic epistemology, which mainly targets the production of theories of knowledge 
and explores definitions of the terms under investigation (Wolterstorff cited by 
Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 20).  
Also, it is “educative”, because in this thesis I am talking about teachers‟ 
intellectual virtues and WB and a teacher education that aims at this. In this regard, 
as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, the account of VEP I argue for 
aspires to connect teaching and intellectual virtues and WB, therefore it should be 
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something “educative” that facilitates teachers‟ intellectual WB (Higgins, 2011, p. 
256). In this context, AREVEP should be used as a tool towards epistemic goods for 
teachers‟ intellectual WB.  
Next, the idea of AREVEP is further explored through the concepts of 
intellectual virtues and epistemic goods. My aim in exploring these connections is to 
contribute to the concept of intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and 
particularly as far as teachers are concerned to make them excellent intellectual 
agents, so as to help children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multi-
faceted role (Hamilton, 2014, p. 1) and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in 
teaching the “question is not only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is 
also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such a 
teaching for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64). In this context, I also argue in 
Chapter 7 for a teacher education that advocates these aim(s).  
3.3.4 Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology and Intellectual 
Virtues 
The concept of AREVEP gives intellectual virtues a primary role, mainly as 
character traits, because, among other things, to perceive intellectual virtues “as traits 
of character encourages us to expand our conception of intellectual goods” (Roberts 
and Wood, 2007, p. 42). In the context of AREVEP teaching, intellectual virtues, 
such as OM, and epistemic goods, such as knowledge, acquaintance and 
understanding, are interconnected constituent parts of teachers‟ intellectual WB.    
First, it is necessary to recall a significant difference between virtues in VEP 
and other areas such as virtue ethics. Intellectual virtues in VEP, as Roberts and 
Wood (2007) stress, explicitly aim at epistemic goods and are realized in the relevant 
epistemic context, whereas moral virtues in virtue ethics aim at moral good and are 
realized in the context of good-seeking. For example in this thesis, the intellectual 
virtue of OM aims, among other things, at knowledge and understanding and in this 
sense, it is realized in the context of knowledge/understanding-seeking. (Roberts and 
Wood, 2007). Intellectual or epistemic virtues also constitute the foundation of 
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excellent intellectual activity such as reasoning and they demonstrate “strong social 
dimensions” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 113).  
However, the way that intellectual virtues are examined here is not the only 
legitimate way. Earlier I mentioned, for example, virtue-reliabilism, which perceives 
intellectual virtues as reliable faculties or, elsewhere, virtues as skills and talents 
(Baehr, 2011). A crucial difference between intellectual virtues as understood here 
and other understandings of virtues is that epistemic virtues in AREVEP constitute 
individual qualities that are mainly acquired through action and practice and they are 
“an acquired base of excellent intellectual functioning of some human activity” 
(Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215) (Baehr, 2011) (Riggs, 2010). Additionally, a 
principal characteristic of a person with intellectual virtues is their desire to achieve 
intellectual goods, e.g. a virtuous intellectual person wants to know, to understand 
etc. (Baehr, 2011) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). In this context, as Robert and Wood 
(2007) argue, a person‟s intellectual “virtues contribute to the acquisition and 
transmission of epistemic goods” (ibid, 2007, p. 35). Likewise, as I argue in Chapters 
5 and 6, the epistemic virtue of OM facilitates a person‟s acquisition of “secure” and 
“fertile” “intellectual functionings” for WB, both for themselves and for others. 
However, what epistemic or intellectual goods are related to epistemic virtues? 
Epistemic goods in VEP are conceived as the particular good ends/aims of epistemic 
activity which contribute to one‟s intellectual WB, which in turn is part of an 
individual‟s whole good life (Roberts and Wood, 2007).  
3.3.5 Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology and Intellectual 
Goods  
According to Aristotle, the ultimate end of any good is “eudaimonia” (WB). 
Similarly, the ultimate end of any epistemic good is intellectual WB. In this section, I 
look at epistemic goods. Roberts and Wood (2007) identify three general categories 
of epistemic goods, namely “knowledge, acquaintance, understanding” (ibid, 2007, 
p. 34). They notice that what is usually called “knowledge” in the twentieth-century 
epistemology is perceived as a belief that is both true and justified. Nevertheless, as 
Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, this is a narrow view because the concept of 
knowledge as epistemic good involves more than justified true beliefs or 
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propositional knowledge. From this point of view, epistemic goods are usually 
interconnected; therefore, we should not look at them separately but rather as a 
complex. The concept of AREVEP here is sympathetic to that view.  
Specifically, earlier we saw that propositional knowledge is know-that-
something-is-so knowledge (Moser, 2002) (Zagzebski, 2004) (Steup, 2005) 
(Truncellito, 2007) (Pritchard, 2010). However, when propositional knowledge is 
treated as an isolated topic regardless of the knowledge that surrounds and sustains it, 
it becomes “artificial” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 43). Unlike Zagzebski (2004) 
who identifies knowledge with propositional knowledge and attempts to distinguish 
knowledge from understanding as something non-propositional, just as traditional 
epistemology does, Roberts and Wood (2007) maintain that knowledge involves both 
propositional and non-propositional understanding. They argue that “understanding 
differs from propositional knowledge not in being necessarily non‐propositional, but 
in not being necessarily propositional” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 48). To give an 
example, in relation to non-propositional understanding, when we say that someone 
knows how to play chess very well, we do not mean that the same person knows 
some proposition about it, but that he/she understands how to play chess and he/she 
is acquainted with it.  
In this regard, understanding appears as a deep and complex epistemic good 
that encompasses both propositional knowledge and acquaintance and may also 
appear as a condition of truth. In addition, understanding with all five senses
39
 seems 
to be the most essential epistemic good right after truth. In fact, Roberts and Wood 
(2007) observe that “something like truth is typically a condition of understanding… 
for example, if we think that a person‟s understanding of a text is incorrect, we say 
that she does not understand it… Understanding in general is a rich and complicated 
epistemic achievement” (ibid, 2007, p. 44). They also argue that understanding is the 
ability to “fit things together or grasp connections” and it comes with degrees of 
depth (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 45).  
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 For example, in linguistic situations someone may understand the words as sounds or syntax, but 




Moreover, propositional knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good 
especially in education, but as Ortwein (2012) notes, to acquire as many as possible 
know-that-something-is-so facts may not be as significant as it is to perform an 
understanding concerning these facts. Besides, a thorny, and in my view paradoxical, 
issue in teaching and teacher education is, as I argued in Chapter 1, to give more 
value to the possession and transmission of propositional knowledge and skills 
(Higgins, 2011) rather than to the understanding of acquired knowledge and how 
anything one knows connects with another and the world. Especially in relation to 
this, the intellectual virtue of OM as illustrated in Chapter 6 can play a fundamental 
role, because, among other things, it helps people cultivate their critical qualities and 
become independent thinkers (Hare, 2006). In this sense, like Kvanvig (2003), I also 
stress the significance of a shift in focus from propositional knowledge to 
understanding in teacher education, which appears to have more long-term benefits 
and a lifelong value for both teachers and children.  
Furthermore, Roberts and Wood (2007) liken the epistemic good of 
acquaintance to the condition of someone who has had “such contact and carries 
within him or her, via memory, aptitudes of recognition, belief formation, and 
understanding that are consequent on that earlier contact” (ibid, 2007, p. 51). This is 
the kind of cognitive advantage that we give to someone by saying, for example, that 
they have had a lot of experience hunting in the woods, or working in the financial 
markets. Like propositional knowledge, acquaintance is of great importance for 
teaching, but unlike propositional knowledge, it involves first-hand, personal 
experience.  
For instance, in ancient Greek the verb “know” can be replaced either by the 
verb oida or gignosko (Liddell and Scott, 2016). Oida involves personal experience 
because it encompasses sensual experience, and it is used in cases of acquaintance, 
whilst gignosko is only perceptual and is associated with propositional knowledge. 
Thus, on the one hand, I gignosko that honey has a sweet taste, i.e. I know from what 
I have heard or read that honey is sweet, but I have never personally tasted it, and on 
the other hand, I oida that honey is sweet, i.e. I know from personal experience, 
because I have tasted it, at least once, that honey has a sweet taste (Sakkos, personal 
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communication, July, 2005). Generally, in order of strength, acquaintance is stronger 
than propositional knowledge, but weaker than understanding. 
3.4 Limitations of Virtue Epistemology 
Although the appeal to virtue epistemology appears to have advantages in 
relation to the concepts of intellectual virtues and teachers‟ WB, it also has some 
limitations. In this context, it is suggested that attention should be given not only to 
VEP and to intellectual virtues that good informants – teachers should acquire, but 
also to other concepts. Particularly, if teacher education aims at helping teachers to 
become good informants, VEP is necessary, because it examines, among other 
things, what it is to be a good informant.  
However, according to Siegel (2008), the role of VEP is not sufficient, and 
several issues should be taken into consideration, as education is a wider concept 
than the epistemic. Specifically, Siegel (2008) argues that education is a wider 
concept than the epistemic in the sense that education involves matters of “character, 
moral training, sociality and civic participation, and so on, all of which go beyond 
the epistemic” (ibid, 2008, p. 464), that is, matters that go beyond the desirable 
condition of being merely a good informant, which is what VEP aims at. I argue that 
the same applies to teacher education and teaching, which are the particular focus of 
this thesis, as a sine qua non of education.  
Also, according to Kawall (2002), VEP appears to be too individualistic. 
Unlike virtue ethics, which recognize the difference between self-regarding (moral) 
virtues (e.g. courage) and other-regarding (moral) virtues (e.g. compassion) and 
appreciates both kinds equally, VEP seems to overlook the other-regarding epistemic 
virtues (e.g. integrity) which promote others‟ intellectual WB along with individual 
WB, by over-focusing on the self-regarding epistemic virtues (e.g. courage) which 
mainly contribute to one‟s own epistemic WB. However, this thesis is equally 
concerned with both individual and collective WB, therefore, any mere individualist 
approach to this appears problematic. In order to deal with these implications it is 
worth looking at social epistemology and virtues that share epistemic elements.  
85 
 
Specifically, an anti-classical kind of social epistemology (Goldman, 1999) 
can perhaps avoid individualistic implications found in VEP as it focuses on the 
social conditions in which individuals engage in order to share information with 
others (Schmitt, 1999) (Kotzee, 2013) which undoubtedly constitutes a crucial 
characteristic of education in general and teacher education in particular. However, 
there is disagreement about whether social epistemology actually is a kind of 
epistemology (Alston, 2005). In particular, Alston (2005) challenges the claim that 
social epistemology as presented in Goldman‟s work Knowledge in a Social World 
(1999) is “real epistemology” (Alston, 2005, p. 5) and he argues that social 
epistemology has more in common with social sciences than with epistemology.  
Although Goldman (2006) acknowledges that there is little consensus 
regarding the extent of the social as well as the objectives of social epistemology, he 
refutes Alston‟s claim. Specifically, on the one hand, Goldman (2006) notes that 
some argue that social epistemology should have the same goals as traditional 
epistemology, as the latter seems to be too individualistic, and on the other hand, 
others more radically suggest that social epistemology should be orientated towards 
different traditionally epistemological areas and ultimately replace it.  
Additionally, Goldman (2010) observes that the confusion about whether 
social epistemology is a legitimate strand of epistemology may be due to enquiries 
that investigate social contexts of belief and thought and generally aim at 
deconstructing traditional epistemic concepts rather than enlightening the nature and 
conditions of epistemic accomplishment or failure, and thus, are wrongly categorized 
under the heading of epistemology. Regarding the relationship of social 
epistemology with traditional epistemology, Goldman (2010) identifies three kinds, 
i.e. (a) revisionism, (b) preservationism and (c) expansionism.  
In this context, he argues that “revisionism is not real epistemology”, and in 
this category he places “various social studies of science such as postmodernism, 
deconstructionism and social constructionism” (Goldman, 2010, p. 4). Nevertheless, 
both preservationism and expansionism deserve to be considered original strands of 
epistemology and what makes them different is that preservationism is close to 
traditional epistemology, whilst expansionism seeks to explore areas that are 
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unfamiliar to mainstream epistemology (Goldman, 2010). Kotzee (2013) also notes 
that over the last two decades traditional epistemology has been challenged by two 
different strands in the subject, i.e. virtue and social epistemology. In this regard, he 
also recognizes that social epistemology is a distinctive branch, yet true 
epistemology (Kotzee, 2013).  
Also, Schmitt (1999) argues that social epistemology constitutes a distinct 
category of epistemology and differentiates, for example, from the sociology of 
knowledge or other social studies “in being conceptual and normative study, not 
primarily empirical, and in describing the necessary-sufficient social conditions, not 
just the possible social conditions of knowledge” (ibid, 2004, p. 354). In his 
discussion about “social conditions”, Schmitt (1999) seems to argue for a situation 
where there is more than one individual and, more interestingly, where two or more 
individuals are intentionally related (e.g. friendship) (ibid, 2004, p. 379). Besides, on 
the basis of the notion of social conditions, Schmitt (1999) divides social 
epistemology into three categories, i.e. “(a) the role of social conditions in individual 
knowledge, (b) the social organization of cognitive labor and (c) the nature of 
collective knowledge” (ibid, 2004, p. 354). Although all three attempt to explore 
different areas, they also try to answer whether the conditions of knowledge in 
various aspects are social or individualistic. In the following paragraphs, I point to 
some implications that the concepts examined so far may have for teachers and 
teacher education. 
3.5 Educational Implicationsn  
Education consists in knowledge, thus, teaching and teacher education as 
parts of education are necessarily and strongly related to knowledge. Epistemology is 
also the theory of knowledge, therefore, teaching, teacher education and 
epistemology are necessarily connected. Additionally, Roberts and Wood (2007) 
argue that “the formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of 
schools and parents” (ibid, 2007, p. 23). Likewise, from the point of view of this 
thesis, the formation of excellent epistemic informants – teachers is as much a 
teacher‟s personal endeavour as it is the business of teacher education. If teacher 
education programmes aim at teachers‟ intellectual WB, then there is an obvious 
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reason to focus on teachers‟ intellectual virtues so that teachers become good 
informants. In relation to this, Roberts and Wood (2007) highlight the importance of 
intellectual development through training and nurture. However, they also note that 
epistemology appears to be quite disappointing because  
“Given the central place of knowledge and understanding in human life, one would 
expect that epistemology would be one of the most fascinating and enriching fields of 
philosophy and itself an essential part of an education for life. But the character and 
preoccupations of much of the epistemology of the twentieth century disappoint this 
expectation” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 8) 
Similarly, MacAllister (2012) and Siegel (2008) observe that epistemological 
concepts appear too abstract and vaguely focused, and for this reason they are not 
easily directly applicable to education and therefore, to teacher education. In this 
sense, I argue that VEP and particularly AREVEP can offer alternatives and new 
insights, and teacher education, among other things, could be an area where VEP 
extends the importance of epistemology as the theory of knowledge. Accordingly, a 
focus on teachers‟ intellectual virtues, rather than on abstract definitions of 
knowledge, beliefs and justification, makes the concept of VEP clearly more relevant 
to teacher education than mere epistemological discussions, as well as an area of 
research that is potentially more responsive and welcoming to new concepts. 
From a different perspective, Siegel (2008) notes that not only is education 
rich in epistemological content and relevance, but particular epistemological matters, 
e.g. epistemic goods and values, could well be developed in the context of education, 
so that thinking about education could bring significant advantages in the pursuit of 
epistemological concerns. Similarly, I argue that both teacher education and VEP are 
keen to comprehend epistemic goods and virtues and show a determination in 
fostering them, as formal education is, or at least should be, a social practice 
interested mainly in the development of intellectual goods (Siegel, 2008). Therefore, 
from this point of view, teacher education programmes, apart from a primary interest 
in VEP and AREVEP, should perhaps also show an interest in social epistemology as 
a more collective epistemological type (Siegel, 2008). 
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In this context, what epistemic goods should teachers try to achieve? The 
Standards for Registration (GTCS, 2012) state, among other things, that teachers 
should acquire knowledge and understanding which according to Roberts and Wood 
(2007) are two of the “three main intellectual goods, i.e. knowledge, acquaintance 
and understanding” (ibid, 2007, p. 34). Intellectual goods are conceived as good ends 
of intellectual activity which contribute to teachers‟ intellectual WB, which is part of 
their whole good life and then pupils‟ WB. In the light of this, as Hansen (2007) 
suggests, teacher education programmes should operate between two boundaries: “a 
professional, evidence-based track of what does work and an existential-normative 
track of how teachers understand themselves in what they are saying and doing” 
(ibid, 2007, p. 3). However, any epistemic goods that teachers should achieve, such 
as knowledge and understanding, as I argue in Chapter 1, should be acquired 
primarily for their own intellectual WB, and then pupils‟ WB is inevitably also 
advantaged, because teachers‟ and pupils‟ WB are unbreakably intertwined. In this 
sense teachers‟ epistemic WB is significant not only in its own right but also because 
it fosters pupils‟ WB (Fallon, 2006) (Malm, 2009) (Gray, 2010).  
However, as Resnick (2006) argues “it used to go without saying that 
education is toward some vision of the good life… and without a claim of the 
meaning of life, educational intervention is not well-justified” (ibid, 2006, p 329). 
From this point of view, I argue that a justification for teaching someone is needed 
and if that is toward a vision of the good life and WB, then teachers should be able to 
experience that (ibid, 2006, p. 329). Also, Goodlad (1992) notes that “the mission of 
teacher education is derived on the one hand, from the mission of schooling and on 
the other hand, from the role of teachers in advancing that mission” (Goodlad, 1992, 
p. 90). Accordingly, if the mission of schooling involves a vision of WB particularly 
for those directly involved in the educational process (Resnick, 2006), i.e. both 
teachers and pupils, then teacher education programmes should be concerned with 
teachers‟ WB per se. This implies that in teacher education programmes that aim at 
teachers‟ WB, teachers should “not only learn how to teach but also learn how to 
learn through teaching” (Higgins, 2011, p. 12). Particularly, from the perspective of 
this thesis, teacher education should aim at teachers‟ epistemic WB - both for their 
own sake and for the pupils‟ sake - and should help teachers cultivate their 
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intellectual virtues with a particular focus on the virtue of OM on which I will 
elaborate in Chapter 6. 
Specifically, I focus on OM and particularly on two accounts that appear to 
be “the most developed in character-based VEP” (Kwong, 2015, p. 3). The first 
account is that of Baehr (2011), who argues that OM is a character trait that 
necessarily makes particular demands on the individual themselves. The second 
account is that of Riggs (2010), who argues that OM shows that the individual‟s 
involvement is necessary for intellectual virtue. In addition, I specifically examine 
OM in relation to the individual‟s strongly-held beliefs (Adler, 2004) and their 
“engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006), which are in particular 
educationally significant. Additionally, I draw a parallel to say that OM is a virtue 
that facilitates all other virtues, and, therefore, it facilitates the acquisition of 
teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for intellectual WB 
(Baehr, 2011) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). In this regard, 
I introduce the concept of genuine intellectual OM which is both reasonable and 
well-informed, and becomes the link between those different discourses discussed in 
the thesis which use different terminology. This, however, should become clearer in 
Chapter 6, when I put it in the general context of WB discourse in education, and in 
the specific context of “subjective” and “objective” theories of WB, which is 

















In the previous chapters I argued that an account of WB requires an account 
of virtue(s). In order to make that connection between WB and virtue(s), I relied on 
(i) Aristotle‟s NE and (ii) virtue epistemology, which focuses more on intellectual 
WB and connects that to intellectual virtue(s). In this context, I brought together the 
old and timeless Aristotelian theory and contemporary virtue epistemology discourse 
as a background to what I believe to be a full account of WB that relies on a 
particular understanding of virtue. In this chapter I look at something different.  
My aim in both Chapters 4 and 5 is to investigate WB discourse in education. 
I am doing this because I am specifically interested in teaching and teachers‟ WB, 
because, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, teachers‟ WB is inextricably connected to 
pupils‟ WB, and therefore, they are equally important. First, I approach the terms 
conceptually and stress that various terms are used in the literature for the concept of 
WB, the most dominant of them being “flourishing”, “happiness” and “well-being”. 
In this chapter, and throughout the thesis, I consistently use the term “well-being” 
because it is more general and expresses in a less problematic way the aims of this 
project. Next, I look at the best-known distinction of WB theories, between 
“subjective” and “objective” ones, with a particular focus on the “subjective major-
informed desire” and “objective list” theories, where the issue at stake is whether 
something is good for us because we want it or we want something because it is good 
for us.  
In this chapter I argue that a full account of WB in education should be both 
subjective and objective in equal measure. Additionally, as I argued in Chapter 1, 
education is social by definition, in that there are not just individual students and 
groups of children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers among others, 
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who all interact with one another. Therefore, in this chapter I also argue for an equal 
concern for both individual and collective WB, i.e. both self-interest and concern for 
others should be equally important in the educational context. In order to further 
support these views, here, I look at White‟s (2011) subjective-collective oriented 
account of WB and in the next chapter, I additionally examine Nussbaum‟s 
objective-individual oriented account of WB, so that an equal balance in subjective-
objective and collective-individual factors of WB is maintained in accordance with 
the aims of this thesis. In particular, White‟s account of WB consists in three 
elements, namely “success”, “whole-heartedness” and “worthwhileness” which can 
be objectively determined. The best way to do this is by looking at the example of 
the arts and art critics, as “objectivity” is central to their work. It is also stressed that 
White‟s subjective factor of WB is not the individual but a loose body of people 
where the most “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those of people 
who experience all kinds of goods. These people, however, are not experts in the 
same way that art critics are experts in their fields, but rather they are a loose body of 
people with “accumulated wisdom”. Education, as White (2011) emphasizes, plays a 
crucial role in this process, mainly because through education individuals become 
better – informed about WB pursuits and what WB consists in. 
4.2 Well-being in Education: Terms and Concept(s) 
Recently there has been an increasing interest in education for WB, and 
questions about WB in education in fact constitute some of the most important 
questions about the purpose of education itself (Suissa, 2008) (Coleman, 2009) 
(White, 2011) (Morris, 2013) (Thorburn, 2014). Before one starts to analyse the 
problem of defining WB, one faces a problem. As De Ruyter (2015) notes, not only 
are there different terms for and concepts of WB, but different terms may be used for 
the same concept. For instance, apart from the term “well-being”, two other words 
are dominant in the literature namely “flourishing” and “happiness” (White, 2011) 
(De Ruyter, 2015). Some scholars use the terms interchangeably, whilst others 
maintain that each of the three has a different meaning. Usually, however, “well-
being” is considered a general term which covers various theories of happiness and 
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flourishing, and the use of one or another indicates which specific theory of WB one 
is defending (White, 2011) (De Ruyter, 2015).  
Both “flourishing” and “happiness” go back to Aristotle and the debate about 
how eudaimonia is best translated. As De Ruyter (2015) notes, “flourishing” is 
related to objective theories of WB and “happiness” to subjective ones. However, it 
may also be the case that the more one thinks of subjective WB as something that 
could objectively be achieved, the less subjective one becomes, adopting a combined 
view of WB. Moreover, Brighouse (cited by White, 2006, p. 383) argues that 
“happiness” and “flourishing” do not have the same meaning and should not be used 
interchangeably because “flourishing is a richer property than happiness”. According 
to White (2006), however, Brighouse (cited by White, 2006) is not consistent in his 
view, because he sometimes brings the notions together, although he advocates 
avoiding that. For instance, he claims that “it is fair to assume that the evidence of 
what makes people happy in the real world is also evidence of what makes people 
flourish” (Brighouse cited by White 2006, p. 384). In this thesis, I use the term “well-
being” instead of the terms “flourishing” or “happiness”, because it is more general 
and less problematic. 
Coleman (2009) emphasizes that it is an exciting challenge to work out the 
different educational approaches to the notion of WB and he attempts to define it by 
looking at conflicting concepts of WB in the literature. Coleman (2009) observes that 
for some scholars “well-being” is not the same as “happiness” when “happiness” 
appears to be a measurable condition within positive psychology
40
. Additionally, he 
observes that “well-being” is not identical with emotional literacy
41
, if emotional 
literacy consists in “understanding and managing one‟s own emotions as well as 
responding to the emotions of others” (Weare cited by Coleman, 2009, p. 284). 
Besides, Coleman (2009) argues that perhaps a line should be drawn between 
“mental health” and WB because mental health is mostly used by health 
professionals in a negative way rather than positively. Therefore, it would be better 
                                                 
40
 For WB as an approximation for studying happiness see Layard, Seligman et al. (Coleman, 2009, p. 
283-284).  
41
 For WB as an approximation for emotional literacy or emotional intelligence see Ecclestone and 
Hayes, Hall et al. (Coleman, 2009, p. 284).  
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to avoid using the term “mental health” in the educational context though this may be 
contestable (Coleman, 2009).  
Furthermore, Coleman (2009) notes that WB is usually employed in 
discourses such as “resilience, freedom and choice, a meaningful life, high morale 
and job satisfaction, social and emotional aspects of learning, though from different 
standpoints” (ibid, 2009, p. 283). Similarly, Thorburn (2014) claims that recent 
educational theories on WB “focus on personal growth, relationships with others and 
engagement with activities of interest” (ibid, 2014, p. 206). On the other hand, Rice 
(2013) puts an emphasis on the individual arguing that “WB is about what is good 
for the individuals, what is in their self-interest and makes life go well for them” 
(ibid, 2013, p. 197).  
Another aspect of how WB is comprehended in educational literature is 
reflected in a report conducted by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE, 2008) on secondary education which shows that there are many 
ways to define WB. Specifically, the review was based on a definition of social and 
emotional WB which encompasses three aspects: 
“(a) The emotional WB (including happiness and confidence, and the opposite of 
depression/anxiety), (2) the psychological WB (including resilience, mastery, 
confidence, autonomy, attentiveness/involvement, and the capacity to manage others 
and to problem solve) and (3) the social WB (good relationships with others, and the 
opposite of conduct disorder, delinquency, interpersonal violence and bullying)” 
(NICE, 2008, p. 6-7) 
Particularly in Scotland, the new Curriculum for Excellence (Education 
Scotland, 2004) gives a leading role to the WB of children and of all those who 
belong to the educational community. “Health and Well-being” is determined as one 
of the core curricular areas where “learning in health and well-being ensures that 
children and young people develop the knowledge and understanding… they need 
for mental, emotional, social and physical well-being now and in the future” 
(Education Scotland, CfE, 2004, p. 8). Obviously, the ongoing educational reform in 
Scotland shows an increasing interest in educating for WB and this is welcome. 
However, as Thorburn (2014) suggests, “educational ambitions should be better 
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supported in terms of philosophical clarity, model-based explanations about how 
well-being may be planned and pedagogically enacted” (ibid, 2014, p. 220).  
The account of WB that this thesis defends neither rejects any of these current 
approaches to WB nor explicitly supports them. It rather looks at the wider concept 
of WB in education discourse, under which various theories of “happiness” and 
“flourishing” reside. In this regard, the best – known theories subject to this 
distinction, as White (2011) and De Ruyter (2015) observe, are the subjective and 
objective theories of WB. The central conflict between these theories is whether 
some things in our life are good because we want them or whether we want them 
because they are good for us (Heathwood, 2014). In this chapter I argue that WB 
consists in both subjective and objective factors. To this end, in the following 
paragraphs, I begin by briefly examining the general context of these foundational 
concepts. Then, I particularly investigate White‟s (2011) subjective-collective 
oriented account of WB. However, this thesis argues for a multi-faceted account of 
teachers‟ WB that shows an equal concern for both subjective and objective factors 
of WB as well as for collective and individual ones. Therefore, in the next chapter, I 
also look at Nussbaum‟s (2011) approach which is more objective-individual – 
oriented to compensate for the imbalance.  
4.3 A Combined Theory of Well-being: Subjective-Major-Informed Desire and 
Objective List Theory 
A central question in the study of human WB is whether it is objective or 
subjective, that is, whether the elements of an objective list are good merely by virtue 
of one‟s positive attitude towards them or good independently of one‟s attitude. In 
both Chapters 4 and 5 I argue that WB is neither merely objective in the sense that it 
is rooted in human nature per se nor is it merely subjective in the sense that it is 
entirely based on individualistic major-informed preferences (White, 2007). 
Therefore, a full account of WB in education should be one that combines a 
subjective- major-informed desire theory with an objective list theory of WB. In 
addition, I argue that both self-interest and concern for others in the educational 
context are equally important, because in education not only individual pupils and 
groups of pupils are involved, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc. 
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who all depend on and interact with one another. Therefore, a full account of WB in 
education should also place an equal emphasis both on the individual and on 
collective factors of WB. 
To this end, first in this chapter, I examine White‟s subjective (major-
informed desire)-collective account of WB. However, I argue that White‟s account is 
insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he gives too much emphasis to the 
subjective rather than the objective factor, and to the collective rather than the 
individual. Therefore, in the next chapter, I also explore Martha Nussbaum‟s 
objective-individual account of WB, which emphasizes the objective and individual 
aspect of WB. Let me now elaborate the concepts. 
4.3.1 Subjective Major-Informed Desire Theory of Well-being 
To begin with, a challenge to the objective view of WB is the belief that it is 
necessary for individuals to have a positive attitude towards something, i.e. to want, 
like, desire, care about something in order for it to be beneficial for them or for 
something itself already to involve their positive attitude towards it (Heathwood, 
2014). As Heathwood (2014) notices, according to one aspect of “desire theory” or 
preference satisfaction theory, WB consists in satisfying one‟s desires. This view is 
popular among economists, obviously because this way WB is more easily measured 
through people‟s choices in the markets.  
However, sometimes we want things that are not or turn out not to be good 
for us. In other words, how does satisfying these false or “ill-informed” desires 
contributes to one‟s WB? Subjectivists maintain that personal WB can be achieved 
through the satisfaction of one‟s major informed desires (White, 2002). On the one 
hand, White (2002) observes that desires are described as “major” because an 
individual‟s desires are usually hierarchically structured. For instance, a person‟s 
desire to abuse others or take drugs because this makes them happy and gives them 
satisfaction is obviously a false or “ill-informed” desire. To give another example, 
someone‟s desire to eat sugar does not have the same significance as the same 
person‟s desire to be healthy and fit. In this sense, one‟s desires should be 
hierarchically structured and the “major” ones, e.g. staying healthy and fit instead of 
consuming sugar, should prevail. On the other hand, there are many kinds of desires, 
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such as desires about oneself (“self-regarding), desires about one‟s entire life 
(“global”) and desires about one‟s desires (“second-order”) (Heathwood, 2014). 
Thus, people can accomplish WB, if they pursue what they primarily desire, i.e. WB 
consists partly in pursuing one‟s “major” desires. Additionally, desires should also be 
“informed” because it is possible that major desires are based on misleading or 
insufficient understanding, so, one should take into account every effect in satisfying 
one‟s desires (White, 2002).  
Some problems that arise in desire theory relate to its scope and to desires 
which may change over time. Regarding the former, one could argue that desire 
theory should be limited just to one‟s own life and not apply to others‟ lives. It 
should also exclude desires the fulfillment of which one is unaware. In relation to the 
problem of changing over time, desire theory should look only at what happens at the 
time of desire and not at events before or after that (Heathwood, 2014), which I think 
is meaningful from an individual point of view, but perhaps not from a collective 
one, where many individuals are involved and can be affected by others‟ desires 
during, before and/or after, as happens in education. The next part briefly discusses 
two other approaches to subjective WB, i.e. pleasure and positive emotions, are 
shortly discussed as well as how they might be related to the major-informed desire 
theory that particularly interests us here.    
4.3.1.1 Subjective Major-Informed Desires, Pleasure and Positive Emotions 
First, it is necessary to say a few things about the nature of pleasure. As 
Heathwood (2014) summarizes, according to the “felt-quality or emotional theory”, 
pleasure is just a feeling among others which one may or may not want and, if 
pleasure is good, then it is an objective good and hedonism turns out to be an 
objective theory of WB. In the “attitudinal theory”, pleasure is or involves an 
attitude, and if the pleasure is good then it is a subjective good and hedonism is a 
subjective theory of WB. Second, another dominant approach to subjective WB is 
that of “positive emotions”. Positive psychology in particular explores this concept 
and psychologists begin with “measuring, e.g. through individuals‟ self-reports, what 
is best referred to as subjective WB” (Van Hoorn, 2007, p. 2). Specifically, Diener, 
Oishi and Lucas (2009) state that  
97 
 
“Researchers who study subjective WB assume that a fundamental element of the 
good life is that individuals like their life. Subjective WB here is particularly defined 
as individuals‟ cognitive and affective WB, i.e. the presence of positive and the 
absence of negative effects and evaluations of their life. In this sense, subjective WB 
is a wide concept that involves experiencing pleasant emotions, low levels of 
negative ones and high life satisfaction. The positive experiences of subjective WB 
are a central topic of positive psychology because they make life rewarding.” 
(Diener et al., 2009, p. 63) 
Moreover, recent research shows that there has been huge progress in 
psychologists‟ understanding of the factors that influence individuals‟ subjective WB 
(Van Hoorn, 2007) (Easterlin, 2003). Besides, as Easterlin (2003) notes, using 
methods that give the concept of subjective WB an empirical and measurable content 
improved by progress in information and communication technology, subjective WB 
research has attracted increasing attention from markets, economists, politicians and 
policy-makers. In attempts to define human WB there is almost no agreement among 
scholars over a single definition of human emotion and pleasure (Van Hoorn, 2007). 
Taking into account the descriptions given above, it seems that desire, pleasure and 
emotion are closely related and perhaps in some instances overlap. However, the 
subjective factor of desires as understood in the WB account of this thesis differs 
from mere desires, informed desires, major desires, mere pleasure and emotions in 
that they are both major and informed.  
Furthermore, it is a widely-held view that emotions and pleasure can be found 
and observed outside human beings, e.g. dogs seem to enjoy cuddles and treats and 
they also seem to feel guilty when they are scolded for misbehaviour, whereas they 
are not widely believed to possess the ability to reason at least as far as we know and 
in the particular way that human beings demonstrate reason. In this connection, 
following Aristotle‟s ideas as discussed in Chapter 2, it is also widely accepted that 
perhaps the most characteristic good of human beings is their capacity to reason and 
if they reason well they are able to form informed and reasonable desires, i.e. to 
know what they want, why they want something and how this can contribute to their 
WB. Hence, if an individual‟s desires are hierarchically structured, I argue that an 
account of WB should be related to one‟s major desires, which are also informed and 
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reasonable in order to avoid misleading or insufficient understanding, and this in turn 
relates to one‟s ability to reason well.  
In this regard, in Chapter 5 I argue that the virtue of OM can play a crucial 
role both in informing major desires and in reasoning well, because they share some 
common characteristics. For example, OM involves “rational assessment and 
evaluation and also involves adjusting one‟s beliefs or confidence levels according to 
the outcome of this assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). Additionally, OM is 
descriptive in that it provides information about how things are and it is normative 
because it informs us about how things ought to be; it is also detailed and able to give 
answers to what, why and how questions, such as why an excellent informant should 
be open-minded anyway (Riggs, 2010). Also, OM is central to enquiry and seriously 
engaged in dialogue, as well as being closely related to self-knowledge and self-
monitoring (Hare, 2006). Being “informed”, or “well-informed” as White (2011) 
emphasizes later on, and reasoning well are closely related to all these elements, 
among others. Next, let us look at the other side of the spectrum, which is objective 
theories of WB. 
4.3.2 Objective List Theory of Well-being 
It is believed that education should aspire and help anyone being educated to 
lead a personally fulfilling life (White, 2002) (White, 2007). However, what is meant 
by that is contested. Is it possible to compose an objective list of elements for 
individual WB which applies to all individuals being educated, regardless of how 
desirable or pleasant these elements are? Or is WB a subjective issue that merely 
consists in the satisfaction of an individual‟s desires and pleasures? Different 
answers to these questions have significant implications for education. This thesis 
argues that a better theory of WB in education is a combined one that consists in both 
subjective-major-informed desire theory and objective list theory. According to the 
objective view of WB certain things are good for individuals independently of their 
particular interests, likes and cares (Bradley, 2014) (Heathwood, 2014). Objective 
list theories are usually understood as theories of WB that list elements which consist 
neither in mere pleasurable experience nor in desire-satisfaction. In other words, 
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objective list theories claim that “all instances of a plurality of basic objective goods 
directly (or non-instrumentally) benefit people” (Rice, 2013, p.197).  
But what should go on the list? For instance, objective lists of educational 
WB usually contain among other things knowledge, autonomy, enjoyment, being 
respected, achieving one‟s goals etc. (White, 2002) (Heathwood, 2014). A first 
objection when creating such lists is why certain things rather than others are 
included on the list. Crisp (2013) argues that this is not a problem for an objective list 
theory on the grounds that it can be seen as “enumerative and not an explanatory” 
theory, i.e. it simply gives a listing of all objects that belong to the concept of WB 
and it does not have to explain why certain objects are on the list and others are not. 
Similarly, White (2002) notes that it is one thing to compose objective lists of 
individual goods and another to demonstrate their objectivity. Therefore, according 
to Crisp (2013) what makes a particular element on the list good, e.g. knowledge, is 
that “it is good in itself and explanation should stop there”. In my view, Crisp‟s 
response to this problem is unsatisfying and weak. In particular, following the 
question of what should go on a list (say x), the question of why x should go on the 
list inevitably arises. The view that x “is good in itself” carries its own problems, but 
let us suppose we agree on that. Unless it is clarified what exactly its specific good is 
in relation to a specific aim, x appears either weak or pointless.  
To give an example, let us say that OM is good in itself and as such it should 
be included in an objective list of WB. To stop investigation there, as Crisp (2013) 
suggests, is problematic. First, we should look at why such a list is conducted, that is, 
what are its particular targets, e.g. its goal may be an account of WB that shows an 
equal concern for the individual and the collective. Second, it is necessary to agree 
on a definition of OM so that we all have a common understanding of what OM 
consists in. In this context, it is important that a definition of x encompasses similar 
elements to the aim(s) of the list, obviously beyond being “good in itself”. Third, it 
should be clarified how, if so, OM is related to the specific aim(s) of the list. If it is 




Hence, it is one thing to say that an explanation of why something should be 
included on an objective list is a kind of work in progress and a completely different 
thing to say, as Crisp (2013) does, that there is no need to provide such an 
explanation. In this sense, if an objective list theory should be adapted in teaching, 
first the aim(s) of such a list should be clarified, let us say pupils‟ WB. Second, there 
should be an agreement through dialogue especially between all those involved, e.g. 
teachers, students, teacher educators, policy-makers etc., regarding the elements of 
the list. In this regard, those who are involved should agree on a common 
understanding of the elements and then, arguments should be provided by all 
regarding why something should be included on the list or not and the best 
arguments should prevail. From this point of view, as shown in Chapter 5, OM 
appears as a facilitating virtue necessary for fertile dialogue. 
A second objection against objective list theories of WB is how the elements 
in the list are rated. Why, for example, is component x more essential than 
component y? This is similar to the problem mentioned above. Bradley (2014) 
suggests that rather than just jumping into intuitive judgments about the significance 
of certain elements, it would be better to find a general principle for objective lists 
that can inform us what components should be included and why as well as how 
these can be evaluated once they are included on the list.  
Moreover, I think that Aristotle‟s function argument can shed some light on 
both the problems that objective list theories face. Specifically, if the main 
characteristic of human beings is the activity of reason and if human good is the 
ability to reason well namely in accordance with virtue, then it could be the case that 
any elements of an objective list theory of WB should be characterized by their 
potential and/or actual contribution to the activity of reason in accordance with virtue 
and their evaluation should be based on the extent to which each element contributes 
to the activity of reasoning well. In particular, we saw in Chapter 2 that in Aristotle‟s 
view virtues are necessary to WB because WB is a virtuous activity and virtuous 
activity is the realization of virtues of the rational part of the human soul. 
Accordingly, we could say that an objective list for WB generally requires virtues as 
elements and an objective list for intellectual WB would require intellectual virtues 
in particular.  
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Hence, let us suppose there is a final convergence on what should be included 
on the list and in what order. Another problem arises, that is, who is the most 
appropriate to take such decisions and in what ways? According to White (2007) 
“there are not any experts or authorities in relation to what a flourishing life consists 
in”, if an expert is supposed to be one that knows everything about WB and if 
authority is someone who has the legitimate right to impose on others what he/she 
considers to be best for their WB. Again, Aristotle‟s ideas can be enlightening that is 
some people are generally in a better position than others to comprehend WB goods 
because of their ability to reason well, their knowledge and their experience. For 
instance, doctors are usually in a better position to understand issues related to health 
than fishermen and in turn, cardiologists are usually in a better position to 
comprehend issues related to the heart than ophthalmologists, but all, to a greater or 
lesser degree, have some understanding of health. In a similar line of thought, White 
(2007) argues that since there are not WB experts per se, all individuals‟ voices are 
or should be heard in the context of WB, however, to a varying extent. I elaborate 
White‟s ideas later in the chapter. In the next section, two other approaches in 
objective WB, i.e. pleasure and perfectionism, are briefly discussed in relation to the 
objective list theory.  
4.3.2.1 Objective List Theory, Pleasure and Perfectionism 
An alternative to the objective list theory of WB is objective hedonism, 
according to which the only elements of WB are pleasure and pain, where pleasure is 
the positive element and pain the negative one (Bradley, 2014). Prima facie, 
hedonism seems to be a kind of objectivism as pleasures make one‟s life better and 
pain makes it worse, regardless of one‟s attitude towards pleasure or pain. In this 
sense, i.e. assuming that pleasure is a different kind of feeling not reducible to desire, 
hedonism is a version of objective WB.  
Nevertheless, Bradley (2014) notes that, if we think about pleasure in a 
different way, then hedonism becomes a subjective kind of WB. That is whether a 
feeling is a pleasure and contributes to a person‟s WB, depends on the attitude of the 
individual who has the feeling. Anti-hedonists, however, would argue that not every 
pleasure is good and there are things other than pleasures that are good. From my 
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perspective, objective hedonism may not be so different from objective list theories 
in the sense that they both have objective elements of WB. Specifically, the former 
recognizes two objective components for WB, namely pleasure and pain (Bradley, 
2014), whilst in the latter more components are included and new ones can be added 
or taken out (Nussbaum, 2011) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). 
Furthermore, perfectionism is considered to be another dominant objective 
theory of WB (Bradley, 2014). Specifically, according to perfectionism “what is 
good for us is determined by what kind of things we are; for example, in a society 
where people are treated as less than fully human, those people may fail to perfect 
their nature which is a tragedy for them” (Bradley, 2014, p. 8-9). However, I think 
that instead of being antagonistic to the other objective theories, perfectionism could 
be viewed as a way to provide solutions, to some extent, to the objections discussed 
above. To be more specific, like in the problems of what WB consists in or what the 
aims of education are, that constitute perpetual problems to which there is not a 
single answer, the definition of perfectionism in terms of human nature seems 
problematic because there is not a single view concerning what human nature is. 
Nevertheless, perfectionism could provide a criterion for objective list theories in 
terms of what should be included on the list, why and in what order, and in this way 
operate in a supplementary manner. For instance, a criterion might be what is good in 
order to perfect human nature and on this, again, Aristotle‟s function argument and 
the activity of reason as discussed above and particularly in Chapter 2, can shed 
some light.  
In relation to all three, i.e. perfectionism, human nature and education, it is 
worth quoting Democritus (1948) who said that nature and instruction, that is 
teaching, are similar as instruction transforms humans and in transforming them it 
creates humans‟ nature. However, Kazepides (1979) notes that “a lot must be said 
about the nature of teaching which in turn would enable human nature to flourish” 
(ibid, 1979, p. 63). In a similar line of thought, in this thesis I argue that teachers, 
teaching and students cannot be seen separately from one another, because teaching 
requires somebody to „deliver‟ it, i.e. teachers, and also someone to „receive‟ it, i.e. 
students. Teaching also aims at students‟ WB, but as argued in Chapter 1, teachers‟ 
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and students‟ WB is inextricably connected, therefore, I argue that “a lot must be 
said” about teachers‟ WB in education.  
4.4 White’s Subjective-Collective Account of Well-being 
It is a widely – held view that one of White‟s most important contributions to 
educational theory and practice is his work on WB which over the years took an 
objective-subjective form that has both individual and collective at its core (De 
Ruyter, 2015) (Siegel, 2015). According to White (2011) WB is a “successful and 
whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (ibid, 2011, p. 
109). As is shown next, White argues for a subjective-major-informed desire account 
of WB and objective goods. However, White‟s (2011) idea of subjective does not 
focus on individuals‟ major-informed desires, but on what a group of people desires. 
In this sense, De Ruyter (2015, p. 88) observes that his account of WB is “inter-
subjective” rather than (individual-) subjective. Thereafter, in the chapter, I refer to 
White‟s account of WB as subjective-collective. In the following section, some of 
White‟s most significant ideas on WB are discussed, i.e. “success”, 
“worthwhileness”, “whole-heartedness”, “objective goods” among other things and 
“a wider transformation in the social, political and economic realm” which are 
elaborated in his work Exploring Well-being in Schools (2011) and which this 
chapter mainly draws from.   
4.4.1 Well-being beyond the Basics 
First, let me clarify that White (2011) uses the terms “well-being”, 
“flourishing” and “fulfillment” interchangeably. However, for the sake of clarity and 
consistency I only use the term “well-being”. Second, whereas White‟s ideas mainly 
concern children and schools, my concepts relate to teachers and teaching. So, what 
does WB mean once a person‟s basic needs such as food, housing, health, income, 
education and freedom are met, if anything? The answer to that is far from clear. 
According to White (2011) “we need to go beyond the basics, which may provide the 
necessary for WB, but what exactly is WB is still in question” (ibid, 2011, p. 28). It 
is apparent throughout White‟s work that his purpose is beyond mere survival and to 
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this end, he begins with an examination of the most commonly held views of WB to 
conclude with the most promising ones, a method that reminds us of Aristotle. 
As White (2011) observes, a popular modern view of WB is that it entails 
being famous in wider circles than close relationships. Only a few people, however, 
can be famous, so in this sense everyone else is excluded from WB. Being rich and 
able to buy whatever one desires is another popular view of WB. However, if 
education, health and income, for example, which are basic goods for all, can be 
bought, those who cannot afford them are excluded from WB. Apart from the 
problem that fame and positional goods do not have intrinsic value in themselves, 
they “may also be at the cost of others‟ WB” in terms of accumulation and leaving 
less for the rest (White, 2011, p. 37). Besides, something must be wrong with an 
account of WB if, in order to promote it, things become worse for other people. In 
this regard, White (2011) stresses the need to protect children from the cultural 
tsunamis of fame and wealth so as to give them the opportunity to form a more 
balanced view of WB.   
Moreover, another popular view of WB is based on “pleasure- seeking” 
(White, 2011, p. 42). Drawing on his experience in Britain, White (2011) notices that 
Bentham‟s ideas about WB as pleasurable experiences and the moral duty to promote 
the greatest happiness have been revived in recent years through the work of the 
economist Richard Layard (cited by White, 2011) who grounded his happiness 
agenda into governmental policy in 2000. In relation to this, White (2011) argues that 
in many instances enjoyment may come without pleasurable feelings, and that WB is 
not necessarily tied up to happy feelings, which usually last for a short time. 
Although White is not against the idea of pleasure in general, he emphasizes “the 
difference between the sensation sense and the activity sense of pleasure” (White, 
2011, p. 46) and encourages teachers to help their pupils to go beyond popular 
visions of WB in pleasurable exotic food, drink, sex etc. (White, 2007) (White, 
2011). I would add that teachers themselves have to be beyond these popular views 
of WB in order through teaching to help children themselves go beyond them. Even 
more, I argue that teachers‟ WB requires a particular understanding of virtue and 
then there is really one virtue that teachers have to have, as explored in Chapter 5, 
and that is OM because it facilitates their WB and, therefore, pupils‟ WB too. 
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So, if fame, wealth and pleasure as some of the most popular views of WB 
nowadays do not meet the criteria for WB according to White (2011), what might 
WB consist of? White replies that WB is a “successful and whole-hearted 
engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (White, 2011, p. 109) (White, 
2011b) (White, 2007) (White, 2002). 
4.4.2 The Significance of Success for Well-being 
Let us begin with White‟s (2011) notion of “success”, that is, in getting what 
one wants. “Desire satisfaction” or “success” in one‟s goals is undoubtedly related to 
human WB. However, sometimes, the satisfaction of one‟s desires makes one‟s life 
worse rather than better, or it may be the case that two or more desires contradict one 
another, although they contribute to one‟s WB. “What happens in that case?” White 
asks (White, 2011, p. 49). Success is crucial for WB, but only conditionally. 
Specifically, White (2011) suggests that desires should be limited to those that have 
some significance to the individual‟s life, namely to desires that they are not willing 
to give up easily. In this sense, if desires are hierarchically structured, then the most 
significant are the ones near the top, that is, major desires.  
Additionally, something about knowledge should be added to the desire 
satisfaction account, in that desires should be “well-informed” in order to contribute 
to one‟s WB. However, White (2011) also draws attention to issues of paternalism, a 
danger when one‟s “desires are both personally important and well-informed” (ibid, 
2011, p. 50). Put differently, paternalism can be avoided, if an individual‟s desires 
are important for them personally and not because somebody else says so and if 
one‟s desires are not the result of misleading or insufficient understanding. All this is 
summarized in one term, which is that desires for WB should be “well-informed”. I 
think that White adequately mitigates the dangers of paternalism and 
authoritarianism on children by suggesting they have as many as possible actual and 
imaginary experiences of what WB may consist in as well as by targeting the 
development of pupils‟ critical understanding so as to be well-informed and 
autonomous agents (White, 2011).  
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Specifically, White (2011) maintains that a conflict between two goals of WB 
can be dealt with a pre-requisite of “autonomy” on the one hand and a kind of 
disposition formation on the other hand. Let us explain. Being autonomous is a part 
of human WB and it is related to an individual‟s knowledge of their various options 
(White, 1991) and having knowledge of various options for WB has to do with 
induction into WB pursuits (White, 2006). All this implies that, if children have to be 
inducted into WB pursuits to become autonomous, this means that they are not fully 
there yet. In particular, all things being equal, the younger they are the less 
knowledge they have about their options. Thus, an induction, a kind of 
apprenticeship may give them the understanding and the experience required to make 
choices (White, 2011). In addition to this, White (2011) turns his attention to the 
problem of what sort of education would fit this kind of well-informed, autonomous 
individual who is the final authority on their own WB. He points at a kind of 
education that does not merely map out possible lives ahead, but also gives children 
lots of experience of what WB means, now and into the future, by inducting them 
into WB pursuits themselves (White, 2011).  
White‟s suggestions are also interesting in relation to teaching, teachers and 
teacher education, which is a particular focus of this thesis. Specifically, if teachers 
are trained to develop further, does that mean that they are not fully teachers yet? 
Does it mean that the options out there are numerous, so teachers should expand their 
knowledge and understanding required to make “well-informed” choices for their 
WB, and thus, for pupils‟ WB? If this is the case, what sort of teacher education 
would teachers who are the final authority on their WB? This thesis argues that the 
answers to these questions can be found in an account of intellectual WB that relies 
on an account of intellectual virtue as discussed in Chapter 5. From this point of 
view, there is a whole open space for teachers to explore what intellectual WB 
means, if teacher education programmes help teachers be open-minded in order to 
accomplish epistemic goods such as knowledge, acquaintance and understanding, 
and in this way to induct them into WB pursuits themselves.  
Additionally, in helping children into WB pursuits, White (2011) suggests 
that “the literary arts, including fiction, drama and film, are ideal media for 
introducing us to valuable relationships and activities of all sorts that we have not 
107 
 
experienced first-hand” (ibid, 2011, p. 65). However, in the case of teachers, I think 
that philosophy may be even more ideal. Specifically, since I am looking at an 
account of WB that relies on virtues through (i) an Aristotelian perspective which is 
necessarily related to the activity of reason and (ii) a virtue-epistemological 
background which aims at epistemic goods, philosophy, in my view, is more 
appropriate for teachers‟ induction into such an account of intellectual WB pursuits, 
and an account of OM as genuine, reasonable and well-informed, as presented later 
on in the thesis, is an intellectual virtue that facilitates intellectual WB overall. The 
significance of philosophy in this context should be regarded as an idea that may be 
worth future investigation, it is not possible to elaborate here, since this aspect is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.      
Furthermore, White‟s justification of autonomy as an educational aim relies 
on its relationship with the concept of WB. He maintains that “being autonomous is 
an element of WB in a democratic society” (White, 1991, p. 24). However, both 
Siegel (2015) and Pring (2015) raise concerns from different viewpoints in relation 
to White‟s idea of WB as an overarching educational goal and autonomy as a 
subsequent one. Siegel‟s (2015) worry is that “taking the promotion of pupils‟ WB as 
the overall aim of education may threaten pupils‟ autonomy in terms of imposing a 
particular understanding of WB on them” (ibid, 2015, p. 121).  
Also, he argues that, if White tries to give autonomy a general justification in 
its role as an educational aim, this would be problematic, because in non-democratic 
societies autonomy cannot be justified as such (Siegel, 2015). However, I think that 
White (1991) only states something obvious in saying that autonomy is a 
characteristic of WB in democratic societies, because in a non-democratic society, 
e.g. Saudi Arabia, the concept of WB itself, and therefore of any idea that relates to 
it, e.g. autonomy, does not exist at least in ways discussed in this thesis. Thus, Siegel 
(2015) suggests that White should be explicit in restricting his account of WB and 
autonomy in certain circumstances, which I think White does, but perhaps not in a 
bold way. In this sense, obviously, it is reasonable to clarify that the account of WB 
that requires virtues as argued in this thesis is also restricted to the educational 
environments of truly democratic societies where the individual and social WB are 
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highly and equally valued. Whether our Western societies nowadays are truly 
democratic and equally value individual and collective WB or not is a contested 
matter. In this project, clearly, I assume they are, at least up to some point, so that the 
concept of WB can find fertile ground for further exploration and implementation. 
Siegel (2015) nevertheless, insists that there should be a way of getting a kind 
of universal justification of autonomy as an educational aim in any society, if 
autonomy is separated from the notion of WB. From my point of view, Siegel‟s 
(2015) observation would be more meaningful if he provided justification on the 
problem of what makes autonomy a distinctively human characteristic that deserves 
to be respected per se and not in relation to WB, which he does not. For instance, let 
us say, according to Siegel‟s (2015) remarks, that if teachers deal with children as 
ends in themselves and respect them as individuals per se, they (should) cultivate 
their autonomy regardless if autonomy contributes to pupils‟ WB. However, in non-
democratic societies, this may entail grave dangers for pupils‟ WB in various ways, 
whereas in a democratic society the opposite usually applies. Therefore, I think that a 
universal justification of autonomy as an educational aim per se regardless of WB 
may not be possible or meaningful at all. 
From this perspective, it seems that White‟s notion of autonomy is closely 
related to “success” the significance of which in WB is unquestionable. However, De 
Ruyter (2015) notes that White (2011) does not give a full description of success in 
his account of WB. Specifically, White seems to imply that something is successful 
only if it is accomplished in the way in which it is intended, which does not take into 
account various gradations of success in the same worthwhile activity (De Ruyter, 
2015). Also, there seems to be a subjective part in White‟s objective account of WB 
which complicates matters, which is that the individual should be able to confirm 
their WB and their feelings should be harmonized with the successful worthwhile 
activity or relationship. However, De Ruyter (2015) argues that different individuals 
usually value and rank an activity or relationship differently, so a successful 
worthwhile activity that is extremely important for one may be less important to 
another. Additionally, often in real life people may be successful in worthwhile 
activities and relationships, nonetheless, they may not be in a position to confirm 
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their WB and harmonize their feelings with these, due, for example, to periods of 
psychological distress.  
Unsurprisingly in the context of WB, various problems must be addressed in 
relation to White‟s (2011) ideas, where he maintains that a revised desire satisfaction 
account of WB is appropriate for our society. However, he argues that desire 
satisfaction is not enough, since WB apart from being “successful” and “well-
informed”, equally importantly requires “worthwhileness” and “whole-heartedness” 
(White, 2011). Let us see what these mean and why they are necessary to White‟s 
account of WB.  
4.4.3 The Requirements of Worthwhileness and Whole-heartedness  
First, White (2011) notes that pupils need from an early age to spend time in 
whole-hearted pursuits that they enjoy, and education should help them to experience 
WB now, while they are children, not in the future or just in their life as adults 
(White, 2009). Importantly, White (2011) (2009) points out that it is not realistic to 
experience all kinds of worthwhile pursuits and, to this end, imagination can play a 
vital role. Through literature and the arts pupils may experience all sorts of activities 
and relationships which it is not possible to experience directly, providing them not 
just with the relevant knowledge but with feeling(s) as well. In relation to teachers, 
however, I argued earlier that philosophy may be more appropriate in a context of an 
account of WB that requires an account of virtues. 
Moreover, in order to exclude meaningless activities, which may be what one 
wants and gets, i.e. the desire satisfaction criterion is met, but do not contribute to 
their WB, White (2011) adds the criterion of “worthwhileness as necessary to WB” 
(ibid, 2011, p. 58). However, what makes an activity worthwhile? White (2011) 
claims that one must deal with this problem with genuine and practical, not 
philosophical, doubt, which is usually endless and therefore, unhelpful. Having said 
that, White (2011) does not imply that we must rule out philosophical enquiry 
completely. In other words, he maintains that it is not difficult to think of 
intrinsically worthwhile activities or relationships that contribute to human WB, not 
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just as a means to an end but also valuable and worthwhile in themselves and 
apparently, they should be successful (White, 2011). 
White (2011) emphasizes that his account of WB owes a great deal to Joseph 
Raz (cited by White, 2011), who first talked about three additional elements to the 
concept of WB. A first element is “whole-heartedness”, i.e. to lose oneself in the 
relevant activity or relationship that contributes to one‟s WB (White, 2011, p. 60). 
Second, education for WB should not be restricted to academic subjects but primarily 
“develop a range of personal qualities” which apart from “success” and “whole-











 and many others (White, 2011, p. 61). 
Third, “good luck” seems to be an additional characteristic, necessary to WB and, in 
this sense, White (2011) argues for the need to make life opportunities more equal 
and accessible to all within society, so that WB becomes possible for many and not 
just for a few.  
The second and third characteristic in particular are more relevant to and 
support other parts of this thesis‟s argument. Briefly, in Chapter 1 and 2 I argued for 
teachers‟ WB, a particular account of WB that relies on a particular understanding of 
virtues. In this sense, as in White‟s (2011) claims above, it was argued in Chapter 3 
that teachers‟ intellectual WB “should not be confined to academic subjects” (ibid, 
2011, p. 61) but primarily develop a range of intellectual virtues such as “intellectual 
courage”, “intellectual perseverance”, “intellectual honesty”, “intellectual integrity” 
etc. (Greco and Turri, 2011) (Baehr, 2011) and, in particular, should develop the 
intellectual virtue of OM. Unlike White (2011), however, who talks about “good 
luck”, drawing on Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) in Chapter 5, I argue that teacher 
education should provide “genuine opportunities” for WB to all teachers, both for 
themselves and for children, and that teaching teachers to be open-minded in 
particular, as presented in Chapter 5, is a way to facilitate teachers‟ WB and then 
pupils‟ WB.  
                                                 
42
 i.e. decisiveness to bring to a completion what one wants  
43
 i.e. be strong enough to deal with physical and non-physical fears 
44
 i.e. continue against all odds 
45
 i.e. make proper decisions in any context 
46
 i.e. „the intelligent regulation of one‟s bodily appetites‟ (White, 2011, p. 61) 
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White (2011) (2002), drawing on Raz, claims that WB depends on a desire 
satisfaction condition that is worthwhile for a loose group of people, which constitute 
a kind of culture or tradition within time and that the individual is not the final 
authority on their own WB. However, De Ruyter (2015) notes that, on the one hand, 
an individual‟s WB presupposes that they are in a position to give meaningfulness to 
the good things that are important to all human beings and, on the other hand, a 
person‟s WB also depends on their ability to take full advantage of their capabilities 
to have an optimal development. Both these two characteristics appear to be 
individual-dependent (De Ruyter, 2015). Besides, there is always the possibility of 
existing somewhere in the middle, i.e. “being agent-neutral” (De Ruyter, 2015, p. 
92). All this suggests that there are kinds of goods that are good for all but not 
optimally developed yet, and individuals should move towards them (De Ruyter, 
2015). If they do so, they can achieve WB as well as when they successfully do 
things that not only are valuable to them but are also “worthwhile” and contribute to 
their development.    
Furthermore, White (2007) argues that human nature alone is not in a position 
to provide reasons for worthwhile activities and relationships. Although there are not 
authorities to impose their views, however, an individual‟s WB pursuit has to be 
compatible with respect for others‟ worthwhile pursuits and autonomy. This implies 
that self-interest and concern for others should be inter-connected and treated with 
respect for one another as I argue in this thesis. Pring (2015, p. 8) notices though that 
a deeper explanation and understanding of the historical philosophical tradition of 
this concept is necessary, since White‟s notions seem to call upon Mill‟s and 
Dewey‟s similar concerns. Pring (2015) also underlines the significance of 
experience in justifying worthwhile activities and relationships, therefore, experience 
is another concept that deserves special investigation for its contribution to WB 
which White does not develop. 
4.4.4 Worthwhileness, Objectivity and Well-being  
All in all, can WB as “a successful and whole-hearted engagement in 
worthwhile activities and relationships” be objectively determined? (White, 2011, p. 
109). According to White (2011) “worthwhile activities and relationships are not 
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relative to individual preferences” which means that they are objectively determined 
(ibid, 2011, pp. 59, 86). In order to investigate this, White (2007) (2011) first looks 
into human nature and then into culture. In relation to human nature, White (2011) 
claims that WB may partly depend on human nature, but this is not sufficient, 
because it is not possible to determine what WB is merely on the basis of facts about 
what kind of creature one is. Therefore, more sound argument(s) must be put forward 
beyond human nature in order to justify an activity or relationship as worthwhile.  
To this end, White (2011) looks at the example of aesthetic values. “Aesthetic 
values involve qualities relevant to sounds and sights, balance, contrast and 
complexity as well as qualities that are more closely related to human concerns such 
as expressiveness, humour, depth of insight etc.” (White, 2011, p. 87). They can be 
discovered in both works of art and aesthetic objects and they exist independently of 
one‟s specific inclinations and human nature, and no-one is able to perceive them 
unless they practice doing so. However, he notes that aesthetic values are also “extra-
individual, i.e. they can be comprehended as the products of a culture historically 
located”, so in this sense they appear to be problematic (White, 2011, p. 87).  
Having said that, White (2011) does not mean that aesthetic values are only 
relevant to particular cultural conditions and they cannot exist outside these. The 
same applies to life values, which are usually not relevant to the culture that produces 
them, e.g. the institution of marriage. So, “if individuals are not found on what a life 
of WB is for themselves, who could that be, if anyone?” (White, 2011, p. 89). To 
answer this, White (2011) turns his attention to cultures and philosophers. He notices 
that although cultures can produce “worthwhile activities”, they can also produce 
activities of little or no value or of disvalue, e.g. slavery, and subsequently, they can 
provide a misleading kind of WB. Concerning philosophers, White (2011) observes 
that although they can show various types of WB, they do not usually offer guidance 
towards the most worthwhile which again is problematic.   
However, we saw in Chapter 2 that according to a certain understanding, 
Aristotle distinguishes praxis as the best account of human WB in terms of being 
both virtuous and feasible. In this context, a person with phronesis could be a guide 
in WB pursuits and through reasoning guidance could be found in relation to both the 
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individual and the social (Hughes, 2001). Let us recall that Aristotelian WB consists 
in human activity and human activity is the realization of the virtues of the rational 
part of the soul. Rationality means the ability to think and act in terms of universal 
principles in accordance with reason (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). In this regard, I 
think that Aristotelian reason is central to objectivity and vice versa.  Therefore, 
objectivity is not, as White (2011) claims, central only or mainly to be critics‟ work, 
but also to Aristotle‟s work and perhaps to the work of philosophers‟ generally. 
Besides, as White (2011) notes, art critics justify their judgements with arguments 
that are always open to revision by better ones. If, however, this is not an activity of 
reason, then what is it?  
He concludes that the arts can shed some light on the problem of objectivity 
in WB, because despite any disagreement among art critics, objectivity is central to 
art critics‟ work since they justify their judgments with arguments that are always 
open to revision by better ones (White, 2011). In making these judgments, some 
individuals are in a better place than others. For instance, someone who has studied 
Russian literature for years and has become an acknowledged authority in his field 
seems to be in a better place to judge Dostoevsky‟s novels in comparison with 
somebody who has never read a Russian novel (White, 2011). From this point of 
view, this can provide a criterion for WB in terms of “an outsider, a more 
authoritative insider and an ordinary insider” (White, 2011, p. 90). In light of this, 
White (2011) attempts to apply the same pattern on judgments about objective 
components of WB.  
To be more specific, whereas all kinds of gradations can be found between 
outsiders and insiders, the “authoritative insiders”, as White (2011) argues, cannot be 
characterized as experts on WB in the same way that art critics are called experts in 
their fields. Taking into consideration Mill‟s notion (cited by White, 2011) about 
higher and lower pleasures, where those who experienced both prefer the former, 
White (2011) in a similar line of thought claims that the more “authoritative voices” 
on what WB consists in are those with an “experience of all kinds of goods” who, 
nonetheless, do not constitute a group of experts. Instead, they are a loose body of 
people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 454). Another characteristic of 
114 
 
these people could be a specific interest in reflection on what human WB consists in 
(White, 2011). They also acquire some kind of knowledge about all these issues and 
they reflect with a “freedom of spirit” (White, 2011, p. 454). Besides, they may do 
that “collaboratively or solitarily, but like art critics, they always welcome critical 
discussion of their ideas” (White, 2011, p. 91).   
According to White‟s (2011) view, almost all voices across the population in 
different contexts and in different degrees can and should participate in the 
discussion regarding the components of human WB.  He also stresses that the more 
expert one is the more of an insider one becomes, which is reasonable. However, it is 
important to note that White‟s (2008) idea of WB is not subjective from an 
individual point of view. Specifically, he argues that WB should not be 
comprehended as an individual‟s desire satisfaction, even if the desires in question 
are well-informed and major (White, 2008) (White, 2011). White‟s subjective factor 
of WB is not the individual but a loose body of people where almost everyone is 
inside, whether or not they are experts. As De Ruyter (2015) observes, White‟s 
account of WB is “inter-subjective” (ibid, 2015, p. 88) or, as I say here, it is a 
subjective-collective account of WB.  
Additionally, White (2011) maintains that education can play a basic role in 
distinguishing who exactly can participate in that loose body of people and to what 
extent. If one of the aims of education is WB, as White suggests, then, because of 
education, individuals become better-informed in discerning what WB consists in. 
According to White (2011), pupils have to take the message that no one has the one 
only answer on what constitutes WB and that all are welcome to participate in the 
discussion of “the endlessly open matters that the notion of WB brings with it 
locally, nationally and globally” (White, 2011, p. 95). In a similar context in Chapter 
5 I argue that the virtue of OM is necessary to any discussion concerning WB, 
especially in the educational environment, because one of the characteristics of this 
account of OM, among other things, is, for example, its serious engagement in 
dialogue and its ability to keep dialogue alive and fertile towards WB (Hare, 2006). 
Pring (2015) applauds White‟s call for an early and explicit consideration of 
the aims of education. However, he notices that there is a need for an explicit 
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connection between curriculum and knowledge of how to stay healthy and safe 
nowadays, which modern school reality seems to overlook, and perhaps much more 
could be said by White on this problematic area of basic WB (Pring, 2015). 
Furthermore, Bigger (2012) argues that White‟s concept of WB, which sounds like 
an urgent call for radical educational transformation may lack degrees of criticality. 
In particular, in a digital age when information bombards individuals it is crucial for 
children to develop criticality as a necessary ability for WB both in the basic sense 
and for a deeper engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships (Bigger, 
2012). 
Unavoidably, however, various problems occur in relation to the concept of 
objective goods and in White‟s ideas alike. An immediate example is how something 
objectively good for someone can motivate them to pursue it if they do not want to 
(Clayton, 1993). To this end, the role of education is crucial because it can (or 
should) cultivate within the individual the ability to discern what is good and the 
desire to desire it. However, in my view, it is not education in general that does that. 
This is vague and elusive. It is teaching, and teachers in particular, that can or should 
cultivate this ability in children in the educational context. This is a reason why there 
should be an explicit focus on teachers‟ WB as I argued in Chapter 1.  
Moreover, De Ruyter (2015) like White (2011), believes that objective goods 
are necessary elements for human WB. She thinks that these goods can be 
determined to be important for individuals independently of their disposition towards 
them. Drawing on Nussbaum‟s idea of “central requirements of a life with dignity” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 75 cited by De Ruyter, 2015, p. 93), where objective goods, 
among others, include health, food, shelter and safety, i.e. basic goods, De Ruyter 
(2015) talks about objective goods as “existential needs such as social relations, 
intellectual, creative, aesthetic and physical pursuits and autonomy” (ibid, 2015, p. 
93). In this context, she says that objective goods can be given various meanings and 
contents which, I believe, can be a double-edged sword. Put differently, how can 
something be objectively good if multiple meanings and contents are given to it?  
Specifically, in line with White (2011), she notices that these objective goods 
are individual-dependent and they are related to human nature. However, both De 
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Ruyter (2015) and White (2011) maintain that the way these objective goods are 
accomplished and how individuals develop them are not predetermined. Whereas 
White (2011) seems to focus on the way these objective goods are achieved by 
individuals, De Ruyter (2015) highlights the significance of the universality of these 
goods more than White does, on the grounds that human nature can be extremely 
diverse, but, at the same time, people all over the world share much in common.  
Besides, De Ruyter (2015) like Nussbaum (cited by De Ruyter, 2015, p. 94), 
concludes that it is crucial to recognize that accomplishing these objective goods is 
vital to a “common humanity” which is independent of culture. However, this view 
seems vulnerable and perhaps unrealistic in cases where an individual or a group of 
people are strongly influenced by their culture, resulting perhaps in an override of 
sharing with others the same basic goods due to a “common humanity” idea. For 
example, if an individual‟s or a group of people‟s culture legitimizes the abuse of 
children and women, and if these individuals or groups of people are strongly 
influenced by their culture, how is it possible to share with them any objective goods 
that have “human dignity” at their core? In this sense I think that more should be said 
about objective goods and culture on a basis of a “common humanity” criterion, 
otherwise I would probably need to be “so open-minded that my brains fall out” 
(Riggs, 2010, p. 178). On the other hand, would it be legitimate to absorb all cultures 
into one with common objective goods or would it be possible for all cultures to be 
united under “a common humanity” idea? I don‟t think so either.    
To summarize, a subjective-collective major-informed desire concept of WB 
advanced by John White was explored. Specifically, according to White WB is 
“successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and 
relationships” (White, 2011, p. 109) (White, 2011b) (White, 2007) (White, 2002). 
First, it has to be successful because continual failures in one‟s projects alienate one 
from WB. However, in order to be successful, the individual‟s desires have to be 
major and informed and part of being informed is to know the various options one 
has for WB, that is, to be autonomous (White, 1991). Second, it has to be whole-
hearted because dragging oneself even to the most valuable pursuits in an 
unproductive way cannot contribute to WB. Third, it has to be worthwhile. This is 
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more complicated because the idea of worthwhileness seems to involve issues of 
human nature and cultural existence and also relates to the problem of objectivity.  
Regarding the latter, White (2011) emphasizes that there are no authorities in 
relation to worthwhileness and therefore, to WB (White, 2011) (White, 2007). In 
particular, he argued that worthwhile activities and relationships are objectively 
determined because they are not relative to individual preferences. In order to justify 
this, White (2011) looks at the arts and art critics, and says that objectivity is central 
to art critics‟ work who justify their judgments with arguments that are always open 
to revision by better ones. In making these judgments, some individuals are in a 
better place than others and this can provide a criterion in terms of outsiders, more 
authoritative insiders and ordinary insiders (White, 2011, p. 90). And likewise, White 
(2011) argues for a similar pattern on judgments about objective components of WB, 
where the more “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those with an 
“experience of all kinds of goods”, who, however, do not constitute a group of 
experts but a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 
454). 
However, White‟s position is not sufficient for the aims of this thesis, 
because he gives too much emphasis to the subjective rather than the objective 
factors of WB. Specifically, White‟s account of WB is not subjective from an 
individual point of view, but from a collective one. In this sense, he argues that WB 
should not be comprehended in terms of the individual‟s desires satisfaction but in 
terms of what a loose body of people desire, even if the individual‟s desires are well-
informed and major (White, 2007b) (White, 2011). However, a stronger focus on the 
objective factors of WB as well as on the individual ones is necessary, because this 
thesis argues for a multi-faceted account of teachers‟ WB that equally values the 
objective and subjective, the individual and collective factors of WB. In this sense, it 
is necessary to highlight the idea that there are basic objective goods that can be 
objectively determined and benefit people independently of their particular interests, 
likes and cares (Rice, 2013) (Bradley, 2014) (Heathwood, 2014). Thus, in order to 
stress the significance of objective and individual factors of WB, in the following 
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section I examine Nussbaum‟s (2011) more objective-individual oriented theory of 


























Well-being and Education (Part Two): Nussbaum‟s Objective-Individual Account of 
Well-being and Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s Development of Nussbaum‟s Objective-
Individual Account of Well-being 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter, like the previous chapter, explores WB discourse in education. 
In the previous chapter I first approached concepts and terms conceptually and 
stressed how they are used in the literature in relation to the concept of WB, the most 
dominant of these terms being “flourishing”, “happiness” and “well-being”. Next, 
White‟s (2011) subjective-collective account of WB was examined. I argued that 
White‟s account of WB was insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he 
seemed to place too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB 
rather than on the objective and individual ones, which in this project are considered 
equally important for WB. For this reason, additionally, in this chapter I examine 
Nussbaum‟s (2011) objective-individual oriented account of WB which is more 
objective and individual focused than White‟s account, however, it is subjective and 
collective enough to confront criticism.  
Specifically, I look at some fundamental concepts of Nussbaum‟s 
Capabilities Approach (thereafter CA), which are most relevant to the aims of this 
thesis. First, I clarify how some basic terms and concepts of the CA are used. Then, I 
look at the core ideas of “capabilities”, that is, what a person is able to do and be and 
“functionings”. Capabilities, according to Nussbaum (2011), are valuable per se 
because, unlike functionings, they entail “freedom and choice” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). 
She distinguishes between “combined”, “internal” and “basic” capabilities. Whereas 
combined and internal capabilities are interconnected and can be further developed 
and trained, basic capabilities are the foundation upon which later development and 
training is possible. On the opposite side to “capabilities” are “functionings”, which 
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are “the realization of capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). Functionings are 
inferior to capabilities because they do not involve “freedom and choice” as 
capabilities do. Nussbaum (2011) also introduces into the concept of “capabilities” 
the criterion of “human dignity”, in order to promote the most important capabilities. 
In this sense, she argues that a “life worthy of human dignity” requires “a minimum 
threshold of ten central capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 32). However, it is stressed that 
there are implications with Nussbaum‟s account that are not addressed satisfactorily, 
which makes her concept of WB rather problematic in relation to the aims of this 
thesis. Therefore, I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to go 
beyond Nussbaum‟s CA and expand her ideas especially those related to the 
concepts of “capabilities” and “functionings” for WB.  
The best way to do this is through Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) theory 
which is regarded as a development of the CA. In this context, I particularly focus on 
Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) novel ideas that WB consists in “genuine 
opportunities for secure functionings”, in promoting “fertile functionings” and in 
diminishing “corrosive disadvantages”.  Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), unlike 
Nussbaum (2011), focus on “functionings”, and they argue that being 
“disadvantaged” is not being able to accomplish functionings. Thus, whereas WB is 
“genuine opportunities for secure functionings”, the lack of them constitutes 
disadvantage. According to their theory, it is not only the level of functionings that 
people enjoy at a given time that matters for WB, but it is also important to secure 
that level over time, that is, to have “secure functionings”. Moreover, they emphasize 
that, apart from “secure functionings” and the concept of “risk”, a significant role in 
WB is played by the fact that “disadvantages cluster together”. The phenomenon of 
“clustering” results on the one hand, in “corrosive disadvantages”, that is, in 
multipliers of disadvantage against WB, and on the other hand, in “fertile 
functionings”, that is, in multipliers of advantage for WB. Likewise, this thesis 
argues that since OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, it also facilitates 
teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile functionings” for their own WB and then pupils‟ WB. 
Last but not least, Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) method of “dynamic public 
reflective equilibrium” consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further 
analyse the concepts of functionings and capabilities in order to find effective ways 
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to cope with disadvantage and promote WB. In this regard, the potential use of their 
method in teacher education to further explore ways to improve teachers‟ WB is 
stressed.  
5.2 The Capabilities Approach as a Theory of Well-being 
The CA is one of the most influential of the modern theories of WB, 
especially in relation to education (Unterhalter, 2007) (Unterhalter, 2013) (Deneulin, 
2013) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). The CA begins with these simple yet complex 
questions: “what are people actually able to do and to be, what real opportunities are 
available to them?” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. x). Founded by economic theorist Amartya 
Sen and then notably developed by Martha Nussbaum, the CA appears as “a 
normative theory which claims that the freedom to accomplish WB is a result of 
what people are able to do and to be, i.e. a result of the reasoned choices that people 
are able to make” (Wood and Deprez, 2012, p. 473). The CA was initially developed 
by Sen as an alternative to the utility view and assessment of WB that had dominated 
in economics (Deneulin, 2013). Sen, according to Kleist (2016), argues that WB 
should be assessed not through utility criteria but through capabilities that is the 
freedom people have to do or to be what they have reasons to value. Although 
Nussbaum initially shared a common theoretical ground with Sen, she later 
differentiated from his concepts. It is her later ideas that this thesis particularly 
focuses on. 
There are several reasons for such an explicit focus. First, this thesis argues 
for a multi-faceted account of WB that is not measurable mainly by one factor, as is 
usually the case in GDP and other theories of WB. The thesis‟s multi-faceted view of 
WB necessarily leads to the CA as one of the most developed modern pluralist 
approaches to WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). Second, this project argues for an 
equal concern for individual and collective WB. Although the CA gives emphasis to 
the individual, it also highlights community as vital to human WB (Wood and 
Deprez, 2012). This becomes apparent in Nussbaum‟s (2011) statement that 
“capabilities belong first and foremost to individual persons and only derivatively to 
groups” (ibid, 2011, p. 35). Likewise, Deneulin (2013) observes that 
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“The subject of Nussbaum‟s CA is not groups but individuals; each person has to be 
seen as an end in oneself. What matters is not what a structure or group is doing, but 
how each individual is doing and the impacts of these structures and groups on the 
lives of each individual.”  (Deneulin, 2013, p. 626) 
This quote, however, should not be read as if the CA overlooks the collective 
factor in WB, because the capabilities of “affiliation” and “practical reason” for 
example play an “architectonic role” as organizers of all other capabilities in the 
sense that they are woven into them, as is shown later (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 39).  
Third, as Wood and Deprez (2012) note, Nussbaum considers education to be 
a sine qua non for other capabilities, because education expands possibilities and 
offers alternative ways of being and doing, and helps individuals to live lives that 
have reason to be valued. Unlike other theories of WB, Nussbaum‟s work attracts (or 
should attract) more attention in the educational context, because of her explicit 
concern with the content and process of education, which characterizes her entire 
work both implicitly and explicitly (Unterhalter, 2007) (Unterhalter, 2013).  
Fourth, Nussbaum‟s (2011) theory explicitly provides a list of ten central 
capabilities for WB, which is of crucial importance in terms of objectivity and 
objective goods in the WB context. However, Nussbaum‟s (2011b) list is “not 
offered as a dogma that must be swallowed as a whole… but only if it stands the test 
of argument should be adopted and put into practice” (ibid, 2011b, p. 24). In relation 
to this remark, however, Kleist (2016) notes that whereas earlier Nussbaum argues 
that the list is fixed, she later changes her position to an open-ended list, which 
obviously makes it less problematic. Next, Nussbaum‟s theory of WB is explored in 
relation to other counter theories. To this end I mainly draw on Nussbaum‟s work 
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (2011). 
5.3 Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach: An Objective-Individual Account of 
Well-being  
Education is the first theme that appears in Nussbaum‟s (2011) work, in the 
form of the story of the life of Vasanti, an Indian woman who is unable to do and to 
be things she values, such as having bodily integrity, being educated, having a decent 
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and stable job (Unterhalter, 2013) (Deneulin, 2013). According to Deneulin (2013), 
Nussbaum (2011) attempts to present the extent of her approach in the life of 
Vasanti. Specifically, she attempts to shed some light on deprivations and sufferings 
that other theories such as the GDP approach, human capital, utilitarian and resource-
based approaches simply “cannot read” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 12) and to which they 
therefore, cannot offer solutions. Also, in this way Nussbaum (2011) tries to give 
people a theoretical framework in order to hold their governments responsible and 
accountable to protect and promote a set of foundational individual entitlements 
(Deneulin, 2013). In this regard, Nussbaum (2011) states that  
“We need a counter-theory to challenge the entrenched but misguided theories if we 
want to move policy in the right direction. Such a counter-theory should articulate 
the world of development in new ways, showing us a different picture of what our 
priorities should be. The Capabilities Approach is the counter-theory we need in an 
era of urgent human problems and unjustifiable human inequalities.” (Nussbaum, 
2011, pp. x-xii) 
Nussbaum‟s (2011) approach usually appears as the “Human Development 
Approach” or “Capability Approach” or “Capabilities Approach”. She rejects the 
first, because it is “historically related to the human development report office of the 
United Nations Development Programme and its annual human development 
reports” and because she is also interested in the capabilities of non-human animals 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 17). On the other hand, she favours the term “capabilities” over 
“capability” for describing her approach, because she wants to highlight the fact that 
the most significant components of people‟s WB are plural and distinct and not 
reducible to a single measurement (Nussbaum, 2011), which as I clarified above fits 
the multi-faceted account of WB of this thesis. Next, I look at some of the CA‟s core 
ideas, most relevant to the aims of this thesis, namely the idea of the ten central 
capabilities list and the concepts of capabilities and functioning(s).  
5.3.1 Ten Central Capabilities as Objective Goods for Well-being 
To begin, Nussbaum (2011) develops a minimal theory of justice and WB, 
which consists in ten central capabilities that articulate different priorities at both the 
personal and the social levels. These objective goods are the following: “life, bodily 
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health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, 
affiliation, other species, play and control over one‟s environment” (Nussbaum, 
2000, pp. 77-78) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34). My aim here is not to examine these 
objective goods per se, but rather to explore some aspects of Nussbaum‟s rationale in 
relation to this objective goods list for WB. With this sense in mind, let us look at 
some of the most important characteristics of the list.  
First, the list is “open-ended” in terms of local contexts and in that other 
capabilities can be added (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 35-36) (Deneulin, 2013). Second, 
these ten central capabilities are related to individuals and only “derivatively” to 
groups (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). Third, “the heterogeneity of these capabilities is 
irreducible”, i.e. they are all distinctive and equally significant, therefore, for 
example, one cannot be regarded as more important than another (Nussbaum, 2011, 
pp. 35-36). Fourth, a life of “human dignity” demands that all individuals as citizens 
should be found “above a particular threshold of capability in all ten areas” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32). Fifth, in a case of “tragic choice”, that is when, for 
instance, two central capabilities collide, either alternative involves wrong-doing 
because of the impossibility of ranking among them (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 37). 
Therefore, in “tragic dilemmas”, one should choose the better between two evils. 
Sixth, “the central capabilities are intertwined in many ways, however, “affiliation” 
and “practical reason play an architectonic role in organizing and suffusing all 
others” (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 37, 39). All these, as essential characteristics of 
Nussbaum‟s objective goods list, are now further explored, together with the 
concepts of “capabilities”, “functionings” and the “human dignity” criterion for WB 
and how they relate to the aims of the thesis. 
5.3.2 Capabilities  
“Capabilities” are central to Nussbaum‟s (2011) theory both as a term and as 
a concept. Standing opposite “capabilities” are “functionings, which are the 
realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). From this point of view, capabilities 
seem useless without functionings which appear to give capabilities their purpose. 
However, this is not the case, because as Nussbaum (2011) argues, capabilities are 
valuable in themselves, in the sense that they entail the notions of “freedom and 
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choice” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). According to Nussbaum (2011) in promoting capabilities 
one is promoting freedom and choice, which is not the case in promoting 
functionings. Therefore, capabilities both as a term and as a concept come first in 
Nussbaum‟s theory. However, the priority and significance that Nussbaum (2011) 
gives to “capabilities” over “functionings” for WB is seriously contested by Wolff 
and De-Shalit (2007) in several aspects, as I show later in the chapter.  
Capabilities are the answer to the central question of the CA, i.e. what is a 
person able to do and to be. Specifically, “capabilities are a set of interrelated 
opportunities or freedoms created by a combination of a person‟s abilities, political, 
social and economic environment” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20). In this regard, 
Nussbaum (2011) distinguishes three kinds of capabilities: (a) combined capabilities, 
(b) internal capabilities and (c) basic capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 21-24). 
“Combined capabilities” are an individual‟s whole set of opportunities for choice and 
action in their political, social and economic environment. “Internal capabilities” are 
a person‟s intellectual and emotional capacities, personality traits, states of bodily 
fitness and health, internalized learning, skills of perception and movement, and they 
are highly relevant to the “combined capabilities as an integral part of them” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 21). In particular, Nussbaum (2011) describes “internal 
capabilities” as one‟s non-static and dynamic characteristics which represent one‟s 
trained or developed features and abilities interacting within one‟s particular 
environment.  
In this context, Nussbaum (2011) emphasizes that it is among the duties of 
society to contribute to the development of people‟s “internal capabilities”, 
especially through education. Nussbaum (2011) maintains that the distinction 
between “combined” and “internal capabilities” is extremely important, because a 
society can do well in supporting the production of people‟s “internal capabilities”, 
but not give the opportunities or the freedom to people‟s functionings according to 
their “internal capabilities”, therefore in this way society may treat people‟s 
“combined capabilities” unfairly. Let me explain. For instance, a teacher on a teacher 
education programme has the “internal capability” to freely express him/herself. 
However, through repression of speech, as happens in some kinds of “political 
correctness”, in practice he/she is deprived of this “internal capability”. On the other 
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hand, a teacher can realize an “internal capability”, although he/she may lack the 
developed ability. That is, the teacher is given the opportunity or freedom in the 
educational context to criticize, but he or she lacks the ability to think in a critical 
way. In this regard, as Nussbaum (2011) underlines, it is “not possible for society to 
produce combined capabilities without producing internal capabilities since the 
former actually constitute the latter in addition to the social, economic and political 
context where functionings can be chosen” (ibid, 2011, p. 22).  
Moreover, “internal capabilities” should not be confused with one‟s innate 
equipment, i.e. the powers that a human being brings into the world and that are then 
either developed or not (Nussbaum, 2011). These innate powers are called “basic 
capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2011). “Basic capabilities” are like raw material, the 
foundation upon which later development and training is based. However, Nussbaum 
(2011) highlights that one should be careful with the concept of “basic capabilities” 
in terms of meritocracy, so that it is not assumed that the most innately gifted 
individuals get privileged treatment, but quite the opposite, that is, people who are in 
greater need get more help.  
In the light of Nussbaum‟s (2011) ideas, it could be argued that if teachers‟ 
WB is crucial, as stressed in Chapter 1, then a special emphasis should be given to 
the development of teachers‟ “combined” and “internal capabilities” in order to 
promote their WB and then pupils‟ WB. In other words, teacher education 
programmes should give teachers the opportunities or freedom, as Nussbaum (2011) 
suggests, or teach them to be open-minded as I argue in this thesis, to function 
according to their “internal capabilities” and this way help them also to develop their 
“combined capabilities”. In this context, it could be argued that the virtue of OM, as 
presented in the next chapter, facilitates the development of both internal and 
combined capabilities, and therefore it facilitates WB, in the sense that it appears to 
share some common characteristics with them. For example, OM, like “internal 
capabilities”, is non-static, dynamic and context-dependent, as it can be adapted to a 
complex and constantly changing educational environment (Hare, 2006). However, 
there are significant implications in relation to Nussbaum‟s “capabilities” that 
discourage us from adapting her concept and prompt us to continue with the idea of 
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“functionings” for WB instead, through Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) perspective, 
which is more appropriate to the aims of this thesis as discussed later.  
Williams (1985b) also expresses some similar reservations, prior to Wolff‟s 
and De-Shalit‟s (2007) current concerns in relation to “capabilities”, without, 
however, rejecting the capabilities approach
47
 overall. However, the fact that 
Williams‟ (1985b) critique can be still found in Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas (2007) 
implies that there are still unresolved and/or underdeveloped implications with 
Nussbaum‟s CA even after two decades. In particular, he notes that the term 
capability is not clearly defined and asks what it means to have the capability to do 
anything (Williams, 1985b). Similarly, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) currently notice 
that the term capabilities is too vague and not used consistently, in that in some cases 
it means freedoms for functionings, whilst in other cases it is used as a potential 
combination of functionings not yet accomplished. Also, Williams (1985b) looks at 
the relationship between the capability to do something and the ability to do 
something here and now, and argues that the two may not be identical. Quoting an 
example given by Sen (cited by Williams, 1985b), he says that if one has the 
capability to breathe unpolluted air, then one can do so, i.e. one has the ability to 
breathe clear air here and now. But this is not possible, for instance, if someone who 
lives in a polluted area does not have the financial means to move to another area to 
breathe unpolluted air. Additionally, Williams (1985b) points out the relationship 
between “capability” and “choice” and observes that the former can be transformed 
into mere possibility without the presence of the latter and therefore, the concept 
becomes problematic.  
Furthermore, from an educational point of view, Walker and Vaughan (2012) 
notice that education is (or should be) vital for WB because it can influence the way 
people make good or better choices towards functionings. However, they also note 
that education should move towards developing people‟s capabilities on the grounds 
that “research evidence so far shows that education is central to the expansion of 
capabilities as it provides individuals with skills and capacities” (Walker and 
Vaughan, 2012, p. 500). However, we should not expect that WB, even when it is 
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 Although Williams (1985b) is talking about Sen‟s ideas, his critique is also meaningful for 
Nussbaum‟s approach on a shared basis.  
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explicitly set as an educational aim, will just occur in the educational process without 
showing an explicit concern for teachers‟ education and training for WB as Morris 
(2013) observes and I argue in Chapter 1. Next, let us look at another foundational 
concept of Nussbaum‟s CA, i.e. “functionings” and the criterion of “human dignity” 
for WB. 
5.3.3 Functioning(s) and the Criterion of Human Dignity 
On the opposite side to “capabilities”, Nussbaum (2011) argues that there are 
“functionings”, i.e. the “realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 24). She notes that 
capabilities seem useless without functionings which give them their purpose, 
however, capabilities also have value in themselves because they encompass the 
notions of “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011). In this regard, Nussbaum (2011) 
maintains that in promoting capabilities one is promoting freedom and choice and 
this is not the same as promoting someone to function. She also notes that some deny 
this when they claim that the government should simply make people function in the 
right way, e.g. live a healthy life, which Nussbaum (2011) rejects, arguing that there 
is a moral difference between policies that support health and those that support 
health capabilities in terms of people‟s right to exercise freedom and choice. Hence, 
governments should promote “capabilities”, not “functionings” (Nussbaum, 2011).  
This is a basic point of disagreement between Nussbaum (2011) and Wolff 
and De-Shalit (2007), who argue that “functionings‟ should be promoted instead, as 
explained later in the chapter. Additionally, “people should not be given the option to 
be treated with respect and non-humiliation… all people must be treated with respect 
and their governments should deny humiliating them” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 26). 
However, in a particular understanding, Nussbaum‟s latter statement is at odds with 
her former one, in the sense that if people should not be given the choice whether or 
not to “be treated with respect and non-humiliation” then implications for their 
“freedom and choice” seem to arise. Similar problems are identified by Wolff and 
De-Shalit (2007) in the following sections. 
In this context, Nussbaum (2011) looks at the problem of which capabilities 
should be promoted as the most important. In order to give a systematic answer to 
this, Nussbaum (2011) reminds us that the CA is not a human nature theory that talks 
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about resources, possibilities and obstacles, but not about what to value, but the CA 
is a theory that is “evaluative and ethical from the very beginning” (ibid, 2011, p. 
28). In this sense, Nussbaum (2011) examines on what basis a selection of 
capabilities is possible, and therefore, she introduces the criterion of “human 
dignity”. She argues that there are human living conditions “worthy of human 
dignity” and others that are not. Nussbaum (2011) also emphasizes the protection of 
particular areas of freedom that are vital for a life worthy of “human dignity”. In this 
way she transforms the problem of which capabilities should be promoted as the 
most important into “what a life worthy of human dignity requires” (Nussbaum, 
2011, p. 32). The answer to this is that “human WB demands a minimum threshold 
of ten central capabilities which should be protected and promoted by governments 
so that all people are able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32).  
However, Claasen and Duwell (2013) observe that Nussbaum (2011) is not 
consistent in her use of the “human dignity” criterion, because in her earlier work she 
uses a different criterion: that of “a common humanity” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 71 cited 
by Claasen and Duwell 2013, p. 495). In relation to this, they argue that Nussbaum 
neither offers satisfying reasons for choosing to abandon the criterion of “a common 
humanity” and continue with the criterion of “human dignity” instead, nor does she 
point out the implications that may result from introducing a new criterion into her 
theory (Claasen and Duwell, 2013). They also note that whilst Nussbaum changes 
her selection criterion, she does not make any changes to her central capabilities list. 
Moreover, they seem uncomfortable with the fact that in her later work the earlier 
notion of a common humanity still seems fully active (Claasen and Duwell, 2013). 
From my perspective, however, Nussbaum (2011) does not aim to replace her 
earlier criterion of “a common humanity” with a later criterion of “human dignity” in 
the sense that she turns to a totally different concept. I think that Nussbaum (2011) 
moves forward in the same direction, i.e. the “human dignity” criterion can be seen 
as a more specific part of the more general “common humanity” criterion. This may 
bring its own implications as Claasen and Duwell (2013) notice, but unlike them, I 
think that Nussbaum‟s new criterion of “human dignity” constitutes a progress rather 
than a step backwards. Although Nussbaum (2011) emphasizes that “dignity is an 
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intuitive notion that is by no means completely clear… it is a vague idea that needs 
to be given content by placing it in a context of related ideas” (ibid, 2011, p. 29-30), I 
agree with Claasen and Duwell (2013) that further elaboration and clarification are 
needed. 
To summarize, Nussbaum‟s objective-individual account of WB with a 
particular focus on education was explored as a necessary addition to White‟s 
subjective-collective account of WB. The central questions of Nussbaum‟s CA are 
what people are actually able to do and to be and what real opportunities are 
available to them so as to realize their capabilities and achieve WB. To this end, 
Nussbaum (2011) introduces an open-ended list of ten central capabilities or 
objective goods. A criterion for this objective goods list for WB is the idea of 
“human dignity”. According to this human WB demands a minimum threshold of 
these ten central capabilities, which should be protected and promoted by policy so 
that all people are able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life (Nussbaum, 
2011). However, Nussbaum‟s concepts appear problematic in various aspects. In 
relation to these unresolved and/or underdeveloped implications among other things, 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) “introduce some novel ideas that theoretically enrich the 
CA” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 42). Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) modifications are of 
great importance for this thesis because on the one hand, they focus on 
“functionings” rather than on “capabilities” and on the other hand, they argue that, 
although it is important for WB to achieve a functioning, it is also crucial to “secure 
functioning” over time. It is also crucial to “de-cluster” “corrosive disadvantages” 
that hinder WB and promote “fertile functionings” that promote WB (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007). In the next part of the chapter, Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) ideas 
are investigated as an expansion and “a natural development of the CA” and the 
notions of “capabilities” and “functionings” are further analyzed and discussed in 
relation to the aims of this thesis with a focus on education and teaching.  
5.4 Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s Concept of Well-being 
In this part of the chapter I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual 
clarification to expand Nussbaum‟s CA and look at Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas in 
relation to WB. Unlike the CA, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) mainly focus on 
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“functionings” rather than on “capabilities” and they emphasize how crucial it is for 
WB not only to achieve a functioning but also to secure that functioning over time. 
Overall, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that WB consists in “genuine 
opportunities for secure functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37), in promoting “fertile 
functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, pp. 121-
122). My ultimate aim here is to make three parallels and say that (i) OM is a virtue 
that facilitates all other virtues as was implied in Chapter 3, therefore, OM, as 
presented in Chapter 6, facilitates the acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile 
functionings” for WB, (ii) a kind of “risk” is embedded in the anti-OM cases of 
standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness discussed in the next chapter, 
therefore, anti-OM hinders the acquisition of an individual‟s “secure” and “fertile 
functionings” for WB and  (iii) as argued in Chapter 1, political power and profit can 
be two factors corrosive to virtue, therefore, they are part of what Wolff and De-
Shalit call a “corrosive disadvantage” at the expense of teachers‟ and then pupils‟ 
WB. All three parallels are further investigated in Chapters 6 and 7. However, for a 
better understanding, we need first to look at Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) (2013) 
rationale behind Nussbaum‟s (2011) CA extension and explain the terms they 
introduce.   
5.4.1 Beyond Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
Some of the basic similarities and differences between Nussbaum‟s and 
Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s views of WB are adapted by and contribute to the account of 
WB and OM in this thesis. Let us look at them more closely. Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) draw heavily on Nussbaum‟s CA and their theories have various 
characteristics in common (Gheaus, 2010). First, like the CA, Wolff‟s and De-
Shalit‟s view is pluralist and rejects a monistic approach to WB, e.g. being 
disadvantaged in one aspect does not and should not compensate for being 
advantaged in another aspect (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 22-30) (Nussbaum, 
2011, pp. 24, 36) (Gheaus, 2010). Second, both approaches aim at providing 
practical guidance to policy by constructing a theory that is possible to apply to real 
world conditions (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 97) (Grant, 





 as a starting point “because it is meant to be part of a policy project 
and it is grounded in cross-cultural work aiming at a consensus of what functionings 
are included in the list regardless of people‟s different views of WB” and they add to 
that list another four elements
49
 (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 38). They both stress 
that their objective-element lists are open and “context-dependent” in terms of 
“respecting people” while addressing WB issues, therefore, they are flexible as a 
work in progress (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 40, 97, 32) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 
138, 144, 167).  
Fourth, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) consider six functionings in particular to 
be more “widespread” (although not more important) than the others and they argue 
that the least advantaged are the ones that are doing badly in these “six high-weight 
functionings
50
” (ibid, 2007, p. 106) (Grant, 2008). Nussbaum (2011) does not make 
such a distinction in her central capabilities list, but in a similar manner she says that 
two capabilities in particular “appear to play a distinctive architectonic role
51
” in 
terms of organizing and pervading the others (ibid, 2011, p. 39). Neither Wolff and 
De-Shalit nor Nussbaum rank the elements of their lists, but they argue that the more 
a person is doing badly in more than one of these functionings/capabilities, the more 
disadvantaged he/she is, and therefore, he/she does not experience WB (Wolff and 
De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 36-62). Similarly, the account of WB of this thesis is multi-
faceted, aims at improving and helping to implement educational policy and argues 
among other things for an objective list of WB characteristics that is open and 
context-dependent, an element of which is the virtue of OM. Additionally, in the next 
chapter it is argued that OM as presented in this thesis should not only be an element 
of such a list but is also necessary in the process of deciding what should go on or 
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 (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, (6) 
practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, (10) control over one‟s environment 
(Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 77-78) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34) 
49
 Namely “doing good to other people, not being forced to act contrary to the law, comprehending the 
law and being in a position to understand the local language” (Wolff and De - Shalit, 2007, pp. 50-
51). 
50
 Wolff‟s and De - Shalit‟s list of high-weight functionings includes life, bodily health, bodily 
integrity, affiliation (or belonging), control over one‟s environment and sense, imagination, thought 
(ibid, 2007, p 106). 
51
 “These two are affiliation and practical reason which pervade the other capabilities in the sense that 
when the others are present in a form commensurate with human dignity, they are woven into them” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 39) 
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taken out off that list. In this sense, OM does not appear more important than other 
virtues but rather as a virtue that “plays an architectonic role” in this account of WB 
and as a virtue that must be “widespread” in order to facilitate “intellectual 
functionings” for epistemic WB.  
However, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) do not adapt the CA as it is. First, they 
argue that Nussbaum‟s account of WB “emphasizes the individual who cares more 
for herself rather than the active member of a community who cares both for herself 
and others” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 45). Earlier in this chapter it was argued 
that White‟s account of WB placed too much emphasis on the subjective and 
collective factors of WB rather than on the objective and individual ones. As she 
herself notes “capabilities belong first and foremost to individuals and only 
derivatively to groups” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). It was partly for this reason that I 
turned to Nussbaum‟s more objective-individual oriented CA. Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) disagree, and they try to draw this out as an issue of special focus. As this 
thesis argues, they imply that there should be an equal concern for the individual and 
the collective WB.   
Second, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) focus on functionings rather than on 
capabilities and notice that the CA‟s focus on capabilities rather on functionings is 
“less well motivated than often thought” (ibid, 2007, p. 65) (Gheaus, 2010). Whereas 
the CA focuses on what people can do and be, i.e. the ability to function and “the 
opportunity to select”, Wolff and De-Shalit concentrate on people‟s functionings, i.e. 
the “realization of capabilities” and levels of advantage and disadvantage 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25) (Olsaretti, 2008). Their target is “not just to create 
opportunities for the sake of creating opportunities, but create opportunities for the 
sake of a life worth living” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37).  
Let me explain. Wolff and De-Shalit raise three concerns in relation to the 
idea of capability (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013). First, they argue that there is a gap 
between capabilities and functionings in the CA and they try to show this by 
examining when an individual has a capability. For instance, if someone has the 
opportunity to create social networks but does not take advantage of this because 
they choose to spend their time alone, do they have the capability for “affiliation” or 
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not? Wolff and Shalit (2013) observe that they do have it in the sense that they have 
the ability or the opportunity to accomplish the capability of “affiliation” if they 
decide to do so. In contrast, if someone lives in a village where there are not many 
opportunities to meet people and create relationships with others, do they still have 
the capability of “affiliation” or not? Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) argue that if having 
the capability of affiliation means that one has social networks, then any distinction 
between capability and functioning collapses. If this is not the case, then it is 
necessary to determine when an opportunity is too distant to be a capability. In the 
light of this, the more remote an opportunity is, the more the capability is unrealized, 
therefore, according to Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) the capability becomes useless 
and the less remote an opportunity the less obvious a distinction between capability 
and functioning, therefore, it makes more sense to focus on functionings instead of 
capabilities.   
Next, they point out that when the two concepts are together, they tend to 
create misunderstandings, because it is not always apparent whether something is a 
capability or a functioning (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013). In particular, some 
functionings are actually capabilities for other functionings, e.g. literacy is the 
capability and reading the functioning. However, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) 
note, reading is also a capability for other functionings such as driving, studying etc. 
Also, one can recognize a functioning, e.g. drawing, and sometimes there is a 
straightforward relation between certain capabilities and certain functionings, e.g. 
painting is the capability to draw. However, this is not always the case. For example: 
“A capability set is a set of sets of alternative functionings one is able to accomplish 
which means that with the same capabilities one might be in a position to achieve 
different functionings… In this sense, an implication occurs that to accomplish one 
functioning he or she may have to sacrifice another functioning.” (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, p. 64) 
A third reason for focusing on functionings rather than on capabilities is 
epistemological, i.e. “functionings unlike capabilities are more or less directly 
observable, possible to be illustrated, less vague… and therefore, they appear less 
complex in terms of policy” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 63-64). They argue 
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that whereas it may be possible to illustrate a set of achieved functionings, a set of 
capabilities would perhaps need “an indefinite number of illustrations” (Wolff and 
De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65). In this regard, although both Nussbaum‟s and Wolff‟s and 
De-Shalit‟s concepts aim at policy, I think the ideas of the latter appear more feasible 
in terms of implementing policy whereas the former may be problematically 
complex. Fourth, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) find the CA distinction between being 
in a position to do or to be something, i.e. capability, and actually doing or being 
something, i.e. functioning, unconvincing. They argue that “the concept of 
capabilities is too abstract and not always used with consistency and thus, it should 
be replaced with the concept of genuine opportunities to secure functionings” (ibid, 
2007, pp. 37, 74). In order to analyse their concept, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) 
begin by assuming that normally most of the good things that a government can 
legitimately offer to its citizens are opportunities, since to guarantee any functionings 
of them would unavoidably involve some kind of coercion.  
In this regard, they suggest that a “genuine opportunity” is an opportunity that 
does not involve undue costs and risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007, p. 80). It is also an opportunity to do something only if this is reasonable, that 
is, any costs of doing so are reasonable, depending on the context. Besides, Wolff 
and De-Shalit (2013) disagree with CA‟s idea of a state that offers and/or secures 
capabilities instead of securing functionings, because this way the main 
responsibility for one‟s WB shifts to the individual. However, Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2013) argue that an emphasis on the least-advantaged individuals‟ responsibility for 
their WB does not make sense, therefore it is crucial that the state considers how to 
secure the latter‟s functionings and not just their capabilities. In Chapter 6 I draw a 
parallel to say that as in the case of a state and its citizens, teacher education should 
focus on facilitating teachers‟ “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB by 
teaching teachers to be open-minded. In the next section I explore Wolff‟s and De-






5.4.2 Disadvantage: the Lack of Genuine Opportunities for Well-being 
To begin, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) look at WB in terms of what it is to be 
(dis)advantaged and in the light of this, they try to explore how and why WB is 
absent or incomplete in a person‟s life and then suggest ways for improvement. As 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) emphasize, in order to improve the WB of the 
disadvantaged, first of all one “must have a basic understanding of what it is to be 
disadvantaged… and being disadvantaged in a particular way is basically a matter of 
not being able to accomplish the particular functioning… it is a lack of genuine 
opportunities (for secure functionings)” (ibid, 2007, pp. 4, 38, 74, 84). In this regard, 
they argue that it is necessary to investigate the concept of functionings.   
Particularly, their understanding of human WB is based on understanding 
people‟s level of advantage or “functioning” and “its opposite, i.e. disadvantage” 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 38). In this way, on the one hand, they try to produce 
a rich account of the nature of disadvantage theoretically (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). 
On the other hand they attempt to explore the nature of disadvantage in practice, as I 
elaborate later in this section, by engaging in the real world through their method, i.e. 
the “dynamic public reflective equilibrium” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 41-43) 
which consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further analyse the concepts of 
capabilities and functionings in order to provide policy effective ways to deal with 
disadvantage (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). Nevertheless, 
“achieved functionings do not count as the only measure for WB” (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, pp. 65, 81). Other parameters, which the CA seems to overlook, should 
also be taken into account. An important parameter of this kind is the ability to 
provide “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” to all, as discussed earlier, 
and to sustain the functionings over time (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37). 
5.4.3 Secure Functionings Over Time 
Hence, another significant concept here is the idea of “secure functionings” 
which Wolff and De-Shalit consider “a natural development of Nussbaum‟s CA” 
(ibid, 2007, p. 37, 84). The general idea is that what matters for people is not just the 
level of functionings they enjoy at any specific time, but also their potential for 
sustaining that level, i.e. to secure functionings. Additionally, they emphasize that 
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the main problem with sustaining a level of functionings is when people are exposed 
to particular kinds of risk of losing the functionings. In this sense, they argue that the 
CA fails to look at an issue of vital importance for WB, i.e. “the freedom to sustain 
functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65), because of its persistent focus on 
“the freedom to achieve functionings” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 18). But how do Wolff 
and De-Shalit justify the need for “secure functionings” for WB? They argue that in 
terms of WB and diminishing disadvantage, we should first, and in particular, cope 
with “the problem of risk” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 7). 
5.4.4 The Idea of Risk 
So, they begin by investigating the exposure to “risk” as a crucial factor of 
disadvantage (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65).  In other words, the “lack of 
(genuine) opportunities” usually involves risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, pp. 38, 74). Having said that, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) do not 
suggest that all risks are bad or possible to avoid. On the contrary, some risks may be 
considered good, or advantages and elements of a good life. However, their 
particular concept of risk is embedded in the concept of disadvantage which 
negatively influences WB and it has the following three characteristics. First, a risk 
to secure functionings and WB is not something good or possible to avoid, and in 
everyday life it is usually taken involuntarily and therefore becomes a disadvantage. 
Second, bigger risks are either those that cause more harm or those that potentially 
involve further risks. And third, there is the compulsion to take risks not in terms of 
physical violence, but in a situation where there are not better alternatives (Wolff and 
De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 63-69). 
Let us look at a current example, i.e. Shia/Alawite Muslims and Christians of 
the Middle East
52
. In the areas which are currently occupied by extremist Sunni 
Muslims of ISIS, any Shiite, Alawite and Christian civilians usually face significant 
risks in relation to their WB. Roughly speaking, they are forced either to renounce 
their religious, cultural and political identity or to be beheaded or to abandon their 
homeland and become refugees. These people can be characterized as disadvantaged 
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 These groups are merely a contemporary example. Many other groups exist and lots of other 
examples could also be used as illustrations. 
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and according to Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s definition of risk they fulfil all three 
criteria, i.e. they take these risks involuntarily, it is not possible to avoid them and 
they have to choose between death, potential death and loss of their identity whilst 
there are not better alternatives. 
Specifically, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that people‟s functionings can 
be at risk in three ways. First, there is the “risk to a particular functioning” (Wolff 
and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 70). One common example of this category in my view is 
employment risk. For instance, an employee on a non-permanent basis faces the risk 
of unemployment every day. Usually, he/she is not in a position to improve their 
condition, unlike policy which in terms of people‟s WB could offer permanent jobs 
and alternatives in case of unemployment. Second, there is the “cross-category risk” 
(ibid, 2007, p. 70). For someone whose only means of subsistence is their income 
from employment, the risk of unemployment also puts at risk their life, bodily health, 
bodily integrity, affiliation and other elements that Nussbaum (2011) and Wolff and 
De-Shalit (2007) describe. Third, there is the “inverse cross-category risk” (Wolff 
and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 70). In order to secure one functioning, let us say food, some 
people put at risk their life and bodily health by scavenging from garbage. However, 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that, unlike cross-category risk, inverse cross-
category risks are usually initiated by the person him/herself, whose actions put one 
category at risk in order to secure another. Chapter 6 includes discussion of two cases 
of anti- OM that entail the idea of risk in some respects, namely i.e. standardized-
mindedness and closed-mindedness.  
5.4.5 Corrosive Disadvantages: Multipliers of Disadvantage against Well-being 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) underline that we need more than to understand 
the concepts of “risk” and “secure functionings” alone. In addition, it is necessary to 
look at the phenomenon of “clustering disadvantages” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 
120) and particularly at the consequent idea of “corrosive disadvantage” (ibid, 2007, 
p. 121). In order to identify the least advantaged, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) 
basically consider two issues, i.e. disadvantages in the “six high-weight 
functionings” and whether these “disadvantages cluster together” (ibid, 2007, p. 
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118). Looking at relevant existing literature and research
53
 that uses the language of 
functionings as well as using findings from their own empirical research, Wolff and 
De-Shalit (2007) show that there is “clustering” in these core functionings. 
Accordingly, people who experience “a clustering of disadvantages especially in the 
six high-weight functionings” seem to be the worst off (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, 
p. 118). This idea, as Gheaus (2010) stresses, appears to be one of Wolff‟s and De-
Shalit‟s “most significant contributions” (ibid, 2010, p. 149). The phenomenon of 
“clustering
54
” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120) is particularly important for this 
thesis because it entails the core ideas of “corrosive disadvantages” and “fertile 
functionings”. Also, it is significant in terms of indexing disadvantages and 
understanding the causal relations that produce “corrosive disadvantages”.  
In particular, “corrosive is a kind of disadvantage that affects other 
functionings in a negative way” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 121). There are 
various difficulties in relation to the identification of cause(s) behind corrosive 
disadvantages that identify a corrosive disadvantage itself that needs to be 
confronted. One difficulty is that “causation is not straightforwardly observable” 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 136). For instance, how do we know that x is such 
because of y or whether there is a deeper cause z for both? How do we know that 
someone became a drug user because he or she dropped out of school or whether 
they did both because they were a victim of bullying? It seems there is not a definite 
answer to this. In my view, however, the problem of this “not straightforwardly 
observable causation” behind corrosive disadvantages partly downgrades Wolff‟s 
and De-Shalit‟s claim of superiority of functionings over capabilities as 
“functionings are more observable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 136). 
Besides, if, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue “functionings are in a way the 
opposite of disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, p. 38) and “functionings are observable”, 
then it would be reasonable to expect that the same applies to non-functionings as 
well, i.e. disadvantages, but it does not.  
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 See details in Disadvantage (2007, pp. 122-127). Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
present in detail the works upon which this argument is based. 
54
 Wolff and De - Shalit also observe that clustering can be “dynamic” and “cross-generation 
dynamic”; the first takes place when “clustering of disadvantage may persist and accumulate over 
time” and the second when it is “reproduced over generations” (ibid, 2007, p. 120). It is not my 
intention to examine these notions here. 
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Additionally, is it sufficient to characterize a disadvantage based only on the 
fact that it leads to further disadvantages, unless one is also in a position to identify 
the causal relations behind it? Take for instance a person infected by an aggressive 
kind of cancer that causes further health problems. What is the point of identifying 
that cancer causes these further problems unless we know why? Usually it is not 
possible to cure or treat a health problem unless its causes are known. Likewise, I 
believe that the merits of “observable functionings” are less significant in terms of 
intervention, e.g. in teacher education policy, unless the cause(s) behind the 
functionings is/are also observable or possible to identify. 
Another difficulty in identifying causes behind corrosive disadvantages, as 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, is that different background theoretical frameworks 
could influence what one identifies as cause(s). In this sense, there is a possibility 
that some causal relations are just artefacts of the theoretical framework within 
which the issue under investigation is examined, that is, there is a problem of bias. 
However, I think that this is not necessarily illegitimate or something that should be 
avoided at any cost, because obviously we use our past (knowledge, experience etc.) 
to move in the present and towards the future. Particularly, in the following chapter, 
concerning the problems both of identifying causal relations behind corrosive 
disadvantages and of bias, I argue that OM can offer help and be part of the solution 
due to its specific characteristics of being genuine, well-informed and reasonable. 
This in turn implies that OM facilitates “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual 
functionings” for epistemic WB. 
5.4.6 Fertile Functionings: Multipliers of Advantage for Well-being 
Apart from “corrosive disadvantages”, the phenomenon of “clustering” 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120) also entails the concept of “fertile functionings”. 
According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2007)  a fertile functioning is “a functioning or 
the precondition for functioning that spreads its good effects over several categories, 
either directly or by reducing risk to the other functionings” and it appears as a way 
to “overcome corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, p. 122, 121). However, Wolff 
and De-Shalit (2007) note that it is generally “easier to establish which are the 
corrosive disadvantages than to verify beyond doubt fertile functionings” because 
141 
 
“currently very little is known about fertile functionings in contrast to a significant 
established amount about corrosive disadvantages, especially in the area of health” 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 154, 147).  
In order to understand this difficulty let us look at the following example. A 
widely – believed claim is that “being educated” means being able to address various 
kinds of disadvantage and as such being educated is a significant fertile functioning 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, 142). Specifically, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue 
that being educated can be translated, among other things, into being able to make 
“good use of one‟s sense, imagination and thought
55
” which is a fertile functioning 
(ibid, 2007, 142). Nevertheless, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) observe that although 
research into education such as that of Piaget (cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 
214) shows that education of two- to three-year-old children is extremely fertile, the 
general claim that being educated is a fertile functioning can be challenged in various 
respects.  
First, findings of the European Social Survey (as cited by Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, p. 142) demonstrate that “it is not the case that the more people are 
educated, the more satisfied they are with their lives.” However, they note that this 
can be challenged by the fact that educated people‟s horizons and aspirations are 
wider, therefore they are more difficult to satisfy. Second, educated people are 
usually more critical of the world and themselves, therefore, it is less easy to be 
satisfied with their life overall. Although there is not a significant correlation 
between being educated and being satisfied with one‟s life overall, Wolff and De-
Shalit (2007) highlight that “the highest correlation lies between being educated and 
healthy” (ibid, 2007, p. 143). Apart from their own research, Wolff and De-Shalit 
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33) and one of Wolff‟s and De - Shalit‟s six high-weight functionings (Wolff and De - Shalit, 2007, p. 
106). Nussbaum‟s definition of sense, imagination and thought, which Wolff and De - Shalit (2007) 
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means limited to, literacy and basic mathematics and scientific training. Being able to use imagination 
and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one‟s choice, 
religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being able to use one‟s mind in ways protected by guarantees 
of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious 
exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non beneficial pain” (Nussbaum, 
2011, p. 33).  
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(2007) call upon several studies that also support this claim (ibid, 2007, pp. 122-125, 
214).   
In the same context, whereas “it is difficult to prove that being educated is 
necessarily a fertile functioning, there is strong evidence that not being educated is a 
corrosive disadvantage particularly in terms of (un)employment” (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, pp. 143, 214). That is to say, whilst being educated does not guarantee 
employment, an uneducated individual is more likely to be unemployed, therefore, 
they are more likely to be exposed to risks concerning the functionings associated 
with employment, e.g. bodily health, affiliation, control of one‟s environment, and 
their WB overall (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). Similarly, they note that “although 
lacking education is always a corrosive disadvantage, its fertility appears to be much 
more context-dependent” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p 144). 
From another point of view, Nussbaum (2011) observes that “fertile 
functionings” seem to be the “flipside of corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2011, p. 44). 
However, this is not always the case as “corrosive disadvantages and fertile 
functionings are not necessarily mirror images of each other” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007, p. 134). This distinction is particularly important in terms of policy 
intervention. To give an example, the absence of bodily integrity is corrosive, whilst 
its presence is not necessarily fertile. Conversely, the absence of humour is not 
corrosive, whereas its presence can be fertile (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 134). 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) emphasize that “causation in is not always similar to 
causation out”, that is, if somebody has been “run over by a car this person will not 
be cured by having that car reverse back over him” (ibid, 2007, p. 134). Additionally, 
inspired by Susan Mayer‟s argument (1998 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 
134-135), they argue that although research data clearly shows that a lower income is 
a corrosive disadvantage because it prevents one from having genuine opportunities 
to secure functionings, earning more, that is beyond a certain minimum to meet basic 
needs, is not necessarily a fertile functioning or a facilitating precondition for other 
functionings. In the next chapter I argue that since OM is a virtue that facilitates 
others virtues, it can also facilitate a person‟s secure and fertile functionings for WB.  
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5.4.7 Dynamic Public Reflective Equilibrium: Dialogue about Functionings for 
Well-being 
The last idea discussed in this section is Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s attempt to 
explore the nature of disadvantage practically by engaging in the real world through 
their method, i.e. a “dynamic public reflective equilibrium” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007, pp. 41-43), which consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further 
analyse the concepts of functionings and capabilities in order to find policy effective 
ways to deal with disadvantage (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) (Shrader-Frechette, 
2008). Their method consists in dialogue between philosophers and the public about 
functionings for WB and how to provide policy effective ways to deal with 
disadvantage (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 41-43) (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) 
(Shrader-Frechette, 2008). As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, the roots of their 
method lie in John Rawls’ private reflective equilibrium and Michael Walzer’s 
contextual reflective equilibrium (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 12-13).  
They clarify that their aim is to “provide and philosophically justify a method 
that is in position to identify the least advantaged in any society” (Wolff and De-
Shalit, 2007, p. 120). To this end, they conducted a series of interviews with people 
they regarded as disadvantaged
56
 and professionals who take care of disadvantaged 
people in a variety of fields
57
. Interviews in the first phase were semi-structured, i.e. 
more like discussions rather than simple interviews in the sense that people had the 
opportunity to talk about the most important human functionings without a particular 
frame. In the second phase, whilst they moved on to an explicit discussion of 
Nussbaum‟s (2011) ten central capabilities list as it appeared “intuitive, well-argued 
and comprehensive enough”, they suggested four additional categories due to their 
findings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 189). Finally, they created a developed 
“basic list of functionings as part of the task of setting out a particular pluralist 
account of disadvantage” and advantage for WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37). 
Although their method is only a work in progress and a research pilot programme, as 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, I think in future research it would be worth looking 
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at its potential use in teacher education where for example open-minded philosophers 
of education, virtue epistemologists, educational researchers, teachers, student 
teachers, policy makers etc. jointly engage in dialogue in order to explore intellectual 
pursuits for epistemic WB both for themselves and for pupils‟ WB.  
5.4.8 Disagreements 
Generally, Shrader-Frechette (2008) emphasizes that Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) have developed the concepts of advantage and disadvantage in significant 
ways. However, these do not constitute answers to problems (Shrader-Frechette, 
2008). Gheaus (2010) also notices that, despite the fact that Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) make some original contributions, the most significant of which is “the use of 
the insight that in most societies disadvantages cluster”, their work involves various 
theoretical and practical problems which they do not examine properly by looking at 
the arguments in depth (Gheaus, 2010, p. 149). For example, she says that Wolff and 
De-Shalit (2007) may be unrealistically optimistic concerning the possibility of 
provision on behalf of a policy that provides “genuine opportunities to secure 
functionings” for all in accordance with the provided list of functionings (Gheaus, 
2010). She also notes that their account of disadvantage is closer to an account of 
WB rather than an account of justice as it should be (Gheaus, 2010). Moreover, 
Grant (2008) observes that, even if Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) approach is the 
right one, they still have to answer the question of what people themselves should do 
so as to achieve a particular level of functioning. Instead of replying, they provide 
ruminations about the subject through discussions relating to disadvantage and 
responsibility in general (Grant, 2008).   
In addition, although Arneson (2010) finds Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s work 
significant and full of insight, he thinks that they fail to provide guidance to policy 
for three reasons. First, he challenges their claim that there is “a consensual starting 
point” for different theories to adapt the same policy that “priority should be given to 
the worst off” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 3) as unjustified and rather arbitrary 
(Arneson, 2010). Second, he finds contradictions in Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) 
pluralistic view of disadvantage. For instance, on the one hand, Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) note that “pluralism is merely the doctrine that different disadvantages are 
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incommensurable” and on the other hand they say that “although we have accepted 
the incommensurability of functionings… alternative functioning sets are 
comparable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 96-97) (Arneson, 2010). Third, their “six 
high-weight functionings” list appears to be directed by “hunches” instead of being 
anchored in solid theoretical and empirical ground (Arneson, 2010, p. 348).  
Apart from these general concerns about Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s project, 
particular concerns are expressed in relation to their idea of shifting from capabilities 
to functionings. Arneson (2010) for instance thinks that Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s 
(2007) suggestion “not just to create opportunities for the sake of creating 
opportunities but create opportunities for the sake of a life worth living” is confusing, 
because if opportunities mean expanding one‟s capabilities, then in one sentence it is 
implied both that capabilities are not worthwhile per se and that in order to live a 
good life one should value and enable one‟s capabilities. So, “do capabilities matter 
per se or not?” he asks (Arneson, 2010, p. 346). Besides, he says that Wolff‟s and 
De-Shalit‟s (2007) strategy of “genuine opportunities to secure functionings” is, on 
the one hand, flawed due to the multidimensional nature of functionings and the 
difficulties in evaluating one‟s opportunities to achieve certain functionings and, on 
the other hand, it is problematic in terms of commensurability, i.e. to tell who is the 
least advantaged (Arneson, 2010).  
Also, various objections are expressed in relation to Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s 
(2007) concept of “secure functionings”. Specifically, Arneson (2010) argues that the 
idea of “risk” is incorrect because “the possibility of suffering a risk of harm is not 
the same as suffering a harm” (Arneson, 2010, p. 346). Unlike the latter, the former 
does not necessarily involve negative effects on WB. Therefore, he says that he 
cannot see the extra merit that the “secure functionings‟” idea gives to the CA. 
Gheaus (2010), although she recognizes that the integration of the factor of “risk” 
into the account of disadvantage is an innovative idea, she stresses the need for a 
deeper exploration due to the diversity of cases. From my perspective, Arneson‟s 
objection is a reasonable one, but I would not go so far as to discard the whole 
concept as incorrect, because it is often the case that the balance between actually 
suffering the risk and the possibility of suffering a risk is so delicate that it affects 
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one‟s functionings to a greater or a lesser degree in any case. Besides, it is generally 
accepted that prevention is better than treatment.  
In contrast, Olsaretti (2008) observes that the “high-weight functionings” or 
heavy disadvantages for their opposites are actually evidenced by Wolff‟s and De-
Shalit‟s (2007) empirical research, i.e. the “public dynamic reflective equilibrium”, 
which also shows that these functionings do cluster regarding the least advantaged. 
In addition, let us recall that the significance of these “high-weight functionings” is 
determined by relevant existing literature and research
58
 that already uses the 
language of functionings and their interviewees‟ answers.  Thus, it is not fair to 
maintain, as Arneson (2010) does, that their list is merely based on “hunches”. 
Besides, they emphasize that any findings are considered to be “suggestive rather 
than definite” and that their work should be seen as a pilot research programme 
where there is open space for further research and deeper analysis of existing 
research (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 127). Without overlooking these 
implications, which are not exclusive to Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s concepts, I think 
that OM, as presented in the next chapter, can offer significant help to their approach 
to WB by adding new and crucial perspectives to solve any problems that arise. In 
this sense, the virtue of genuine intellectual OM that is well-informed and reasonable 
facilitates secure and fertile functionings for WB both theoretically and in practice. 
However, critique of Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas is not limited to the above. Of 
particular interest are Nussbaum‟s critical views on their modifications and concepts.  
First of all, Nussbaum (2011, p 42) welcomes Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) 
ideas as a fruitful contribution in the theoretical apparatus of the CA overall. In spite 
of the fact that Nussbaum (2011) seems to embrace the core of “secure functionings” 
which is the security perspective, she insists on the significance of “capabilities” both 
as a term and as a concept, and therefore, she re-names the term “secure functioning” 
as “capability security” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 43). She also underlines that “an idea of 
security is already contained into the central capability of emotions” implicitly 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33). However, she admits that Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s concept 
of “secure functionings” is related to both emotions and reasonable expectations. In 
                                                 
58
 See Disadvantage (2007), pages 122-127. 
147 
 
this regard, reasonable expectations may suggest that the security factor looks at “if 
and how far a capability is secured by policy, the market or power politics” 
(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 43). Regarding Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas of “fertile 
functionings” and “corrosive disadvantages” she recognizes that they both constitute 
two concepts of great significance, however, she raises particular concerns in relation 
to the former (Nussbaum, 2011). Specifically, she claims that Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) do not distinguish as clearly as they should between the concepts of 
“functionings” and “capabilities”, and alliteration makes their analysis confusing. 
Therefore, she suggests that the term “fertile capabilities” instead of “fertile 
functionings” is more appropriate in the context of WB (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 44).  
Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) respond to Nussbaum‟s observations by making a 
thought experiment. Through this, they try to show that Nussbaum‟s (2011) 
suggestions are perplexing and lead to further philosophical implications. 
Particularly, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) look at what it means to have a functioning 
as a “realized capability” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 24). They set forth three options:  
“(i) to accomplish the functioning, (ii) to have the choice whether or not to 
accomplish the functioning, i.e. to have the freedom whether or not to accomplish the 
functioning and (iii) to accomplish the functioning in one‟s own way, i.e. to have the 
freedom how to accomplish the functioning” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 163) 
According to their thought experiment both choice (ii) and choice (iii) 
constitute kinds of freedom, and therefore, they could easily be confused. 
Additionally, if a person has a “realized capability” for bodily health, this means that 
(i) he/she is healthy and probably (iii) he/she is healthy in his/her own way. 
Moreover, Nussbaum (2011) argues for a “CA that is committed to respect people‟s 
powers of self-definition” which can mean either (ii) or (iii) or both (Nussbaum, 
2011 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit (2013, p. 163). In this sense, Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2013) doubt whether people‟s choice/freedom whether or not to be healthy is 
actually respected. Elsewhere Nussbaum (2011) says that “the CA is focused on 
freedom or choice holding that a good society is one that promotes for its people a 
set of opportunities or freedoms that they choose whether or not to exercise, thus, it 
respects people‟s powers of self-definition ibid, 2011, p.18). However, she also 
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argues that “there is one exception: people should not be given the choice or freedom 
to be treated with respect and nonhumiliation” (ibid, 2011, p. 26). In writing this, 
however, as I see it, Nussbaum (2011) contradicts and undermines her own 
argument. 
In order to make their argument stronger, Wolff and De-Shalit refer to 
research conducted by Michael Marmot (2008 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 
163). Specifically, they consider people who live in an area of Glasgow where men‟s 
life expectancy is very low around fifty-four. Although these men have free access to 
the Scottish health system, their lifestyle choices, which include drinking and 
smoking, use of drugs, poor diet and violence, result in their low life expectancy. 
However, some men in the same area manage to live longer, which implies that all 
men in the area have the freedom to choose whether they achieve health or not
59
.  
According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2013), if we accept Nussbaum‟s (2011) 
critique we should focus on health capability rather than health per se because it is 
the former that gives value to people‟s lifestyle decisions. However, in this case, 
freedom of choice is no longer the focus and the stress is on concerns about the 
environment that leads them to particular lifestyle choices. From this point of view, 
Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) note that “freedom whether or not to accomplish bodily 
health does not seem valuable in itself” (ibid, 2013, p. 163). In this context they also 
recognize “the legitimacy of people‟s choice to damage their health, but not so much 
as a freedom good in itself, but rather as a side effect of some other activity that they 
find valuable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 165).    
In addition, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) notice that Nussbaum (2011) seems 
to liken the two types of freedom, i.e. freedom to achieve health and freedom to fail 
to achieve health, to “different religious and secular views of life” (Nussbaum, 2011, 
p. 26). However, they argue that the capabilities usually come into the category of 
bodily health rather than the “religious and secular” categories, because there is great 
“value in the accomplishment of capabilities as well as in the capabilities being 
secured” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). In this sense, they recognize how 
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essential it is that people accomplish capabilities in their own way, and so does 
Nussbaum‟s (2011) CA.  However, at the same time, Nussbaum (2011) seems to 
“over-emphasize the freedom not to accomplish some functionings” in one‟s own 
way (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164).  
Furthermore, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) disagree with Nussbaum‟s (2011) 
suggestion that “fertile functionings” be changed into “fertile capabilities”, because 
this would be problematic from the viewpoint of an “unrealized capability” and how 
possible it is for a capability to be fertile (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). They 
argue that it is not possible for an “unrealized capability” to be “fertile”, unless it is 
instantly realized, “but then it is the functioning that does the work” and not the 
capability (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). In this regard, Nussbaum‟s proposal 
to modify the terms does not make sense. Having said that, Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2013) agree with Nussbaum (2011) that “the way a functioning is acquired can 
make the functioning more or less fertile”, however, “this does not apply to all cases” 
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164).  
All in all, I think that Nussbaum‟s and Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s ideas are to 
some extent are of mutual importance for WB rather than antagonistic. Specifically, 
on the one hand, I agree with Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) to a certain degree that 
emphasis should be given in a “context-dependent” or consequences-dependent value 
of freedom of choice, i.e. if one‟s freedom to choose is for choosing good then 
freedom has high value, but if it is for choosing bad, then it is not highly valuable. 
On the other hand, however, I recognize along with Nussbaum (2011, p. 26) how 
crucial a person‟s “freedom of choice” per se is, when I think of it in terms of its 
absence, and from this point of view a “context-dependent” discussion would make 
no sense (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 97). If “freedom of choice” means “the power or right 
to act, speak or think as one wants and the power to self-determination” (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2016), Nussbaum (2011) is right to stand for this above all. In this 
context, although need not be any discussion about whether we should be free to 
choose, I believe that discussion about the consequences of our choices for WB that 
are freely made is necessary beyond doubt. In relation to the latter, the virtue of OM 
is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification, because I argue that facilitates a 
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person‟s acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB in his/her own 
way, since it is related to self-knowledge and self-monitoring, as argued in Chapter 
6. In addition, it is a virtue with respect to others‟ “freedom of choice” and WB 
because, among other things, it is seriously engaged in dialogue. Last but not least, 
this account of OM appears to be highly “context-sensitive” in terms of “a more 
refined and thoughtful… or a better and more appropriate” (Papastephanou and 
Angeli, 2007, p. 606) consideration of the context, because it is genuine, reasonable 
and well-informed.  
To sum up, in Chapters 4 and 5 I looked at WB discourse in education and 
argued that a full account of WB in education should place an equal emphasis on the 
subjective and objective factors of WB. In particular, I argued that WB is not merely 
subjective in the sense that it is only based on individualistic major-informed 
preferences and it is not merely objective in the sense that it is rooted in human 
nature per se (White, 2007). Therefore, I argued for a combined account of WB 
which consists in both subjective- major-informed desires and objective list 
elements. In addition, I argued that education involves not only individual students 
and groups of children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc. who 
all depend on and interact with one another. Therefore, I argued that an equal 
concern both for the individual and for collective WB is vital.  
To this end, first, in Chapter 4, I examined White‟s subjective-collective 
oriented account of WB. According to White (2011), WB consists in three elements, 
that is, “success”, “whole-heartedness” and “worthwhileness”, which can be 
objectively determined. The best way to do this is by looking at the example of the 
arts and art critics, as “objectivity” is central to art critics‟ work. Also, the subjective 
factor of WB in White‟s account is not the individual him/herself, but a loose body 
of people where the most “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those of 
people who experience all kinds of goods. These people, however, are not experts in 
the same way that art critics are experts in their fields, but rather they are a loose 
body of people with “accumulated wisdom”. And in this process, education, as White 
(2011) emphasizes, plays a crucial role, mainly because through education 
individuals become better–informed about WB pursuits and what WB consists in. 
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However, I argued that White‟s account of WB is insufficient for the aims of 
this thesis, because he gives too much emphasis to the subjective rather than to the 
objective factor, and to the collective rather than the individual. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I also explored Nussbaum‟s objective-individual account of WB, which 
emphasizes the objective and individual aspects of WB. According to Nussbaum 
(2011) a “life worthy of human dignity” requires at least ten objective elements, that 
is, “a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities” which belong “foremost to 
individual persons and only derivatively to groups” (ibid, 2011, pp. 32, 35). The core 
idea of Nussbaum‟s theory of WB is “capabilities”, namely what a person is able to 
do and be. Capabilities are valuable per se because, unlike functionings, they entail 
“freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). In this regard, education and policy 
in general should promote and cultivate people‟s capabilities. On the opposite side to 
“capabilities” are “functionings”, which are “the realization of capabilities” and, as 
Nussbaum (2011) argues, functionings are inferior to capabilities because they do not 
involve “freedom and choice” as capabilities do (ibid, 2011, p. 25).  
However, I argued that it was necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to 
go beyond Nussbaum‟s CA and expand her ideas, especially those related to the 
concepts of “capabilities” and “functionings” for WB. To this end, I also investigated 
Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) account of WB which, although it is regarded as a 
“natural development of the CA”, is different because, among other things, it focuses 
on “functionings” instead of “capabilities” and emphasizes that apart from the level 
of functionings that people enjoy at a given time, it is also crucial to secure that level 
over time. In this chapter, I argued that if, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) maintain, 
WB consists in “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37), in 
promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 
2007, pp. 121-122), and if in teaching we aim at pupils‟ WB and help them be 
mutatis mutandis as advantaged as possible, then, on the one hand, we should focus 
on teachers‟ “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” that constitute 
advantages for their WB and facilitate teachers‟ “secure” and “fertile functionings”. 
In parallel, on the other hand, we should try to limit and/or diminish teachers‟ 
exposure to “risks” that constitute “disadvantages” for their WB, such as profit-
seeking and political power, as I argued in Chapter 1, and then for pupils‟ WB. To 
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this end, in the following chapters, I argue that a way to facilitate teachers‟ “secure” 
and “fertile functionings” is by teaching teachers to be open-minded, whilst 
standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness are discussed as two anti–OM 
cases that hinder teachers‟ acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” and 



































In this chapter I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM. My aim here is, on 
the one hand, to show that OM is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification if we 
want to know what epistemic WB is and, on the other hand, to draw a parallel to say 
that OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, therefore, it facilitates the acquisition 
of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile functionings”, both their own and others‟. 
Building upon what we established in Chapter 3 and virtue epistemology (VEP), I 
focus on two accounts of OM that appear to be “the most developed in character-
based VEP” (Kwong, 2015, p. 3). The first account is that of Baehr (2011) who 
argues that OM is a character trait that necessarily makes particular demands on the 
individual themselves. The second account is that of Riggs (2010) who argues that 
OM shows that the individual‟s involvement is necessary for intellectual virtue. In 
addition, I specifically examine OM in relation to the individual‟s strongly-held 
beliefs (Adler, 2004) and their “engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006) 
which are, in particular, educationally significant. Then, I briefly discuss two anti-
OM cases, that is, “closed-mindedness” (Riggs, 2010) and standardized-mindedness.  
As I will show, OM is the link between those different discourses that use 
different terminology as examined in the previous chapters, that is, on the one hand, 
an account of WB that requires virtue(s) from Aristotle‟s and VEP perspectives, and 
on the other hand, an account of WB in education that equally combines the 
subjective and objective, the collective and individual factors of WB from White‟s, 
Nussbaum‟s and Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s viewpoints. Particularly in this chapter, my 
aim is to extend the concept of intellectual WB and to this end, I bring together, 
among other things, Roberts‟ and Wood‟s (2007) idea that epistemic virtues are “an 
acquired base of excellent intellectual functionings of some human activity” (ibid, 
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2007, pp. 153, 215) discussed in Chapter 3, and Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s (2007) 
notion of “secure” and “fertile functionings”. In this context, I put forward the 
concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed and 
argue that it facilitates “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings”, namely 
epistemic WB, both individually and collectively. In this sense, I use the terms 
secure and fertile intellectual functionings and epistemic (or intellectual) WB 
interchangeably. Also, I briefly discuss the case of standardized-mindedness as 
something that hinders teachers‟ secure and fertile” “intellectual functionings” for 
intellectual WB and then pupils‟ WB since, as I argued in Chapter 1, teachers‟ and 
pupils‟ WB are inseparably intertwined.   
6.2 What Is Open-mindedness? 
To begin, Baehr (2011) talks about three accounts of OM. First, he presents 
the “conflict model”, according to which OM is “a willingness or ability to 
temporarily set aside one's doxastic commitments about a particular matter in order 
to give a fair and impartial hearing to an opposing belief, argument, or body of 
evidence” (ibid, 2011, p. 143). He argues that this model is insufficient, because OM 
does not always involve some kind of conflict or disagreement, and thus it cannot be 
adequate in contexts such as neutrality and indecisiveness about the matters under 
examination.  
Second, Baehr (2011) illustrates a refined version of the conflict model, i.e. 
the adjudication model, which suggests that “OM is essentially a disposition to assess 
one or more sides of an intellectual dispute in a fair and impartial way” (ibid, 2011, 
p. 145). However, he notes that this model is not satisfactory either, because OM is 
not necessarily an issue of making a fair or impartial evaluation of the aspects of an 
intellectual disagreement. For example, OM may also concern neutral situations in 
which there are not any disagreements or conflict as well as activities that do not 
involve rational assessment. Therefore, Baehr (2011) proposes a third account of 
OM: 
“An open‐minded person is characteristically (a) willing and within limits able (b) to 
transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the 
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merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint… supplemented - only to a limited range 
of cases
60
 - by the proviso that where open‐mindedness involves rational assessment 
or evaluation, it also necessarily involves adjusting one's beliefs or confidence levels 
according to the outcome of this assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154)  
Equally important, Baehr (2011) argues that “OM is largely or often a 
facilitating virtue”, namely OM is an intellectual virtue that creates the space for 
other virtues and faculties to achieve their functions, especially by “helping one‟s 
mind to detach or stay detached from a specific position” (ibid, 2011, p. 157).  
To continue, Riggs (2010) wants to provide a clear understanding of 
epistemic virtues in general and to this end, he starts with OM. His interest in 
epistemic virtues is related to their “particularity and distinctiveness”. In this regard, 
Riggs (2010) explores “an account of OM that is plausible and makes OM interesting 
in its own right… namely independently of whether it is possible to define evaluative 
concepts in terms of any virtue” (ibid, 2010, p. 175). In order to give an account of 
OM, Riggs (2010) examines three parameters.  
The first parameter is that OM, like any particular virtue, should offer a clear 
picture of a person possessing that virtue, i.e. on the basis of a particular account of 
OM it will be easier to recognize an open-minded individual than to recognize a 
virtuous person on the basis of a general account of virtue. In this sense, an account 
of OM should be descriptive and normative
61
 as well as detailed and directly 
applicable in the real world where one lives (Riggs, 2010). Second, Riggs (2010) 
argues that intellectual virtues in general and OM in particular, like ethical virtues, 
should be treated as personal qualities. However, whether epistemic virtues should be 
viewed as “faculties” or as “personal qualities” can be contested as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, as it is a major point of conflict between “virtue-reliabilists” and “virtue-
responsibilists” in virtue epistemological debates. In this context, although Riggs 
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 Baehr (2011) notices, however, that “this does not constitute a general requirement or 
necessary condition for exercising open-mindedness, because in contexts where rational assessment is 
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response to such assessment” (ibid, 2011, p. 155). 
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(2010) does not reject “virtue-reliabilism” on the grounds that its ideas may be 
necessary for an excellent informant, he argues, and I agree, that “virtue-
responsibilism”, with its agent-oriented concept of virtue appears more relevant and 
satisfactory in terms of providing an account of OM. Third, Riggs (2010) notes that 
any account of OM should be able to provide satisfying answers to questions such as 
(a) why a person should want to be open-minded, (b) how it is possible to be open-
minded, when, for instance, one holds at the same time a firm belief, (c) why 
someone virtuous should be open-minded. These questions are further explored in 
6.2.1. 
However, what makes OM so special a virtue for WB in comparison with 
other intellectual virtues? Generally speaking, it is common practice among virtue 
epistemologists to present lists of intellectual virtues, and OM is often at the top of 
these lists (Riggs, 2010). This could imply that the virtue of OM is the most 
important and/or the least controversial. Riggs (2010) though challenges the view of 
OM superiority in relation to other virtues and argues that its place near the top of a 
list of virtues may be due to the fact that although OM has strong ethical aspects, it 
does not introduce itself as a moral virtue, therefore, it is an easy choice. On the other 
hand, Riggs (2010) observes that it is difficult to make judgments about the 
controversiality or significance of an epistemic virtue, because in virtue 
epistememology, in comparison with moral virtues and virtue ethics, little progress 
has been done so far concerning a deep understanding of the concept of intellectual 
virtues.  
From another perspective, Arpaly (2011) argues that OM can be regarded 
both as an intellectual and as a moral virtue, but as a moral virtue OM is a puzzle, 
because exercises of moral virtues in general appear as expressions of moral concern, 
whilst gaining, losing and/or reconsidering beliefs are not actions and therefore, 
cannot be actions derived from moral interest. In this regard, two virtues which are in 
essence different and operate in the areas of intellect and moral respectively, claim 
the same name, that is, OM. However, here I am not looking at and taking a position 
concerning tensions between intellectual and moral virtues. This thesis aims at 
teachers‟ intellectual WB and then pupils‟ WB which as I argued in Chapter 1, are 
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inseparable. Thus, I particularly focus on virtue epistemology and epistemic virtues, 
which, however, does not necessarily imply an exclusion of the moral factor, only 
that it is not examined here. 
Moreover, it is not my aim in this chapter to defend OM as the most 
important virtue for intellectual WB. However, on the one hand, I imply that a 
special characteristic of this account of OM is that all other virtues that aim at 
intellectual goods and epistemic WB necessarily involve some kind of OM and on 
the other hand, I argue that as OM facilitates other virtues (Baehr, 2011), it also 
facilitates “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). 
Let us look at some examples in relation to the former. According to Roberts and 
Wood (2007) “love of knowledge is an intellectual virtue that consists in excellent 
orientation of one‟s will to knowledge… a virtue that provides the motivation needed 
for intellectual WB” (ibid, 2007, pp. 153, 213). “Generosity” is another intellectual 
virtue that consists in contributing to others for their own WB (Roberts and Wood, 
2007, p. 286). Also, “intellectual courage is to be able to persist in a doxastic state, 
e.g. belief, or/and course of action, e.g. inquiry, towards intellectual goods despite 
the fact that doing so involves an obvious threat to one's WB” (Baehr, 2011, p. 164).  
Given a definition of these virtues and a rich definition of OM as presented 
above by Baehr (2011) and Riggs (2010), we can see how particular characteristics 
of OM are entailed in other virtues, therefore, it is probably the case that all virtues 
entail some kind of OM. An examination of the relationship(s) between OM and 
other intellectual virtues is certainly worth its own research, however, this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, which focuses on the concepts of OM and WB. Hence, let us 
further explore the intellectual virtue of OM through the ideas of strongly – held 
beliefs (Adler, 2004) and “engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006) that 
are in particular educationally significant for WB, both individually and collectively.  
6.2.1 Open-mindedness and Strongly-Held Beliefs 
Adler (2004) emphasizes the relationship between OM and strongly-held 
beliefs. He observes that, if one has a firm belief, then it is usually the case that one 
does not think that there is a serious possibility that one‟s belief is false. However, 
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only beliefs that are held as all-or-nothing can represent how one actually holds 
strong opinions. According to Adler (2004) OM is a “meta-attitude” towards one‟s 
belief as perceived and not merely towards the particular proposition in the same way 
that “fallibilism is a meta-doubt” about the excellence of one‟s belief and not a doubt 
about the truth of any particular proposition (ibid, 2004, p. 130). He emphasizes that 
this tension becomes crucially central in the relationship between OM and education 
(Adler, 2004).  
For instance, in the light of the aims of this thesis we should ask, if it is 
necessary in teaching teachers to be open-minded and how far this should be an 
obligation. If our aim is teachers‟ WB and then pupils‟ WB and if this account of 
WB requires a particular account of virtue(s), then OM is necessary to teachers. On 
the other hand, if OM is necessary to teachers who teach and if teaching and teachers 
are part of formal education where legal commitments apply, then being open-
minded involves some kind of obligation. However, as I argued in Chapter 1 and 
further stress in the next chapter, both necessity and obligation issues here should be 
seen from both viewpoints, i.e. that of teachers and of teacher education 
programmes. In this regard, if teacher education aims at teachers‟ WB and then 
pupils‟ WB, then it is necessary and an obligation of teacher education programmes 
as part of formal education to teach teachers to be open-minded. 
However, to what extent should teachers be open-minded
62
? This question 
particularly relates to the problem of receptiveness of different views without 
decreasing one‟s strength of commitment or strongly-held beliefs and it is also 
related to Riggs‟s (2010) intertwined questions that were put forward in section 6.2, 
i.e. (a) why should a person want to be open-minded, (b) how is it possible to be 
open-minded, when, for instance, one holds at the same time a firm belief, (c) why 
should someone virtuous be open-minded. Let me explain. In relation to why a 
person should be open-minded anyway, Riggs (2010) notes that it is an absolute fact 
that all human beings are fallible. Therefore, to be open-minded, that is, to be open to 
alternative views, different from one‟s own views, constitutes a good strategy to find 
and restrict one‟s false beliefs that obviously hinder intellectual WB. 
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This gives rise to whether it is possible and/or legitimate to be open-minded 
and simultaneously hold a strong belief. Riggs (2010) points out that this is 
appropriate and “if one is not so open-minded that one‟s brains fall out”, one must be 
capable of firm beliefs with regard to which the virtue of OM seems to be most 
essential (ibid, 2010, p. 178). To give an example, a person has a strong belief that 
dialogue, as “a discussion between two or more people or groups especially one 
directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem” 
(Oxford Dictionary, 2016), is a sine qua non for teachers‟ and pupils‟ WB in the 
educational context. This is a firm belief that not only does not undermine the virtue 
of OM, but, on the contrary, I believe, it seems impossible to hold such a strong 
belief unless one is open-minded.  
Moreover, there is the problem of why someone virtuous or an excellent 
informant should be open-minded anyway, since an excellent informant is most 
likely to achieve intellectual goods, such as knowledge and understanding, and then 
achieve WB their own beliefs rather than any alternatives. In relation to this, Riggs 
(2010) argues that no matter how intellectually virtuous one is, there is always the 
possibility of holding a false belief even if the possibility of a false belief maintained 
by an excellent informant is smaller in comparison with less virtuous informants. 
Although to become an excellent informant is, among other things, what we should 
all strive for in education, to assume that we need not always be intellectually open 
to alternative views seems to undermine intellectual WB itself. Looking at ways 
always to be intellectually open leads us to examine issues regarding enquiry and 
dialogue. 
6.2.2 Open-mindedness, Enquiry and Serious Engagement in Dialogue 
Hare‟s (2006) account of OM is educationally significant in particular, 
because among other things, he connects OM with education straightforwardly. He 
argues that OM plays a crucial role in education, because it helps one to be ready for 
change in an unsettled world and to be inventive in addressing emerging issues. 
According to Hare (2006), in societies and educational environments alike, to move 
towards and/or come into mutual agreements is crucial, because people usually hold 
different opinions and criteria, and therefore they come to differing conclusions 
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which can, if not properly treated, disrupt the good operation of both society and 
education.  
In this context, on the one hand, enquiry and dialogue are significant for WB 
and on the other hand, OM appears to be a virtue central to enquiry and dialogue 
(Hare, 2006). As Hare (2006) implies, OM is particularly important in teaching, 
because if teachers are supposed to cultivate any critical qualities, become 
independent thinkers and in this way “work towards a closer approximation” to the 
epistemic goods of knowledge and understanding towards both their own and pupils‟ 
WB, teachers should also pursue the ideals of original enquiry and open dialogue 
(Hare, 2006, p. 15).  
In addition, although OM can be justified by one‟s self-view as fallible, it 
does not necessarily result from one‟s judging it worthwhile to engage in dialogue 
where one does not know or is not certain of one‟s and/or others‟ beliefs (Adler, 
2004). In this regard, Riggs (2010) talks about a “serious engagement in dialogue” 
where one is receptive to others‟ criticism and alternative views and engages in 
achieving, losing and revising beliefs in certain reasonable ways (Arpaly, 2011). 
From this point of view, OM maintains dialogue alive and fertile and holds out the 
possibility that thorny issues can be worked out effectively over time.  
6.2.3 An Open-minded Individual and Open-minded about Something 
Furthermore, it is important to stress the distinction between being an open-
minded individual and being open-minded about something. Both Adler (2004) and 
Riggs (2010) note that it is possible for an open-minded person not to show OM in 
certain cases.  
Being open-minded about a particular belief means that one takes challenges 
to this belief seriously. However, to take challenges seriously does not imply that a 
person should take all challenges seriously (Adler, 2004) (Riggs, 2010). In order to 
evaluate which challenges should be examined seriously in terms of devoting time 
and energy to this, and which ones should not, an epistemic agent should acquire 
and/or be in a process towards “epistemic self-knowledge” and “epistemic self-
monitoring” (Riggs, 2010). As Riggs (2010) argues the former consists in one‟s 
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knowledge about one‟s own intellectual strengths and weaknesses and is something 
that can be cultivated and the latter ensures that one‟s epistemic self-knowledge is 
always effective in practice and can be practiced. In addition, both “epistemic self-
knowledge” and “epistemic self-monitoring” promote genuine OM and not the kind 
of “an open-minded person whose brains fall out” as explained earlier (Riggs, 2010). 
Next, I briefly discuss two cases of anti-OM, that is, “closed-mindedness” and a 
concept that I call standardized-mindedness. Although I only hint at these concepts 
here, they are both worth further examination in the future. 
6.2.4 Closed-mindedness and Standardized-mindedness as Anti-Open-
mindedness Examples 
It is probably the case that we would not appreciate life if death did not exist. 
In a similar way, “closed-mindedness as the result of taking one‟s own ideas to be 
obvious and universal, therefore, unquestionable” makes its opposite that is OM even 
more important for WB (Riggs, 2010, p. 184). However, it is fundamental not to 
confuse “closed-mindedness” with strongly-held beliefs. As Riggs (2010) implies 
above, a person‟s strongly-held beliefs based on the criteria of epistemic goods such 
as knowledge and understanding can contribute positively to their WB. For instance, 
when Socrates states that he only knows that he knows nothing, he grounds his 
concept on this one and only strongly-held belief that he knows nothing.  
 Also, an anti-OM case may be what I call standardized-mindedness in 
teaching. To give an example, if, in accordance with political correctness we should 
“avoid forms of expression and/or actions that are perceived to exclude, marginalize 
and/or insult (individuals and/or) groups of people who are socially disadvantaged 
and/or discriminated against” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and if a kind of double-
standard political correctness is one that, although it “avoids forms of expression 
and/or actions that are perceived to exclude, marginalize and/or insult (individuals 
and/or) groups of people who are socially disadvantaged and/or discriminated 
against
63
”, it does not “avoid forms of expression and/or actions that are perceived to 
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Wolff‟s and De - Shalit‟s (2007) ideas. How legitimate is it to be politically correct in favour of one 
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exclude, marginalize and/or insult (individuals and/or) groups of people who are” not 
perceived to be “socially disadvantaged” and therefore, it “discriminates against” 
them, then, in this context, if particular double-standard types of political correctness 
are regarded as prevailing standards in formal education and if one keeps up with 
these standards, one is standardized-minded. In this sense, standardized-mindedness 
may also be regarded as a kind of “closed-mindedness”. Hence, when teachers are 
not open-minded as shown earlier, towards negative prevailing norms such as a kind 
of double-standard political correctness, they hinder their way towards epistemic 
goods and WB and also towards pupils‟ achievement of intellectual goods and WB. 
Let us look at another example. If a prevailing norm orchestrated by the 
factors of profit-seeking and political power, as I argue in Chapter 1, is that teaching 
consists in the “transmission of detachable skills and discrete knowledge, all 
measured by standardized tests” (Higgins, 2011, p. 3), and if teachers merely keep up 
with this norm without being open-minded to alternative views, then teachers are 
standardized-minded. However, this should not be seen as a one-sided situation. We 
should also look at what kind of teacher education promotes or hinders anti-OM for 
or against teachers‟ WB respectively and subsequently pupils‟ WB, as I argue in 
Chapter 1. I discuss this further in the following sections and in Chapter 7, 
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To sum up, OM is perceived as “often and largely a facilitating” intellectual 
virtue significant both individually and collectively (Baehr, 2011, p. 157). However, 
as Riggs (2010) argues, it is difficult to make judgments about the controversiality or 
the importance of an epistemic virtue, because, unlike in the area of moral virtues 
and virtue ethics, in virtue epistemology little progress has been made so far 
concerning a deep understanding of the intellectual virtues. In addition, OM in 
relation to strongly-held beliefs, as Adler (2004) observes, is a “meta-attitude” 
towards an individual‟s belief as perceived and not merely towards the particular 
proposition in the same way that fallibilism is a “meta-doubt” about the excellence of 
one‟s believing and not a doubt about the truth of any particular proposition (ibid, 
2004, p. 130). In this regard, it is suggested that dialogue can play a crucial role in 
the tension between being open-minded and holding a strongly-held belief. However, 
although OM could be justified by one‟s self view as fallible, it does not result from 
one‟s judging it worthwhile to engage in dialogue where one may not know or 
should not be certain of one‟s belief, as the same also happens regarding others‟ 
beliefs, according to Adler‟s (2004) view.  
In this regard, Riggs (2010) suggests the criterion of serious engagement in 
dialogue, i.e. devotion of time and effort, where alternative views can be discussed. It 
is argued that to be open-minded, namely to be open to alternative views other than 
one‟s own, constitutes a good strategy to find and restrict one‟s false beliefs. Besides, 
“if one is not so open-minded that one‟s brains fall out”, one must be capable of firm 
beliefs with regard to which the virtue of OM seems to be essential as Riggs (2010, 
p. 178) argues. The virtue of OM is also important because, no matter how 
epistemically virtuous one is, there is always the possibility of holding a false belief, 
even if the possibility of a false belief maintained by a virtuous person is smaller in 
comparison with a less virtuous person.  
Moreover, Hare (2006) observes that coming to mutual agreements is very 
important for the good functioning of education where, as in society, people usually 
hold different opinions and criteria, and therefore, they come to differing 
conclusions. From this perspective, the virtue of OM seems essential, particularly in 
initial teacher education, since it maintains dialogue alive and fertile and holds out 
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the possibility that thorny issues can be worked out effectively over time (Hare, 
2006). Last but not least, it is suggested that to be open-minded about a particular 
belief means that one takes challenges to this belief seriously. Notwithstanding, 
Adler (2004) and Riggs (2010) argue that to take challenges seriously does not imply 
that one takes all challenges seriously. In this regard, in order to evaluate which 
challenge should be examined seriously and which one should not, an epistemic 
agent should strive for epistemic self-knowledge and maintain epistemic self-
monitoring (Adler, 2004) (Riggs, 2010).  
In the second part of this chapter, I introduce the concept of genuine 
intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed and brings together all the 
different discourses discussed in the previous chapters that use different terminology. 
In this context, I argue that the virtue of genuine intellectual OM facilitates teachers‟ 
acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings”, both for their own and then for 
pupils‟ intellectual WB.  
6.3 The Concept of Genuine Intellectual Open-mindedness: Reasonable and 
Well-informed 
Just as OM creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their 
functions for intellectual WB by helping one‟s mind to detach or stay detached from 
a specific position, and therefore, OM is a facilitating virtue (Baehr, 2011), genuine 
intellectual OM is a virtue that facilitates the acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and 
“fertile” intellectual functionings” or epistemic WB, both individually and 
collectively (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). However, what 
particularly does the concept of genuine intellectual OM stand for in this thesis? In 
this section I break down the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both 
reasonable and well-informed and explain how it becomes the link between the 
different discourses discussed in the previous chapters that use different terminology.  
First, the term “genuine” adapts the characteristics that Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) attribute to “genuine opportunities” (for secure functionings) (ibid, 2007, pp. 
37, 74) that is genuine OM does not involve undue costs and risk towards one‟s WB. 
In this sense, for example, it facilitates the virtue of “intellectual courage which 
consists in being able to persist in a doxastic state despite the fact that doing so 
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involves an obvious threat to one's WB” (Baehr, 2011, p. 164). Second, genuine OM 
is “intellectual” because it involves “cognitive standpoint(s)… and rational 
assessment or evaluation” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). It is also intellectual because it 
explicitly aims at intellectual goods such as knowledge and understanding towards 
intellectual WB. In this regard, genuine intellectual OM is based on virtue 
epistemology which gives intellectual virtues a primary role for epistemic goods and 
WB. Additionally, by being “intellectual”, genuine OM becomes in particular 
educationally significant because one the one hand, as Aristotle says, “intellectual 
(virtue) in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching for which reason it 
requires experience and time” (Aristotle, NE 1103a15) and on the other hand, 
everything in (teacher) education is thinking-related and usually delivered through 
instruction and learning (Pakaluk, 2005). 
Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is both “reasonable” and “well-
informed”. It is “reasonable” because it involves “within limits ability…” (Baehr, 
2011, p. 154) that is any costs of being open-minded are reasonable to accept 
depending on the context. Thus, it is reasonable in terms of being “context-
dependent”, as Nussbaum (2011, p. 97) notes, but not in terms of whether or not but 
to what extent to be genuinely open-minded. Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is 
reasonable because it is closely related to the Aristotelian concepts of the activity of 
reason and meson and practical reasoning about a good to be brought (Kraut, 2014) 
(Crisp, 2000). Let us remind ourselves that, according to Aristotle, WB consists in 
using reason, i.e. the rational part of the soul, in accordance with virtue and “meson 
is to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, and this is characteristic of 
virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Also, “virtue aims at what meson is” (Aristotle, NE 
1106b29) and “meson preserves virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b12). According to a 
certain understanding, being virtuous and being phronimos is exactly the same thing, 
and in intellectual virtue/phronesis, reason and choice are united. Besides, “an open‐




Additionally, genuine intellectual OM is “well-informed” in order to confront 
the risk(s) of misleading or insufficient understanding that hinder one‟s WB. 
Specifically, as White (2011) argues, desires for WB should be both major 
(personally important) and “well-informed” (ibid, 2011, p. 50). An individual with 
genuine intellectual OM that is “well-informed” is able to provide answers in relation 
to why and what they are open-minded about as well as how this can contribute to 
their epistemic WB; in this sense, one is able to give detailed information about how 
things are (descriptive) and how they ought to be (normative) (Riggs, 2010). 
Moreover, it is “well-informed” because it is promoted, as Hare (2006) notes, by 
self-knowledge and self-monitoring. From an Aristotelian perspective, genuine 
intellectual OM is well-informed because it belongs to “praxis which is a life of 
informed, virtuous activity…” (Siegler, 1967, p. 31), “a life in accordance with the 
other kind of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1178a9-10) that is phronesis (Hughes, 2001), the 
practical approach to knowledge that copes with what, why and how questions 
concerning WB (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000) (Pakaluk 2005).  
6.3.1 Genuine Intellectual Open-mindedness for Secure and Fertile Intellectual 
Functionings  
Furthermore, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) aim at “creating opportunities for 
the sake of a life worth living” through exploring the concepts of “secure” and 
“fertile functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37). And Baehr (2011) argues that OM, among 
other things, “creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their 
functions” for intellectual WB (ibid, 2011, p. 157). Therefore, I argue that OM 
facilitates the creation of such opportunities for WB and, specifically, I argue that 
genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed facilitates the 
acquisition of a person‟s “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for 
intellectual WB  (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 
215).  
According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), a focus on offering opportunities 
for functionings for WB seems less problematic in comparison to guaranteeing 
functionings for WB, because the latter may involve issues of paternalism or 
authoritarianism. Likewise, I argue that a teacher education that aims at teachers‟ 
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intellectual WB by helping them, among other things, to be open-minded, therefore 
facilitates the acquisition of teachers‟ epistemic WB or “secure” and “fertile” (Wolff 
and De-Shalit, 2007) “intellectual functionings” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 
215) and also, shows respect to their “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25) 
and their “major informed (intellectual) desires” (White, 2002), because by definition 
OM involves teachers‟/individuals‟ “willingness and within limits ability to 
adjust…” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). Besides, as I argued previously from an Aristotelian 
perspective, genuine intellectual OM is connected to the concept of meson and 
particularly to that which is relative to the individual (Aristotle, NE 1106b20) which 
is intertwined with one‟s choice, and “choice is deliberate
64
 desire of things in our 
power…” (Aristotle, NE 1113a10).  
In addition, OM maintains dialogue fertile and alive (Hare, 2006) and in this 
way it offers “genuine opportunities” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 74) for further 
exploration of particular subject(s) and/or resolution of thorny issues. Genuine 
intellectual OM that is reasonable and well-informed helps people “come into mutual 
agreement(s) through serious engagement in dialogue” (Hare, 2006) because in such 
dialogue self-interest and concern for others in terms of peoples‟ different criteria 
and opinions are equally important and also this kind of dialogue involves the notion 
of “success” beyond individual desire satisfaction (White, 2011, p. 49) both for the 
individual‟s and for others‟ intellectual WB. On the other hand, a lack of OM as a 
facilitating virtue to the creation of such opportunities (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 
84) hinders dialogue, therefore, there is a “lack of genuine opportunities” for 
“secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for WB both individually and 
collectively (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 74) (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 
215).   
Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is necessary for “secure functionings” 
both in terms of sustaining the level of functionings over time (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007) and concerning the freedom or choice to sustain functionings in respect of 
their powers of self-definition (Nussbaum, 2011) (Baehr, 2011). As Hare (2006) 
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observes, OM is closely related to self-knowledge and self-monitoring, it cultivates 
one‟s critical qualities and helps one be ready for change. Therefore, genuine 
intellectual OM helps individuals to distinguish when to do what in order to sustain 
“intellectual functionings” for WB as well as whether and/or how to achieve 
functionings over time, depending on the context. It is also helpful in relation to the 
problem of the multidimensional nature of functionings and thus of the difficulties in 
evaluating opportunities that Arneson (2010) points at, since genuine intellectual OM 
is central to inquiry and devotes time and effort to evaluating challenges (Hare, 
2006).  
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that “generally, very little is known about 
fertile functionings and it is difficult to verify them beyond doubt” (ibid, 2007, pp. 
147, 154). Accordingly, would it not be problematic to claim that genuine intellectual 
OM is necessary to fertile functionings as a facilitating virtue, since so little is known 
about fertile functionings themselves and on top of that, it is difficult to verify them 
beyond doubt? On the contrary, given the reasonable, well-informed and context-
dependent account of genuine intellectual OM, I argue that its contribution is 
necessary if we want to further unpack the concept of teachers‟ “fertile” “intellectual 
functionings” for intellectual WB in teacher education. Also, if genuine intellectual 
OM is considered a virtue that is closely related to meson
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 as discussed above and 
meson is what “produces, increases and preserves health (or WB)” (Aristotle, NE 
1104a16), then that which is intertwined with “what produces, increases and 
preserves” WB, i.e. OM, can be regarded as something that contributes to fertile and 
secure functionings for WB. 
Last but not least, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that in terms of WB and 
“improving people‟s lives… understanding fertile functionings is vital... and a fertile 
functioning is a golden lever for social policy”, so to discover more about it becomes 
a crucial task (ibid, 2007, pp. 122, 136). In terms of educational policy and 
implementing policy, I argue that genuine intellectual OM is crucial as something 
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that contributes to the concept of teachers‟ fertile intellectual functionings for their 
own WB and then pupils‟ intellectual WB. In the following section, I look at the 
concept of standardized-mindedness, which entails risk and therefore, hinders 
intellectual WB. In this regard, it is on the opposite side to genuine intellectual OM. 
6.3.2 The Case of Standardized-mindedness  
Earlier in the chapter it was noted that closed-mindedness, i.e. “the result of 
taking one‟s own ideas to be obvious and universal, therefore unquestionable” 
(Riggs, 2010, p. 184), appears to be the opposite of OM. In this context, it was also 
stressed how fundamental it is not to confuse firm beliefs with dogmatism (Adler, 
2004) and in this regard, I argued that strongly-held beliefs based on the criteria of 
epistemic goods seeking both for individual and for collective intellectual WB 
constitute a good basis for intellectual achievement. Also, the notion of standardized-
mindedness was discussed where one does not differentiate from negative prevailing 
norms in relation to epistemic goods-seeking for WB. In this sense, the concept of 
standardized-mindedness was briefly discussed in the context of particular kinds of 
political correctness in education as well as in dealing with a mainly subject-
knowledge/skills oriented teacher education. 
Thus, in this section, the concept of standardized-mindedness that is partially 
reasonable and partially informed is regarded as a kind of anti-genuine intellectual 
OM that hinders secure and fertile intellectual functionings for intellectual WB. For 
example, in this sense, one is partially reasonable when one does not think it 
reasonable to accept any costs for aiming at intellectual goods and WB regardless of 
the context. One is also partially informed when, for instance, is not able or willing 
to confront the risk(s) of misleading or insufficient understanding for intellectual 
WB, both one‟s own and others‟. In addition, a standardized-minded person may 
engage seriously in dialogue with others in terms of devoting time and effort (Hare, 
2006), however, they do not show the “willingness and within limits ability to 
transcend a default cognitive view in order to take up or take seriously the merits of 
distinct  alternative cognitive points” (Baehr, 2011).  
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Also, as we saw in the previous chapter, a corrosive disadvantage is a kind of 
disadvantage that affects other functionings in a negative way (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007). In this context, standardized-mindedness appears to be corrosive and involves 
risk(s) for intellectual functionings for WB. Thus, if genuine intellectual OM 
facilitates teachers‟ secure and fertile intellectual functionings, then it may well be 
the case that the absence or insecure presence of genuine intellectual OM, as it 
occurs in standardized-mindedness, hinders teachers‟ epistemic WB and then pupils‟ 
WB. From this perspective, if teacher education should limit, minimize or diminish 
teachers‟ exposure to risk(s) that constitutes disadvantages for accomplishing 
epistemic goods towards intellectual WB, then teacher education should maximize 
teachers‟ opportunities to secure and fertile intellectual functionings that constitute 
























Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis I argued that teachers‟ WB is crucial, because it is inextricably 
connected with pupils‟ WB. However, I stressed that there is a gap in teacher 
education concerning an explicit concern about teachers‟ WB overall, because, on 
the one hand, it seems to overlook teachers‟ WB, and on the other hand it shows a 
one-sided interest in teachers as professional agents only. I also looked at two factors 
that threaten teachers‟ WB, namely, profit-seeking and political power, and argued 
that they constitute a part of a corrosive disadvantage to teachers‟ and in turn on 
pupils‟ WB, because over time they actually increasingly hinder teachers‟ ability to 
be good teachers as they negatively affect their WB.   
In this context, I looked at an account of WB that relies on an account of 
virtue(s) and argued that OM is a necessary concept if we want to know about what 
WB means. To this end, first, in Chapter 2, I drew on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean 
Ethics, because that connection itself is related to Aristotle as he connects the 
concepts of WB and virtue. Second, in Chapter 3, I also looked at contemporary 
virtue epistemology which focuses more on intellectual WB and connects that to 
epistemic virtue(s). In this way, I brought Aristotle and virtue epistemology together 
as a background to what I believe an account of WB that requires an account of 
virtue(s) means.   
In Chapters 4 and 5, I looked at something different, that is, WB discourse in 
education. To this end, first, I explored White‟s subjective-collective account of WB, 
however, I argued that his account is insufficient, because White places too much 
emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB, whereas this thesis regards 
them equally important in the educational context. Therefore, I also examined 
Nussbaum‟s objective-individual account of WB. However, I argued that we also 
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need to go beyond Nussbaum‟s CA and look at Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s concept of 
WB, which, although it is considered to be a development of the CA, is different 
because it focuses on functionings rather than on capabilities and stresses the 
importance of securing the level of functionings that people enjoy over time. In this 
context, Wolff and De-Shalit argue that instead of capabilities we should focus on 
genuine opportunities for secure and fertile functionings for WB. In Chapter 6, I 
honed in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the link between those 
different discourses that use different terminology examined so far. In particular, I 
argued that the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-
informed is necessary for teachers‟ secure and fertile intellectual functionings or 
epistemic WB, both for themselves and for pupils‟ intellectual WB. 
All in all, WB is what we all want and as we move forward, policies at a 
national and a global level increasingly focus on WB. For example, the UK 
Government directly relates WB and health policy and has also launched the 
National Wellbeing Programme to “start measuring our progress as a country, not 
just by how our economy is growing, but by how our lives are improving; not just by 
our standard of living, but by our quality of life” (UK Government, 2010). Also, 
from a global perspective, in 2015 the United Nations
66
 (UN) agreed on an ambitious 
global agenda that outlines seventeen goals for sustainable development, and Goal 3 
in particular talks about “well-being for all at every stage of life” by 2030. However, 
as Dag Hammarskjold (1964) once said, “In our era, the road to holiness necessarily 
passes through the world of action” (ibid, 1964, p. 240). In a similar way, I think that 
the road to teachers‟ WB, which is inextricably connected to pupils‟ WB, should 
necessarily pass through the world of teacher education policy. Thus, I look next at 
initial teacher education programmes in Scotland and discuss some ideas about how 
the concepts of this thesis can be applied in a real policy context. 
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7.2 Directions for Future Research  
Since I am interested in teachers, teaching, WB and OM, the natural 
conclusion should be how we are going to get there, and one way is to teach teachers 
to be open-minded before they become teachers. Therefore, I look at Scottish initial 
teacher education programmes and briefly discuss ways towards future improvement. 
I particularly focus on initial teacher education (thereafter ITE) and student teachers, 
i.e. prospective teachers who are not yet qualified but are learning to be teachers, 
because as stated in the Guidelines for Initial Teacher Education (GTCS, 2013), it is 
the “first stage in the process of professional education and the foundation upon 
which all further professional development is built” (ibid, 2013, p. 2). Additionally, a 
large number of teachers come from ITE programmes where they shape their initial 
educational identity as future teachers. In this sense, “ITE provides the foundation 
for the quality of future teaching workforce and this should be a priority for all” 
(Donaldson, 2011, p. 46). Thus, I now turn to discuss some key topics of Scottish 
ITE and, although I do not go through each of the topics systematically, I look at 
how the main ideas and argument(s) of this thesis might inform it. To this end, I 
mainly draw on Donaldson‟s report Teaching Scotland‟s Future (2011), on the 
Standards for Registration (GTCS, 2012) and on the Guidelines for ITE Programmes 
in Scotland (GTCS, 2013). 
7.2.1 Aim(s) of Scottish Initial Teacher Education Programmes 
Let us begin with the overall aim of Scottish ITE as stated in the Guidelines 
for ITE Programmes (2013) and in Donaldson‟s report Teaching Scotland‟s Future 
(2011): 
“The overall aim of programmes of ITE is to prepare student teachers to become 
competent, thoughtful, reflective and innovative practitioners, who are committed to 
providing high quality teaching and learning for all pupils...” (GTCS, 2013, p. 1) 
(Donaldson, 2011, p. 30) 
Generally, an aim is a desired outcome (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and a 
result that one‟s plans or actions are intended to achieve (Cambridge Dictionary, 
2014). Thus, an overall aim is the general and ultimate desired outcome and result of 
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the plans or actions that are intended to be accomplished. What is this ultimate aim? 
It is “high quality teaching and learning for pupils”. How is this overall aim 
achieved? It is accomplished by “preparing student teachers to become practitioners 
(competent, thoughtful etc.)”. In the light of the ideas of this thesis, I think there are 
several problems with this.  
In Chapter 1 I argue that high – quality teaching is greatly and positively 
associated with pupils‟ overall achievement and WB. However, it is also stressed that 
high – quality teaching does not consist only in teachers‟ quality as professional 
agents, because teachers‟ personal and professional life is equally important as far as 
high – quality teaching is concerned. In other words, who teachers are as persons 
cannot and should not be separated from who and what they do as professionals 
(Carr, 1993) (Higgins, 2011). The same applies to student teachers who constitute the 
future teaching workforce. In this regard, I argue that an explicit concern about 
student teachers as individuals and not just as future practitioners should be clearly 
stated and both their personal and their pre-professional WB should be regarded as of 
equal value, otherwise, from the point of view of this thesis, the overall aim will be 
insufficient and it will not be possible to accomplish the desired outcome fully or 
even partially. 
Furthermore, although there is concern about the negative impacts that 
pupils‟ social disadvantage has on their education for WB, as Donaldson (2014) 
observes, there is no similar concern about student teachers. For instance, Donaldson 
notes that “social disadvantage remains a very important factor in pupils‟ educational 
failure” (2014, p. 188). For this reason, the Standard talks about “teachers‟ 
responsibility to address pupils‟ underachievement arising from social disadvantage” 
(Hulme and Menter, 2011, p. 87). However, if we care about teachers‟ and student 
teachers‟ WB, as this thesis argues, we should also look at teachers‟ and student 
teachers‟ “underachievement arising from social disadvantage”. In Chapter V, it was 
discussed how disadvantage is eliminated, that is, when there are genuine 
opportunities to secure functionings for all (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007).  
Thus, a factor of successful reform in ITE, from the perspective of this thesis, 
would be the extent to which ITE provides such genuine opportunities and whether it 
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promotes student teachers‟ secure and fertile intellectual functioning(s) for epistemic 
WB by teaching student teachers to be open-minded, as well as the extent to which it 
deals with risks and corrosive disadvantage(s) that hinder student teachers‟ WB, such 
as profit-seeking and political power. Also, the method of dynamic public reflective 
equilibrium, where philosophers, non-academics, student teachers etc. engage in 
dialogue could be used as a way to work them out.  
Moreover, in Chapter 3 it is underlined that teaching and learning in 
education are strongly and necessarily related to knowledge and understanding, 
which constitute epistemic goods. Epistemic goods are good ends of intellectual 
activity which contribute to student teachers‟ intellectual WB, which in turn is part of 
their whole good life, both personally and professionally (Roberts and Wood, 2007). 
From this perspective, if student teachers‟ intellectual WB is closely related to the 
achievement of particular epistemic goods/educational aims such as knowledge and 
understanding, and if intellectual virtues are the means to achieve epistemic goods, 
then ITE should focus in particular on the cultivation of student teachers‟ intellectual 
virtues so as to become good informants. In this regard, ITE should also place an 
emphasis on virtue epistemology and particularly on an alternative regulative 
educative virtue epistemology, and thus go beyond abstract definitions of knowledge 
and subject-knowledge excellence.  
7.2.2 Standards and Capabilities  
Here, I do not suggest discarding the idea of standards in ITE overall, but 
rather enriching and expanding its perspective. In particular       
“The Standard for Provisional Registration specifies what is expected of a student 
teacher who is seeking provisional registration with GTC Scotland. It must therefore 
constitute standards of capability in relation to teaching… The scope of this 
document is limited to defining the SPR and does not address in detail how 
judgements will or should be made. It is not intended to be used as a checklist. In 
broad terms, the person reviewing the work of the teacher needs to be reassured that 
the capabilities described by the professional standard are achieved…” (GTCS, 
2012, p. 2) 
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The basic ideas that the above statement implies are close to some of the 
ideas of this thesis as presented in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of WB discourse in 
education. First, it is clarified that particular “standards of capability” are expected 
from student teachers as future teachers which, obviously, are objective and 
constitute a minimum threshold
67
. Likewise, as explained in Chapter 5, according to 
Nussbaum (2011) human WB demands a minimum threshold of ten central 
capabilities which should be protected and promoted by policy so that everyone is 
able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life. In the light of this, more can be 
said about ITE‟s obligation not only to protect and promote “standards of capability 
in relation to teaching”, but also to protect and promote student teachers‟ “secure” 
and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 
2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007) through teaching them to be open-minded. Second, 
it is specified that the standards of capability should not be used as a “checklist”, 
which means that the concept of the standards entails a kind of subjective factor. This 
thesis is sympathetic to that view, since it argues that objective and subjective factors 
of WB in the educational environment are equally important.  
Moreover, “the person reviewing the work of the teacher” appears to be a 
kind of expert. Similarly, Donaldson (2011) also talks about “mentors that should be 
carefully selected and undertake training based on a recognition of the skills and 
capacities required for this role” (ibid, 2011, pp. 53, 94). However, this 
person/expert/mentor is called to assess student teachers “in broad terms” having as a 
guide the Standard for provisional registration which “does not address in detail how 
judgements will or should be made and it is not intended to be used as a checklist”. 
This sounds rather odd and the ideas discussed in the thesis can perhaps shed some 
light. Specifically, let us recall that from an Aristotelian viewpoint, an expert is a 
person with phronesis, which is a key intellectual virtue for WB and the practical 
approach to knowledge. In this regard, “the person reviewing the work of the 
teacher” should be phronimos and intellectually virtuous.  
From another point of view, we saw that according to White (2011), an expert 
in WB, in terms of a more “authoritative insider”, belongs to a body of people with 
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accumulated wisdom and experience of all kinds of goods. In this sense, the person 
who reviews the work of teachers should be such “an authoritative insider”.  This 
also implies that there should not be only “one person reviewing the work”, but a 
body of people with accumulated wisdom or a kind of phronesis, and from the 
viewpoint of this thesis, virtue epistemologists, educators, philosophers of education 
and others like them should participate.  
However, as Donaldson (2011) observes, “teaching has never been a 
straightforward task… it is both complex and challenging” (2011, p. 84) and, along 
the same lines, Ortwein (2011) suggests that such teaching should take place in “an 
educational environment that takes a holistic view of the educated person” (2011, p. 
147). Additionally, Donaldson (2011) notes that ITE cannot provide student teachers 
with the knowledge and skills necessary for a lifetime of teaching. In this sense, the 
education and professional development of every student teacher needs to be seen as 
a lifelong task. From this perspective, as Roberts and Wood (2007) emphasize, “the 
education in question is not only technical, i.e. a training in specialized skills, but is 
also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such an 
education for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64). In such a context, this thesis 
argues that OM is a virtue necessary for WB because it facilitates student teachers‟ 
secure and fertile intellectual functionings for epistemic WB.   
7.3.3 Extended Professionals and Partnerships 
Furthermore, Donaldson (2011) highlights and promotes the idea of the 
teacher as an extended professional, namely one who  
“is highly proficient in the classroom and who is also reflective and enquiring not 
only about teaching and learning, but also about those wider issues which set the 
context for what should be taught and why… Extended professionals are agents of 
change, not passive or reluctant receivers of externally-imposed prescription” 
(Donaldson, 2011, pp. 15, 18).  
This thesis is sympathetic to Donaldson‟s (2011) view of a teacher as 
extended professional, and would argue that a necessary virtue that this kind of 
teacher or student teacher has to have is OM and in particular, genuine intellectual 
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OM that is both reasonable and well-informed, as described in Chapter 6. Also, the 
idea of “partnerships” in education in order to “promote learning and well-being”, is 
highly valued and pervasive in all ITE policy documents (GTCS, p. 15) (GTCS, 
2013, p. 1) (Donaldson, 2011). Working in partnerships, or in other words working 
collaboratively, is another way of highlighting the importance of collective WB 
perspective in education.  In the context of this thesis, which equally values the 
individual and collective WB, any model of partnership can be strengthened and 
further developed if the individuals, who work collaboratively towards “learning and 






















Ackrill, J. L. (1973) Aristotle‟s Ethics, London: Faber and Faber 
Ackrill, J. L. (1978) Aristotle on Action, Mind 87 (348), pp. 595-601 
Ackrill, J. L. (1980) Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Essays on Aristotle‟s Ethics (edited 
by Rorty, A. O.), Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 15-34 
Adkins, A. W. H. (1978) Theoria versus Praxis, Classical Philology 73 (4), pp. 297-
313 
Adler, J. (2004) Reconciling Open-mindedness and Belief, Theory and Research in 
Education 2 (2), pp. 127-142 
Alexander, L. (2012) Deontological Ethics. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ (Last accessed 
20/05/2016) 
Alston, W. (2005) Beyond „Justification‟: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Annas, J. (1993) The Morality of Happiness, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) Modern Moral Philosophy, Philosophy 33 (124), pp. 1-
19  
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1967) Thought and Action in Aristotle in Aristotle‟s Ethics: 
Issues and Interpretations (edited by Walsh, J. J. & Shapiro, H. L.), Belmont 
CA: Wadsworth, pp. 56-69 
Aristotle (1925) The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Ross, D., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Aristotle (350 B. C. E.) Topics, translated by Pickard, W. A. Available from: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/topics.html (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Arneson, R. J. (2010) Disadvantage, Capability, Commensurability and Policy, 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 9 (3), pp 339-357 
180 
 
Arpaly, N. (2011) Open-mindedness as a Moral Virtue, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 48 (1), pp. 75-85 
Athanassoulis, N. (2016) Virtue Ethics. Available from: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Axtell, G. (1997) Knowledge, Belief, and Character, Readings in Virtue 
Epistemology, New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Baehr, J. (2006) Character in Epistemology, Philosophical Studies 128, pp. 479-514 
Baehr, J. (2008) Four Varieties of Character-based Virtue Epistemology, The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, pp. 469-502 
Baehr, J. (2011) The Inquiring Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Baehr, J. (2013) Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice, Journal 
of Philosophy of Education 47, pp. 248-262 
Baehr, J. S. (2004) Virtue Epistemology. Available from: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtueep/ (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
Bailey, O. (2010) What Knowledge is Necessary for Virtue? Journal of Ethics and 
Social Philosophy 4 (2), pp. 1–17 
Barnes, J. (1995) Aristotle‟s Life and Work in The Cambridge Companion to 
Aristotle (edited by Barnes, J.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
1-26 
Barnes, J. (2000) Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Bartlett, R. C. (2008) Aristotle‟s Introduction to the Problem of Happiness, American 
Journal of Political Science 52 (3), pp 677-687 
Battaly, H. (2008) Virtue Epistemology, Philosophy Compass 3 (4), pp. 639-663 





Biesta, G. (2012) The Future of Teacher Education: Evidence, Competence or 
Wisdom?, Research on Steiner Education 3 (1), 8-21 
Bigger, S. (2012) John White‟s Exploring Well-being in Schools, Journal of Beliefs 
and Values 33 (1), pp 133-134 
Biondi Khan, C. (2005) Aristotle‟s Moral Expert: The Phronimos in Ethics 
Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives and Applications (edited by 
Rasmussen, L.), The Netherlands: Springer, pp. 39-55 
Blaauw, M. & Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemology A-Z, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 
Blackburn, S. (2001) Reason, Virtue and Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology, Essays 
on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (edited by Fairweather, A. and 
Zagzebski, L.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-30 
Bostock, D. (2000) Aristotle‟s Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Bradley, B. (2014) Objective Theories of Well-being in The Cambridge Companion 
to Utilitarianism (edited by Eggleston, B. & Miller, D. E.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 220-238 
Broadie, S. (1991) Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Burnyeat, M. F. (2012) Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge in Explorations in 
Ancient and Modern Philosophy Volume 2 (edited by Burnyeat, M. F.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 115-144  
Cambridge Dictionary (2014) Corruption. Available at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/corruption 
Carr, D. (1993) Moral Values and the Teacher: Beyond the Paternal and the 
Permissive, Journal of Philosophy of education 27 (2), pp. 193-207 
Carr, W. & Kemmis, S. (1986) Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and 
Action Research, London: Falmer 
182 
 
Chatzopoulos, J. N. Aristotle‟s Mid-Space. Available from: 
http://www.env.aegean.gr/labs/Remote_sensing/publications/Hatzopoulos_Vi
rtueGr.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Christie, D. (2008) Benchmarks and Standards in Teaching in Scottish Education 
(edited by Bryce, T. & Humes, W.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
pp. 845-854 
Claasen, R. & Duwell, M. (2013) The Foundations of Capability Theory: Comparing 
Nussbaum and Gewirth, Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, pp 
493-510 
Clayton, M. (1993) White on Autonomy, Neutrality and Well-being, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 27 (1), pp 101-112 
Code, L. (1987) Epistemic Responsibility, Hanover: University Press of New 
England 
Cohen, S. M. (2012) Aristotle‟s Metaphysics. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ (Last accessed 
20/05/2016) 
Coleman, J. (2009) Well-being in Schools: Empirical Measure or Politician‟s 
Dream?, Oxford Review of Education 35 (3) , pp 281-292 
Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Crisp, R. (2000) Nicomachean Ethics, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Crisp, R. (2013) Well-being. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-
being/ (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
Day, C. & Gu, Q. (2010) The New Lives of Teachers, New York: Routledge 




De Ruyter, D. (2015) Well-being and Education in Education, Philosophy and Well-
being: New Perspectives on the Work of John White (edited by Suissa, J., 
Winstanley, C. & Marples, R.), Oxon: Routledge, pp.84-98 
Democritus (1948) On Learning in Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 
translated by 
Freeman, K., Oxford: Basil-Blackwell. Available at: 
http://www.humanistictexts.org/democritus.htm (Last accessed 07/07/2016)  
Deneulin, S. (2013) Recovering Nussbaum‟s Aristotelian Roots, International 
Journal of Social Economics 40 (7), pp 624-632 
DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L. (2003) Introduction in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives 
from Ethics and Epistemology (edited by DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L.), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-12 
Diener, E., Oishi, S., Lucas, R. (2009) Subjective Well-Being: The Science of 
Happiness and Life Satisfaction in The Oxford Handbook of Positive 
Psychology (edited by Lopez, S. J. & Snyder, C. R.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 63-73  
Diogenes Laertius (1925) Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Book V, 24 (edited by 
Hicks, R. D.), London: Heinemann. Available at: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.
0258%3Abook%3D5%3Achapter%3D1 (Last accessed 01/08/ 2017) 
Donaldson, G. (2011) Teaching Scotland‟s Future, Edinburgh: The Scottish 
Government 
Donaldson, G. (2014) Teacher Education and Curriculum Change in Scotland, 
European Journal of Education 49 (2), pp. 178-191 
During, I (1991) O Aristoteles, translated by Kotzia-Panteli, P., Athens: Morphotiko 
Idryma Ehtnikes Trapezes 
184 
 
Easterlin, R. A. (2003) Building a Better Theory of Well-being, Paper presented at 
the conference Paradoxes of Happiness in Economics, University of Milano, 
21-23 March 
Education Scotland (2004) Curriculum for Excellence: Health and Well-being. 
Available at: 
http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/Images/health_wellbeing_principles_pr
actice_tcm4-540107.pdf (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
Evrigenis, I. D. (1999) History of Political Thought 20 (3), pp 393-416 
Fallon, D. (2006) The Buffalo upon the Chimneypiece: The Value of Evidence, 
Journal of Teacher Education 57 (2), pp. 139-54 
Frede, D. (2013) Plato‟s Ethics: An Overview. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Furlong, J. & Lawn, M. (2010) Discipines of Education, London: Routledge 
Garver, E. (2006) Confronting Aristotle‟s Ethics, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press 
Garvin, D. A. (1998) The Processes of Organization and Management, MIT Sloan 
Management Review 39 (4), 33-50 
General Teaching Council Scotland (2012) Standards for Full Registration (SFR). 
Available from: http://www.gtcs.org.uk/web/FILES/the-standards/standards-
for-registration-1212.pdf (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
Gettier, E.L. (1963) Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6), pp. 121-
123 
Gheaus, A. (2010) Review of Jonathan Wolff‟s and Avner De-Shalit‟s Disadvantage, 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, pp 145-153 
Girling, J. (1997) Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy, London: Routledge 
Goldman, A. (1999) Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
185 
 
Goldman, A.I. (2006) Social Epistemology. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/ (Last accessed 
06/06/2016) 
Goldman, A.I. (2010) Why Social Epistemology Is Real Epistemology in Social 
Epistemology (edited by Haddock, A., Millar, A. & Pritchard, D.), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 1-28 
Goodlad, J. I. (1992) The Moral Dimensions of Schooling and Teacher Education, 
Journal of Moral Education 21 (2), pp. 87-97 
Grant, C. (2008) Disadvantage by Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Ethics 118 
(2), pp 371-375 
Grant, C. A. & Zeichner, K. M. (1984) On Becoming a Reflective Teacher in 
Preparing for Reflective Teaching (edited by Grant, C. A. & Zeichner, K. 
M.), Boston: Allyn and Bacon, pp. 103-114 
Gray, D. S. (2010) International Perspectives on Research in Initial Teacher 
Education and Some Emerging Issues, Journal of Education for Teaching 36 
(4), pp. 345-351 
Greco, J. & Turri, J. (2011) Virtue Epistemology. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ (Last accessed 
06/06/2016) 
Greco, J. (2002) Virtues in Epistemology in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology 
(edited by Moser, P.K.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 287-315 
Griffiths, M. & Tann, S. (1992) Using Reflective Practice to Link Personal and 
Public Theories, Journal of Education for Teaching 18 (1), pp. 69-84 
Griffiths, M. (1993) Educational Change and the Self, British Journal of Educational 
Studies 41 (2), pp. 150-163 
GTCS (2012) The Standards for Registration. Available at: 
http://www.gtcs.org.uk/web/FILES/about-gtcs/standards-for-registration-
draft-august-2012.pdf (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
186 
 
GTCS (2013) Guidelines for Initial Teacher Education Programmes in Scotland. 
Available at: http://www.gtcs.org.uk/web/FILES/about-gtcs/guidelines-for-
ite-programmes-in-scotland-0413.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2015) 
Hamilton, T. (2014) Teachers‟ Professional Knowledge: A View from Scotland. 
Available at: http://www.teachingscotland.org.uk/education-in-scotland/the-
standards/48-resetting-the-standards.aspx (Last accessed 20/05/2015) 
Hammarskjold, D. (1964) Markings (translated by Auden, W. H. and Sjoberg, L.), 
New York: Ballantine Books 
Hansen, F. T. (2007) Phronesis and Authenticity as Keywords for Philosophical 
Praxis in Teacher Training, Paideusis 16 (3), pp. 15-32 
Hardie, W. F. R. (1968) Aristotle‟s Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hare, W. (2006) Why Open-mindedness Matters, Think 13, pp. 7-15 
Heathwood, C. (2014) Subjective Theories of Well-being in The Cambridge 
Companion to Utilitarianism (edited by Eggleston, B. & Miller, D. E.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 199-219 
Hetherington, S. (2014) Gettier Problems. Available from: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/ (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
Higgins, C. (2011) The Good Life of Teaching, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
Hoffmann, T. (2016) Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics: The Intellectual Virtues. 
Available from: 
http://faculty.cua.edu/hoffmann/courses/769_1081/769_EN6_Intellectual_Vir
tues.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Hookway, C. (2003) How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist in Intellectual Virtue (edited 
by DePaul, M. and Zagzebski, L.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183-
202 
Hughes, G. J. (2001) Aristotle on Ethics, London: Routledge 
Hulme, M. & Menter, I. (2011) South and North - Teacher Education Policy in 
England and Scotland, Scottish Educational Review 43 (2), pp. 70-90 
187 
 
Humes, W. (2001) Conditions for Professional Development, Scottish Educational 
Review 33 (1), pp. 6-17 
Hursthouse, R. (1980), A False Doctrine of the Mean, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 81 (1980-1), pp. 57-72 
Hursthouse, R. (2006) The Central Doctrine of the Mean in The Blackwell Guide to 
Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics (edited by Kraut, R.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 
96-115 
Hursthouse, R. (2012) Virtue Ethics. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Ichikawa, J.J & Steup, M. (2012) The Analysis of Knowledge. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#KnoJusTruBel (Last 
accessed 06/06/2016) 
Irwin, T. (1988) Aristotle‟s First Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kawall, J. (2002) Other Regarding-Epistemic Virtues, Ratio 15 (3), pp. 257-275 
Kazepides, T. (1979) Human Nature in Its Educational Dimensions, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 13, pp 55-63 
Kenny, A. (1978) The Aristotelian Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kenny, A. (1992) Aristotle on the Perfect Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kjersti, W. & Haugalokken, O. K. (2013) Research-based and Hands-on Practical 
Teacher Education: An Attempt to Combine the Two, Journal of Education 
for Teaching: International Research and Pedagogy 39 (2), pp. 235-249 
Klein, S. (1992) The Value of Endoxa in Ethical Argument, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 9 (2), pp. 141-157 
Kleist, C. (2016) Global Ethics: Capabilities Approach. Available at: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ge-capab/ (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
Knight, K. (2007) Aristotelian Philosophy, Cambridge: Polity Press 
188 
 
Kosnik, C., Cleovoulou, Y., Fletcher, T., Harris, T., MacGlynn-Stewart & Beck, C. 
(2011) Becoming Teacher Educators: an Innovative Approach to Teacher 
Education Preparation, Journal of Education for Teachers 37 (3), pp. 351-363 
Kotzee, B. (2013) Introduction: Education, Social Epistemology and Virtue 
Epistemology, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, pp. 157-167 
Kraut, R. (1989) Aristotle on the Human Good, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 
Kraut, R. (2014) Aristotle‟s Ethics. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Kvanvig, J.L. (1992) The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Savage USA: 
Rowman & Littlefield 
Kvanvig, J.L. (2003) The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Kvanvig, J.L. (2010) Virtue Epistemology in The Routledge Companion to 
Epistemology (edited by Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D.), New York: 
Routledge, pp. 199-207 
Kwong, J. M. C. (2015) Open-mindedness as Engagement. Available at: 
http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Kwong_jack_2015_openminded.pdf (Last 
accessed 15/12/2016) 
Lacewing, M (2016) Aristotle on Virtue. Available from: http://documents.routledge-
interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A22014/ethical_theories/Aris
totle%20on%20virtue.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Leonhardt, D. (2014) The Pitfalls of Peace. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/upshot/the-lack-of-major-wars-may-be-
hurting-economic-growth.html?_r=1 (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R. (2011) Ethics. Available from: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.
0057%3Aalphabetic+letter%3D*h%3Aentry+group%3D5%3Aentry%3Dh%
29qiko%2Fs (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
189 
 
Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R. (2016) Epistamai. Available from: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=e%29pi%2Fstasai&la=greek&
prior=o%28mw=s (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R. (2016) Gignosko. Available from: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=gignw%2Fskei&la=greek&can
=gignw%2Fskei0&prior=ble/mma (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R. (2016) Oida. Available from: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=oi%29%3Ddas&la=greek&pri
or=ti (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Losin, P. (1987) Aristotle‟s Doctrine of the Mean, History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 
(3), pp 329-341 
MacAllister, J. (2012) Virtue epistemology and the Philosophy of Education, Journal 
of the Philosophy of Education 46 (2), pp. 251-270   
Macfarlane. B. (2012) I Am an Academic and I Want to Be Proud of It. Times 
Higher Education. Available at: 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/421337.article (Last accessed 
20/05/2016) 
Malm, B. (2009) Towards a New Professionalism: Enhancing Personal and 
Professional Development in Teacher Education, Journal of Education for 
Teaching 35 (1), pp. 77-91 
Menter, I. & Hulme, M. (2011) Teacher Education Reform in Scotland: National and 
Global Influences, Journal of Education for Teaching: International Research 
and Pedagogy 37 (4), pp. 387-397 
Menter, I. (2011) Four „Academic Sub-tribes‟, but One Territory? Teacher Educators 
and Teacher Education in Scotland, Journal of Education for Teaching: 
International Research and Pedagogy 37 (3), pp. 293-308 
Menter, I., Brisard, E. & Smith, I. (2006) Convergence or Divergence? Initial 
Teacher Education in Scotland and England, Edinburgh: Dunedin Press 
190 
 
Merriam Webster (2014) Corruption. Available at: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/corrupt (Last accessed 16/01/2017) 
Monan, J. D. (1968) Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
Montmarquet, J. (1993) Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham, MD, 
Rowman and Littlefield 
Morris, I. (2013) A Place for Well-being in the Classroom? in Research, 
Applications and Interventions for Children and Adolescents (edited by 
Proctor, C., & Linley, A. P.), London: Springer, pp.185-198 
Moser, P.K. (2002) Introduction in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (edited by 
Moser, P. K.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-24 
Moss, J. (2011) Virtue Makes the Goal Right: Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotle‟s 
Ethics, Phronesis 56 (3), pp. 204-261 
Nagel, T. (1972) Aristotle on Eudaimonia, Phronesis 17 (3), pp 252-259 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2008) Promoting 
young people‟s social and emotional well-being in secondary education: 
Available at: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph20/documents/promoting-
young-peoples-social-and-emotional-wellbeing-in-secondary-education-
synopsis-of-the-evidence-and-economic-modelling2 (Last accessed 
07/07/2016) 
Nelkin, D. K. (2013) Moral Luck. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Neuer, H. (2015) The Appointment of Saudi Arabia as Chair of the UN Human 
Rights Council. Available at: http://www.unwatch.org/again-saudis-elected-
chair-of-un-human-rights-council-panel/ (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
Nicholson, D. W. (2016) Philosophy of Education in Action, Oxford: Routledge 
Noel, J. (1999) On the Varieties of Phronesis, Educational Philosophy and Theory 31 
(3), pp 273-289 
191 
 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1980) Shame, Separateness and Political Unity in Essays on 
Aristotle‟s Ethics (edited by Rorty, A. O.), London: University of California 
Press, pp. 395-435 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999) Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category? The Journal of 
Ethics 3 (3), pp 163-201 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000) Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011) Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, 
Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011b) What Makes Life Good? Available at: 
http://www.thenation.com/article/what-makes-life-good/ (Last accessed 
07/07/2016) 
Nyabul, P. O. & Situma, J. W. (2014) The Meaning of Eudaimonia in Aristotle‟s 
Ethics, International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 2 (3), pp 65-74 
Oancea, A. & Orchard, J. (2012) The Future of Teacher Education, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 46 (4), pp. 574-588 
Oancea, A. (2014) Teachers‟ Professional Knowledge and Publicly-Funded Teacher 
Education: a History of Critiques and Silences, Oxford Review of Education 
40 (4), pp. 497-519 
OECD (2005) Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective 
Teachers. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/education/school/attractingdevelopingandretainingeffect
iveteachers-homepage.htm (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 





Olsaretti, S. (2008) Left Behind, Review of Jonathan Wolff‟s and Avner De-Shalit‟s 
Disadvantage, Times Literary Supplement 2008 
Ortwein, M. (2012) Virtue Epistemology and Education. Available from: 
https://oatd.org/oatd/img_viewer?record=handle\%3A1969.1%2FETD-
TAMU-2011-08-10014&img=page-0.png (Last accessed 06/06/2016)  
Ortwein, M. J. (2011) Toward a Regulative Virtue Epistemology. Available at: 
http://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2011-08-
10014/ORTWEIN-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=2 (Last accessed 
20/05/2015) 
Oxford Dictionary (2014) Corruption. Available at: 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corruption (Last accessed 
16/01/2017) 
Pakaluk (2011) Aristotle‟s Doctrine of the Mean Reconsidered in Conference In the 
Footsteps of the Ancients, St. Andrews University, St. Andrews, Scotland, 
Nov. 5-6, 2011  
Pakaluk, M. (2005) Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Papastephanou, M. and Angeli, C. (2007) Critical Thinking Beyond Skill, 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (6), pp. 604-621 
Papastephanou, M. (2010) Aristotle, the Action Researcher, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 44 (4), pp. 589-597 
Papastephanou, M. and Roth, K. (2012) Introduction: the World and the Teacher – 
Prospects and Challenges for Teacher Education in the Age of Globalization 
from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, Ethics and Global Perspective 5 (4), pp. 
187-192 
Parry, R. (2014) Episteme and Techne. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/ (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
193 
 
Peters, R. S. (1977) Education and the Education of Teachers, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 
Peterson, S. (1992) Apparent Circularity in Aristotle‟s Account of Right Action in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, Apeiron 25 (2), pp 83-107 
Plato Theatetus, translated by Jowett, B. Available from: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
Priestley, M. and Humes, W. (2010) The Development of Scotland‟s Curriculum for 
Excellence: Amnesia and Déjà vu, Oxford Review of Education 36 (3), pp. 
345-361  
Pring, R. (2015) Liberal Education and Its Aims in Education, Philosophy and Well-
being: New Perspectives on the Work of John White (edited by Suissa, J., 
Winstanley, C. & Marples, R.), Oxon: Routledge, pp.1-13 
Pritchard, D. (2003) Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Metaphilosophy 34 
(1-2), pp. 106-130 
Pritchard, D. (2010) What Is That Thing Called Knowledge? New York: Routledge 
Resnick, D. (2006) What Could Be Better Than This? Conflicting Visions of the 
Good Life in Traditional Education, Journal of Philosophy of education 40 
(3), pp. 329-344 
Rice, C. M. (2013) Defending the Objective List Theory of Well-being, Ratio 26 (2), 
pp 196-211 
Riggs, W. (2010) Open-mindedness, Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2), pp. 172-188 
Roberts, R. and Wood, J. (2007) Intellectual Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Robinson, D. N. (1989) Aristotle‟s Psychology, Oxford: Columbia University Press 
Rorty, A. O. (1980) The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics 
in Essays on Aristotle‟s Ethics (edited by Rorty, A. O.), Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, pp. 337-394 
194 
 
Russell, D. C. (2009) Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Sachs, J. (2016) Aristotle: Ethics. Available from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-eth/ 
(Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Saylor Foundation (2013) The Good Life: Virtue and Well-being. Available from: 
http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/POLSC201-Subunit-
1.6-The-Good-Life-FINAL.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2016) 
Schmitt, F. (1999) Social Epistemology in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology 
edited by Greco, J. & Sosa, E., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 354-383 
Scottish Alliance for Children‟s Rights (2009) Improving the Lives of Children in 
Scotland - Are We There Yet? Available from: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/255311/0075694.pdf (Last 
accessed 06/06/2016) 
Scottish Executive (2004) Happy, Safe and Achieving their Potential - A Standard of 
Support for Children and Young People in Scottish Schools. Available from: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/36496/0023597.pdf (Last 
accessed 06/06/2016) 




Shope, R.K. (2002) Conditions and Analyses of Knowing in The Oxford Handbook 
of Epistemology edited by Moser, P.K., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
24-70 
Shrader-Frechette, K. (2008) Review of Jonathan Wolff‟s, Avner De-Shalit‟s, 
Disadvantage. Available from: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23341-disadvantage/ 
(Last accessed 03/11/2016) 
Siegel, H. (2008) Is Education a Thick Epistemic Concept? Philosophical Papers 37 
(3), pp. 455-469 
195 
 
Siegel, H. (2015) John White on The Aims of Education in Education, Philosophy 
and Well-being: New Perspectives on the Work of John White (edited by 
Suissa, J., Winstanley, C. & Marples, R.), Oxon: Routledge, pp.112-124 
Siegler, F. (1967) Reason, Happiness and Goodness in „Aristotle‟s Ethics: Issues and 
Interpretations‟ edited by Walsh, J. J. & Shapiro, H. L., Belmont CA: 
Wadsworth, pp. 30-46 
Solomon, D. (1988) Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 13, pp 428-441 
Sorabji, R. (1980) Aristotle on the Role of the Intellect in Virtue in Essays on 
Aristotle‟s Ethics (edited by Rorty, A. O.), London: University of California 
Press, pp. 201-220 
Sosa, E. (1991) Knowledge In Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Statman, D. (1991) Moral and Epistemic Luck, Ratio 4 (2), pp 146-156 
Steup, M. (2005) Epistemology. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
Studtmann, P. (2013) Aristotle‟s Categories. Available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/#Quality (Last accessed 
20/05/2015) 
Suissa, J. (2008) Lessons from a New Science? On Teaching Happiness in Schools, 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4), pp 575-590 
Taylor, C. C. W. (1990) Aristotle‟s Epistemology in Companions to Ancient Thought 
I: Epistemology (edited by Everson, S.), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 116-142 
Thorburn, M. (2014) Educating for Well-being in Scotland: Policy and Philosophy, 
Pitfalls and Possibilities, Oxford Review of Education 40 (2), pp 206-222 
Triantis, Y. (2010) Metaksote anthrope by Carouzos Nikolaos. Available from: 
http://www.epikaira.gr/category/epikaira-arthra (Last accessed 07/12/2012) 
196 
 
Truncellito, D.A. (2007) Epistemology. Available from: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ (Last accessed 06/06/2016) 
UK Government (2010) National Well-being Programme. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-wellbeing (Last 
accessed 27/02/2017) 
United Nations (2015) Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg3 (Last 
accessed 27/02/2017) 
Universities Scotland (2014) How Is Higher Education Funded? Available at: 
http://www.universities-
scotland.ac.uk/uploads/briefings/how%20is%20higher%20education%20fund
ed.pdf (Last accessed 20/05/2015) 
Unterhalter, E. (2007) The Capability Approach and Education, Prospero, November 
2007 
Unterhalter, E. (2013) Educating Capabilities, Journal of Human Development and 
Capabilities 14 (1), pp 185-188 
Urmson, J. O. (1980) Aristotle‟s Doctrine of the Mean in Essays on Aristotle‟s Ethics 
(edited by Rorty, A. O.), London: University of California Press, pp. 157-170 
Van Hoorn, A. (2007) A Short Introduction to Subjective Well-being: Its 
Measurement, Correlates and Policy Uses, Paper presented at the 
international conference Is Happiness Measurable and What Do Those 
Measures Mean for Policy? University of Rome, 2-3 April 
Walker, M. & Vaughan, R. P. (2012) Capabilities, Values and Education Policy, 
Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 13 (3), pp 495-512 
White, J. (1986) The Problem of Self-interest: The Educator‟s Perspective, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 20 (2), pp 163-175 
White, J. (1991) Education and the Good Life: Autonomy, Altruism and the National 
Curriculum, New York: Teachers College Press 
197 
 
White, J. (1997) Education, Work and Well-being, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 31 (2), pp 233-247 
White, J. (2002) Education, the Market and the Nature of Personal Well-being, 
British Journal of Educational Studies 50 (4), pp 442-456 
White, J. (2006) Autonomy, Human Flourishing and the Curriculum, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 40 (3), pp 381-390 
White, J. (2007) Well-being and Education: Issues of Culture and Authority, Journal 
of Philosophy of Education 41 (1), pp 17-28 
White, J. (2007b) Education for Well-being, Education Review 19 (1), pp 28-33 
White, J. (2008) The Centrality of Well-being. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280840912_The_Centrality_of_We
ll-being (Last accessed 07/07/2016) 
White, J. (2009) Education and A Meaningful Life, Oxford Review of Education 35 
(4), pp 423-435 
White, J. (2011) Exploring Well-being in Schools: A Guide to Making Children‟s 
Lives More Fulfilling, Oxon: Routledge 
White, J. (2011b) What Does It Mean to Be Well-Educated? Think 10 (28), pp 9-16 
Williams, B. (1973) Egoism and Altruism in Problems of the Self (edited by 
Williams, B.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 250-265 
Williams, B. (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana Press 
Williams, B. (1985b) The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities in The 
Standard of Living (edited by Hawthorn, G.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 94-102 
Williams, M. (2001) Problems of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Wolff, J. & De-Shalit, A. (2007) Disadvantage, New York: Oxford University Press 
198 
 
Wolff, J. & De-Shalit, A. (2013) On Fertile Functionings: A Response to Martha 
Nussbaum, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 14 (1), pp 161-
165 
Wood, D. & Deprez, L. S. (2012) Teaching for Human Well-being: Curricular 
Implications for the Capability Approach, Journal of Human Development 
and Capabilities 13 (3), pp 471-493 
Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Zagzebski, L. (2004) What Is Knowledge? in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology 
(edited by Greco, J. & Sosa, E.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 92-117 
Zagzebski, L. (2008) The Inescapability of Gettier Problems in Epistemology: An 
Anthology (edited by Sosa, E.; Kim, J.; Fantl, J. & McGrath, M.), Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 207-213 
Zimmerman, M. J. (2104) Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Value. Available from: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/#WhaExtVal (Last 
accessed 03/12/2016) 
